Narrative:

I was the captain of air carrier flight X returning to slc from mzt in jan, 1990. The flight allegedly crossed 16R after landing when cleared to 'cross 14 and hold short of 16R.' initial instructions from approach control were that we would be executing an ILS approach to 16R. This approach had already been reviewed and briefed. Upon turning final we were shifted to 16L. Since we were relatively close in and there was another aircraft about 2 mi ahead and to the right of us making an approach to 16R, I made sure VFR separation was maintained and had only time to determine the ILS frequency for 16L. Not having time to review the runway layout on the 10-9 page and not having landed on that runway previously, I asked the first officer about txwys to the terminal area and he said that if you did not make the midfield turnoff it would be necessary to go all the way to the end which would considerably increase taxi distance back to the terminal. A normal deceleration occurred and the midfield turnoff was made with minimum braking. I heard the tower clear us to cross 16R and heard a response from the first officer indicating cleared to cross and 16R. I thought the clearance to cross 16R was given rather early given the distance to that runway, but reassured myself that they knew what they were doing. Upon approaching 16R I looked down the runway and saw an aircraft which I took to have just taxied into position and so continued taxiing. At about that time my first officer asked if we had been cleared to cross as he had been off the frequency talking to company. Having no doubt that I had heard cleared to cross and 16R I replied in the affirmative. He made no further comment and we crossed runway 16R and taxied to the gate. As we taxied into the gate, the aircraft which I had thought was taxiing into position on 16R turned off the runway well before the runway crossing I had used. After reaching the gate, ground asked us to call the tower. Subsequently, my first officer said it was his understanding that we were 'cleared to cross 14 and hold short 16R' but since he was off the frequency he was not sure. I then had my first opportunity to review the 10-9 page and was surprised to find that a runway 14 existed. I called the tower and they asked me what I thought my clearance had been. I replied 'cleared to cross 16R.' the individual in the tower indicated that the controller thought it had been 'cleared to cross 14 and hold short 16R.' he further said they would pull the tapes and could they call me back? I replied with the phone number of operations and said I would be there for some time. I deadheaded back to denver over 3 hours later but did not receive a call back from the tower. At this point it appears that I did not hear that part of the clearance '14 and hold short', thus the clearance became 'cleared to cross 16R.' the first officer was an air force pilot. From my assessment he is not particularly happy with what has transpired and I can sympathize with that. On a more personal basis, some of his statements are very dogmatic and delivered in such a manner that there is no room for discussion. Thus, while I may feel that there could be a difference of opinion about something and prefer to discuss the subject so as to arrive at a mutually agreed upon position based upon a sharing of information, this is often closed out by a definitive statement of his position. Such an approach results in long periods of silence and a searching for noncontroversial topics for discussion. Such a situation results in a cockpit where a free flow of information may not always occur and where a personal bias against any statement may be questioned. Both crew members should remain on same frequency until all runways are crossed and arrival at gate is imminent. Supplemental information from acn 135503: we made an uneventful landing on runway 16L at slc. Were in a hurry to try to make connecting flight for our deadhead home, made turnoff short of midfield and taxied rapidly toward terminal. Tower gave clearance to 'cross runway 14 and hold short of 16R, remain this frequency.' I read it back verbatim, went off frequency for 10-20 seconds to advise co that we were on ground. Approaching 16R west/high taxi speed I realized the captain didn't plan on holding short. I challenged him if we had rcvd clearance to cross, he replied we were 'cleared to cross the right and contact ground.' this was different enough from our original clearance in content and sound that I accepted it as having been rcvd while I was off frequency. The sight of aircraft on runway having just landed but not yet turned off (thousands of ft away, no immediate threat to us) made me less sure, but by then we were on runway. It later became clear there had been no clearance rcvd while I was off frequency, tower controller rightfully took issue with captain's assertion that original clearance on landing had included clearance to cross 16R. No matter how much trainers we get on these matters, we sometimes still hear what we want to. However especially as a captain heavily involved in safety programs at our airline, he should have known that whenever a crew member questions or challenges clearance that it is always best to stop and resolve the uncertainty right away.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RWY TRANSGRESSION.

Narrative: I WAS THE CAPT OF ACR FLT X RETURNING TO SLC FROM MZT IN JAN, 1990. THE FLT ALLEGEDLY CROSSED 16R AFTER LNDG WHEN CLRED TO 'CROSS 14 AND HOLD SHORT OF 16R.' INITIAL INSTRUCTIONS FROM APCH CTL WERE THAT WE WOULD BE EXECUTING AN ILS APCH TO 16R. THIS APCH HAD ALREADY BEEN REVIEWED AND BRIEFED. UPON TURNING FINAL WE WERE SHIFTED TO 16L. SINCE WE WERE RELATIVELY CLOSE IN AND THERE WAS ANOTHER ACFT ABOUT 2 MI AHEAD AND TO THE RIGHT OF US MAKING AN APCH TO 16R, I MADE SURE VFR SEPARATION WAS MAINTAINED AND HAD ONLY TIME TO DETERMINE THE ILS FREQ FOR 16L. NOT HAVING TIME TO REVIEW THE RWY LAYOUT ON THE 10-9 PAGE AND NOT HAVING LANDED ON THAT RWY PREVIOUSLY, I ASKED THE F/O ABOUT TXWYS TO THE TERMINAL AREA AND HE SAID THAT IF YOU DID NOT MAKE THE MIDFIELD TURNOFF IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO GO ALL THE WAY TO THE END WHICH WOULD CONSIDERABLY INCREASE TAXI DISTANCE BACK TO THE TERMINAL. A NORMAL DECELERATION OCCURRED AND THE MIDFIELD TURNOFF WAS MADE WITH MINIMUM BRAKING. I HEARD THE TWR CLEAR US TO CROSS 16R AND HEARD A RESPONSE FROM THE F/O INDICATING CLRED TO CROSS AND 16R. I THOUGHT THE CLRNC TO CROSS 16R WAS GIVEN RATHER EARLY GIVEN THE DISTANCE TO THAT RWY, BUT REASSURED MYSELF THAT THEY KNEW WHAT THEY WERE DOING. UPON APCHING 16R I LOOKED DOWN THE RWY AND SAW AN ACFT WHICH I TOOK TO HAVE JUST TAXIED INTO POSITION AND SO CONTINUED TAXIING. AT ABOUT THAT TIME MY F/O ASKED IF WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO CROSS AS HE HAD BEEN OFF THE FREQ TALKING TO COMPANY. HAVING NO DOUBT THAT I HAD HEARD CLRED TO CROSS AND 16R I REPLIED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. HE MADE NO FURTHER COMMENT AND WE CROSSED RWY 16R AND TAXIED TO THE GATE. AS WE TAXIED INTO THE GATE, THE ACFT WHICH I HAD THOUGHT WAS TAXIING INTO POSITION ON 16R TURNED OFF THE RWY WELL BEFORE THE RWY XING I HAD USED. AFTER REACHING THE GATE, GND ASKED US TO CALL THE TWR. SUBSEQUENTLY, MY F/O SAID IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT WE WERE 'CLRED TO CROSS 14 AND HOLD SHORT 16R' BUT SINCE HE WAS OFF THE FREQ HE WAS NOT SURE. I THEN HAD MY FIRST OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW THE 10-9 PAGE AND WAS SURPRISED TO FIND THAT A RWY 14 EXISTED. I CALLED THE TWR AND THEY ASKED ME WHAT I THOUGHT MY CLRNC HAD BEEN. I REPLIED 'CLRED TO CROSS 16R.' THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE TWR INDICATED THAT THE CTLR THOUGHT IT HAD BEEN 'CLRED TO CROSS 14 AND HOLD SHORT 16R.' HE FURTHER SAID THEY WOULD PULL THE TAPES AND COULD THEY CALL ME BACK? I REPLIED WITH THE PHONE NUMBER OF OPERATIONS AND SAID I WOULD BE THERE FOR SOME TIME. I DEADHEADED BACK TO DENVER OVER 3 HRS LATER BUT DID NOT RECEIVE A CALL BACK FROM THE TWR. AT THIS POINT IT APPEARS THAT I DID NOT HEAR THAT PART OF THE CLRNC '14 AND HOLD SHORT', THUS THE CLRNC BECAME 'CLRED TO CROSS 16R.' THE F/O WAS AN AIR FORCE PLT. FROM MY ASSESSMENT HE IS NOT PARTICULARLY HAPPY WITH WHAT HAS TRANSPIRED AND I CAN SYMPATHIZE WITH THAT. ON A MORE PERSONAL BASIS, SOME OF HIS STATEMENTS ARE VERY DOGMATIC AND DELIVERED IN SUCH A MANNER THAT THERE IS NO ROOM FOR DISCUSSION. THUS, WHILE I MAY FEEL THAT THERE COULD BE A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION ABOUT SOMETHING AND PREFER TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT SO AS TO ARRIVE AT A MUTUALLY AGREED UPON POSITION BASED UPON A SHARING OF INFORMATION, THIS IS OFTEN CLOSED OUT BY A DEFINITIVE STATEMENT OF HIS POSITION. SUCH AN APCH RESULTS IN LONG PERIODS OF SILENCE AND A SEARCHING FOR NONCONTROVERSIAL TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION. SUCH A SITUATION RESULTS IN A COCKPIT WHERE A FREE FLOW OF INFO MAY NOT ALWAYS OCCUR AND WHERE A PERSONAL BIAS AGAINST ANY STATEMENT MAY BE QUESTIONED. BOTH CREW MEMBERS SHOULD REMAIN ON SAME FREQ UNTIL ALL RWYS ARE CROSSED AND ARR AT GATE IS IMMINENT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FROM ACN 135503: WE MADE AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG ON RWY 16L AT SLC. WERE IN A HURRY TO TRY TO MAKE CONNECTING FLT FOR OUR DEADHEAD HOME, MADE TURNOFF SHORT OF MIDFIELD AND TAXIED RAPIDLY TOWARD TERMINAL. TWR GAVE CLRNC TO 'CROSS RWY 14 AND HOLD SHORT OF 16R, REMAIN THIS FREQ.' I READ IT BACK VERBATIM, WENT OFF FREQ FOR 10-20 SECS TO ADVISE CO THAT WE WERE ON GND. APCHING 16R W/HIGH TAXI SPEED I REALIZED THE CAPT DIDN'T PLAN ON HOLDING SHORT. I CHALLENGED HIM IF WE HAD RCVD CLRNC TO CROSS, HE REPLIED WE WERE 'CLRED TO CROSS THE RIGHT AND CONTACT GND.' THIS WAS DIFFERENT ENOUGH FROM OUR ORIGINAL CLRNC IN CONTENT AND SOUND THAT I ACCEPTED IT AS HAVING BEEN RCVD WHILE I WAS OFF FREQ. THE SIGHT OF ACFT ON RWY HAVING JUST LANDED BUT NOT YET TURNED OFF (THOUSANDS OF FT AWAY, NO IMMEDIATE THREAT TO US) MADE ME LESS SURE, BUT BY THEN WE WERE ON RWY. IT LATER BECAME CLEAR THERE HAD BEEN NO CLRNC RCVD WHILE I WAS OFF FREQ, TWR CTLR RIGHTFULLY TOOK ISSUE WITH CAPT'S ASSERTION THAT ORIGINAL CLRNC ON LNDG HAD INCLUDED CLRNC TO CROSS 16R. NO MATTER HOW MUCH TRAINERS WE GET ON THESE MATTERS, WE SOMETIMES STILL HEAR WHAT WE WANT TO. HOWEVER ESPECIALLY AS A CAPT HEAVILY INVOLVED IN SAFETY PROGRAMS AT OUR AIRLINE, HE SHOULD HAVE KNOWN THAT WHENEVER A CREW MEMBER QUESTIONS OR CHALLENGES CLRNC THAT IT IS ALWAYS BEST TO STOP AND RESOLVE THE UNCERTAINTY RIGHT AWAY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.