Narrative:

Aircraft X released off runway 5 at orf by departure. Aircraft Y being vectored to the TACAN runway 28 final at ngu. (Note: the 28 final at ngu crosses the 5 departure corridor at orf.) as local control; I requested release from departure for aircraft X. Departure released the aircraft on a heading of 300; which is different from the customary heading of 050. I assumed this was to keep the aircraft X west of the aircraft Y's course. As the aircraft X made the left turn to 300; I instructed the aircraft X to contact departure. Shortly after; I observed the aircraft Y turning and joining the TACAN 28 final at ngu. This resulted in what I believe was a loss of standard separation. The departure controller then called upstairs and instructed me to say 'for the tapes' that I 'had visual.' I complied with the instruction and made a statement to that effect; only because the departure controller was a front line manager. I consider this an appropriate application of the 2009 FAA/natca cba-article 65.1. I recommend that departure either (1) not release the aircraft X off runway 5 at orf until the aircraft Y is no longer a factor or (2) not turn the aircraft Y onto the TACAN 28 final at ngu until the aircraft X is no longer a factor.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ORF Local Controller requested release on a departure aircraft from the Departure Controller. Aircraft was released on an unusual heading; Local Controller thought this heading was to avoid traffic inbound. Loss of separation occurred when inbound traffic turned inbound.

Narrative: Aircraft X released off RWY 5 at ORF by Departure. Aircraft Y being vectored to the TACAN RWY 28 final at NGU. (Note: The 28 Final at NGU crosses the 5 Departure corridor at ORF.) As local control; I requested release from departure for Aircraft X. Departure released the aircraft on a heading of 300; which is different from the customary heading of 050. I assumed this was to keep the Aircraft X west of the Aircraft Y's course. As the Aircraft X made the left turn to 300; I instructed the Aircraft X to contact departure. Shortly after; I observed the Aircraft Y turning and joining the TACAN 28 final at NGU. This resulted in what I believe was a loss of standard separation. The departure controller then called upstairs and instructed me to say 'for the tapes' that I 'had visual.' I complied with the instruction and made a statement to that effect; only because the departure controller was a Front Line Manager. I consider this an appropriate application of the 2009 FAA/NATCA CBA-Article 65.1. I recommend that departure either (1) not release the Aircraft X off RWY 5 at ORF until the Aircraft Y is no longer a factor or (2) not turn the Aircraft Y onto the TACAN 28 final at NGU until the Aircraft X is no longer a factor.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.