Narrative:

First officer was flying pilot. We were configured and on speed by 2000 ft. Everything was within standard ops until about the last 300 ft. We got a performance gain (increase in speed/wind shear) which brought the flaps up to 25 degrees. At about 200ft I suggested a go around. First officer I believe felt we were ok to land (I have a lot of confidence in him). At that time we got a terrain warning and flaps too low; because of the flaps going to 25. I'm guessing this occurred around 100 ft from landing. I took another mental snapshot of the situation and felt we could land with plenty of room to stop. We made the last high speed turn off on runway 29 in ewr.regretting not going around; but had less than 20 seconds to make the decision. My last mental snapshot just before landing convinced me that we could stop. Going around that close to the runway presented its own set of problems as well in my opinion. That was one of my reasons for going ahead and landing.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 Captain reported he regretted his decision to allow the First Officer to continue the approach and landing after experiencing a performance gain '(increase in speed/wind shear) which brought the flaps up to 25 degrees' at approximately 200 feet AGL.

Narrative: First officer was flying pilot. We were configured and on speed by 2000 ft. Everything was within standard ops until about the last 300 ft. We got a performance gain (increase in speed/wind shear) which brought the flaps up to 25 degrees. At about 200ft I suggested a go around. First Officer I believe felt we were ok to land (I have a lot of confidence in him). At that time we got a terrain warning and flaps too low; because of the flaps going to 25. I'm guessing this occurred around 100 ft from landing. I took another mental snapshot of the situation and felt we could land with plenty of room to stop. We made the last high speed turn off on runway 29 in EWR.Regretting not going around; but had less than 20 seconds to make the decision. My last mental snapshot just before landing convinced me that we could stop. Going around that close to the runway presented its own set of problems as well in my opinion. That was one of my reasons for going ahead and landing.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.