Narrative:

I'm feeling a little snake bit. This is my second safety event of the day. The final monitor (FM) cancelled aircraft X's approach clearance because they were overtaking traffic ahead. I do not recall the callsign of the lead aircraft. Although on the job training was in progress I do not believe that is a factor in this incident.local control had just departed aircraft Y turning to heading 340; climbing to 10;000 feet when shortly thereafter; FM cancelled aircraft X's approach and issued fly runway heading; maintain 3;000 feet. In local control's judgment there would not be sufficient space between the aircraft Y and aircraft X so local control issued a left turn to 340 degrees; maintain 3;000 feet to aircraft X while aircraft X was still several miles south of the field. I initiated an automated handoff to the departure controller and verbally coordinated with the FM that we were breaking aircraft X out early. Next; I initiated verbal coordination with the departure controller; notifying him that aircraft X was heading 340 degrees at 3;000 feet. It did not occur to me that I should have pointed out aircraft X to another sector until later when the controller in charge (controller in charge) notified me that 'aircraft X is being tracked' which I clarified meant that TRACON was investigating a possible loss of separation or airspace violation.I must have assumed that the FM controller would take care of any point outs; which in hindsight was not good air traffic control. However; TRACON airspace boundaries are not depicted on tower radar displays; nor are we trained on all the airspace that abuts ours. Instead; we are given standard missed approach headings and frequencies to assign. Several actions could have prevented this event. When FM cancelled aircraft X's approach clearance; they could have broken them out since they have better familiarity with that airspace than we do; or airspace boundaries around tower airspace should be depicted and trained so we can better know into whose airspace we may be turning; and standard missed approach procedures should be replaced with 'assign heading and altitude to avert conflict with other arrivals/departures and hand off to the appropriate controller.'when tower advised FM that they are going to turn somebody early; the FM should advise who to hand off the aircraft to or offer to take care of the point out. This one seems less preferable than teaching us the airspace more thoroughly. All this could have been completely avoided by better application of speed control by the arrival controller who set this all up by feeding the overtake to the FM and local controllers to fix. FM should only be concerned with ensuring the non-transgression zone between parallel approaches is protected; rather than cleaning up after a final controller who didn't ensure their aircraft would remain separated to the runway.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DFW Tower Controller issued a non-standard go-around instruction to an aircraft. The Tower Controller did not point out the aircraft to the appropriate TRACON sector.

Narrative: I'm feeling a little snake bit. This is my second safety event of the day. The Final Monitor (FM) cancelled Aircraft X's approach clearance because they were overtaking traffic ahead. I do not recall the callsign of the lead aircraft. Although On the job training was in progress I do not believe that is a factor in this incident.Local control had just departed Aircraft Y turning to heading 340; climbing to 10;000 feet when shortly thereafter; FM cancelled Aircraft X's approach and issued fly runway heading; maintain 3;000 feet. In Local Control's judgment there would not be sufficient space between the Aircraft Y and Aircraft X so Local Control issued a left turn to 340 degrees; maintain 3;000 feet to Aircraft X while Aircraft X was still several miles south of the field. I initiated an automated handoff to the Departure controller and verbally coordinated with the FM that we were breaking Aircraft X out early. Next; I initiated verbal coordination with the departure controller; notifying him that Aircraft X was heading 340 degrees at 3;000 feet. It did not occur to me that I should have pointed out Aircraft X to another sector until later when the Controller in Charge (CIC) notified me that 'Aircraft X is being tracked' which I clarified meant that TRACON was investigating a possible loss of separation or airspace violation.I must have assumed that the FM controller would take care of any point outs; which in hindsight was not good air traffic control. However; TRACON airspace boundaries are not depicted on tower radar displays; nor are we trained on all the airspace that abuts ours. Instead; we are given standard missed approach headings and frequencies to assign. Several actions could have prevented this event. When FM cancelled Aircraft X's approach clearance; they could have broken them out since they have better familiarity with that airspace than we do; or airspace boundaries around tower airspace should be depicted and trained so we can better know into whose airspace we may be turning; and Standard missed approach procedures should be replaced with 'assign heading and altitude to avert conflict with other arrivals/departures and hand off to the appropriate controller.'When tower advised FM that they are going to turn somebody early; the FM should advise who to hand off the aircraft to or offer to take care of the point out. This one seems less preferable than teaching us the airspace more thoroughly. All this could have been completely avoided by better application of speed control by the arrival controller who set this all up by feeding the overtake to the FM and Local controllers to fix. FM should only be concerned with ensuring the non-transgression zone between parallel approaches is protected; rather than cleaning up after a final controller who didn't ensure their aircraft would remain separated to the runway.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.