Narrative:

Shortly after takeoff at 4000 feet the left engine had a compressor stall. I was the pm and the first officer was flying. I quickly saw the egt temp rising and pulled the left throttle back to idle and the egt went down and the engine did not compressor stall again. The egt went into the yellow; later maintenance told us the egt temp reached 609. I then turned off the left auto throttle arm switch to keep the left engine at idle. I called ATC and told them I had an engine problem and had to return to the airport. I did not declare an emergency; looking back I should [have]. I felt that we had very good control of the situation. I did have the crash trucks brought out. ATC gave us a turn to downwind. The first officer was a C5 galaxy driver and I asked him if he was comfortable doing this landing and he said yes so I let him continue flying and land. Next the purser called us and I told him what had just happened and asked him to make a PA and I would follow up later with a PA of my own. The first officer and I discussed keeping the engine at idle and doing a single engine approach and landing; flaps 20. I now went looking for the compressor stall check list; and did not find it while I was being distracted by ATC; setting up for the approach; running the normal checklists; and keeping an eye on the airplane; and airspeed. I felt rushed to get the plane on the ground because the airport was very close. I felt that everything was done so we could make a single engine; left one at idle; landing. We were 350;000 lbs under landing weight and the runway was 12;000 feet long. We landed normally and taxied to the gate. Once at the gate I said to the first officer let's look for the compressor stall check list. After several minutes it was found; we went through it and we had covered everything on it except the flap override switch which I did push on when it went off at 500 ft on final. Now that I have had time to think about how we handled the incident I should [have] taken a deep breath and slowed down; we weren't on fire. I knew there was a checklist for compressor stalls and I should [have] not stopped looking for it.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B777 flight crew reported returning to the departure airport after experiencing a left engine compressor stall climbing through 4000 feet.

Narrative: Shortly after takeoff at 4000 feet the left engine had a compressor stall. I was the PM and the FO was flying. I quickly saw the EGT temp rising and pulled the left throttle back to idle and the EGT went down and the engine did not compressor stall again. The EGT went into the yellow; later maintenance told us the EGT temp reached 609. I then turned off the left auto throttle arm switch to keep the left engine at idle. I called ATC and told them I had an engine problem and had to return to the airport. I did not declare an emergency; looking back I should [have]. I felt that we had very good control of the situation. I did have the crash trucks brought out. ATC gave us a turn to downwind. The FO was a C5 Galaxy driver and I asked him if he was comfortable doing this landing and he said yes so I let him continue flying and land. Next the purser called us and I told him what had just happened and asked him to make a PA and I would follow up later with a PA of my own. The FO and I discussed keeping the engine at idle and doing a single engine approach and landing; flaps 20. I now went looking for the compressor stall check list; and did not find it while I was being distracted by ATC; setting up for the approach; running the normal checklists; and keeping an eye on the airplane; and airspeed. I felt rushed to get the plane on the ground because the airport was very close. I felt that everything was done so we could make a single engine; left one at idle; landing. We were 350;000 lbs under landing weight and the runway was 12;000 feet long. We landed normally and taxied to the gate. Once at the gate I said to the FO let's look for the compressor stall check list. After several minutes it was found; we went through it and we had covered everything on it except the flap override switch which I did push on when it went off at 500 ft on final. Now that I have had time to think about how we handled the incident I should [have] taken a deep breath and slowed down; we weren't on fire. I knew there was a checklist for compressor stalls and I should [have] not stopped looking for it.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.