Narrative:

We were being vectored and descended for approach and landing at ord. The WX was clear and the visibility was good. There was a great deal of visible traffic arriving and departing from ord, and it was layered above and below us. We were cleared out of 8000' to 7000'. As the F/east, it is a primary duty to maintain a traffic watch below 10000'. The first officer was flying the aircraft with use of the autoplt. There an audible click of a switch movement, followed by a red flashing light that drew my attention inside the cockpit. I heard approach control ask where we were going. I looked inside and observed the captain pulling back on the yoke while telling the first officer to stop the descent. The descent stopped at approximately 6740'. The first officer stabilized the aircraft at 7000'. The autoplt had dropped off and the flight director remained engaged. The excursion occurred due to over reliance by the first officer on the autoplt system. This is a product of current training doctrine, which is heavily weighted with emphasis on autoflt of the aircraft. More and more of the basic stick and rudder flying is being delegated to autoflt systems, which in turn is setting the stage for more of this type of incident. The workload could be somewhat eased by ATC through gentler descent and vector profiles. Reduce the rapid fire type clearance data and slam dunk descent profiles that are becoming the rule rather than the exception. Supplemental information from acn 136493: first officer was fairly new on equipment. He said nothing about being uncomfortable on the widebody transport. Discussed incident with cp at gate, and suggested he ask for help when overwhelmed (not apparent to me). First officer so stated perhaps he spent too much time outside the cockpit. He'd stated to me he'd flown one trip. I'd assumed 5 or 6 legs--my mistake.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR WDB ALT DEVIATION OVERSHOT DURING DESCENT.

Narrative: WE WERE BEING VECTORED AND DSNDED FOR APCH AND LNDG AT ORD. THE WX WAS CLR AND THE VISIBILITY WAS GOOD. THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL OF VISIBLE TFC ARRIVING AND DEPARTING FROM ORD, AND IT WAS LAYERED ABOVE AND BELOW US. WE WERE CLRED OUT OF 8000' TO 7000'. AS THE F/E, IT IS A PRIMARY DUTY TO MAINTAIN A TFC WATCH BELOW 10000'. THE F/O WAS FLYING THE ACFT WITH USE OF THE AUTOPLT. THERE AN AUDIBLE CLICK OF A SWITCH MOVEMENT, FOLLOWED BY A RED FLASHING LIGHT THAT DREW MY ATTN INSIDE THE COCKPIT. I HEARD APCH CTL ASK WHERE WE WERE GOING. I LOOKED INSIDE AND OBSERVED THE CAPT PULLING BACK ON THE YOKE WHILE TELLING THE F/O TO STOP THE DSCNT. THE DSCNT STOPPED AT APPROX 6740'. THE F/O STABILIZED THE ACFT AT 7000'. THE AUTOPLT HAD DROPPED OFF AND THE FLT DIRECTOR REMAINED ENGAGED. THE EXCURSION OCCURRED DUE TO OVER RELIANCE BY THE F/O ON THE AUTOPLT SYS. THIS IS A PRODUCT OF CURRENT TRNING DOCTRINE, WHICH IS HEAVILY WEIGHTED WITH EMPHASIS ON AUTOFLT OF THE ACFT. MORE AND MORE OF THE BASIC STICK AND RUDDER FLYING IS BEING DELEGATED TO AUTOFLT SYSTEMS, WHICH IN TURN IS SETTING THE STAGE FOR MORE OF THIS TYPE OF INCIDENT. THE WORKLOAD COULD BE SOMEWHAT EASED BY ATC THROUGH GENTLER DSCNT AND VECTOR PROFILES. REDUCE THE RAPID FIRE TYPE CLRNC DATA AND SLAM DUNK DSCNT PROFILES THAT ARE BECOMING THE RULE RATHER THAN THE EXCEPTION. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 136493: F/O WAS FAIRLY NEW ON EQUIP. HE SAID NOTHING ABOUT BEING UNCOMFORTABLE ON THE WDB. DISCUSSED INCIDENT WITH CP AT GATE, AND SUGGESTED HE ASK FOR HELP WHEN OVERWHELMED (NOT APPARENT TO ME). F/O SO STATED PERHAPS HE SPENT TOO MUCH TIME OUTSIDE THE COCKPIT. HE'D STATED TO ME HE'D FLOWN ONE TRIP. I'D ASSUMED 5 OR 6 LEGS--MY MISTAKE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.