Narrative:

I was the pilot monitoring; the first officer was the pilot flying. We were coming in on an arrival from the northwest and were switched to a more southerly arrival. We decided we'd get the approach to runway xyr and ended up being assigned runway xzl anyway. My assumption is that there was a gap for runway xzl arrivals and they were squeezing us in. We were kept high and fast for almost the entire arrival. The first officer made a comment that he would start slowing if he didn't hear from approach soon and they assigned us 210 knots shortly after. The arrival was stable up to the point we were cleared for the visual approach without any altitude restrictions. At the time we were at 5000 ft MSL. Once cleared for the visual; the first officer set the altitude alerter to 2900 feet. To meet the altitude and speed reduction the first officer had the spoilers deployed at full. I asked him if he wanted me to put the gear down and he declined. He was slowing to 200 knots and I could see that he was getting himself into trouble staying too high. At 200 knots he asked for flaps 8. I switched to flaps 8 and he turned off the autopilot and began a hurried pitch down to catch the glide slope. The air speed rose to 210 knots and I told him we needed the gear down. He agreed and I put the gear down. He immediately asked for flaps 20 and I told him we needed to slow a bit (we were still at 210 knots). I was concentrating on the air speed to give him flaps 20 immediately at 200 knots.he was continuing to slow and I was watching for 180 knots to give him flaps 30. Around this time approach called us with an altitude alert and I looked up and saw 4 red lights on the PAPI. The first officer responded by increasing power and beginning to pitch up. It was somewhere around this time I realized (or was alerted; I can't remember) that the spoilers were deployed at full. I said 'spoilers' and raised them. He began to level off and I could see we were still below glide slope and had 4 red lights on the PAPI. I told him to keep climbing and he complied right away. He reached the correct altitude but was having some trouble tracking the localizer and I saw that we had no approach capture. I reset the automation to the give him an intercept and re-armed the approach so that he could just follow the flight director. At some point we went to full flaps outside of the final fix and the approach was stable and on speed reaching 1500 ft AGL. We landed on runway xzl without incident and; after a circus on the ramp; made it to our gate about 30 minutes later.the most glaring threats were an inexperienced first officer combined with an unusual approach into ZZZ being kept high and fast and landing on a runway not normally used from that arrival; especially given how busy it was. I believe the error that contributed most to our low approach was the spoilers being fully deployed followed closely by my poor monitoring. I was so fixated on the airspeed that I was neglecting the altitude of the aircraft. I forget that visual approaches into ZZZ are routine for me; but not for new fos. My subconscious incorrectly assumed the first officer was handing the attitude of the aircraft without any problems. It should not have taken an altitude alert by approach to make me aware of our mistake. The undesired aircraft state was being high; fast; and spoilers deployed for too long. I believe this incident falls mostly on my shoulders. I should have been more vigilant in my monitoring. My first officer had about 150 hours on the aircraft and I had assumed his previous aviation experience made him more comfortable on the crj than he was. In hindsight; I should have been more considerate of his history since he hadn't flown much in the years prior to joining [carrier]. I need to be more proactive with first officer's when I can see threats coming. We did discuss the threats of being high and fast before it was an issue because I could see it coming but it wasn't enough just to talk about it. I don't believe we busted any altitude assignments since we were last assigned 5000 feet and cleared on the visual approach without an altitude assignment further out than usual. My biggest take away from this incident is to be more aware when flying with both experienced and inexperienced first officer's. It can get away from us quickly and the ability for pilots to get it back under control varies widely. Once everything was settled; the first officer did a great job completing the approach to a landing.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-200 Captain reported the aircraft became high and fast on initial approach then too low. After ATC advisement and adjustments; the flight landed normally.

Narrative: I was the pilot monitoring; the FO was the pilot flying. We were coming in on an arrival from the northwest and were switched to a more southerly arrival. We decided we'd get the approach to Runway XYR and ended up being assigned Runway XZL anyway. My assumption is that there was a gap for Runway XZL arrivals and they were squeezing us in. We were kept high and fast for almost the entire arrival. The FO made a comment that he would start slowing if he didn't hear from approach soon and they assigned us 210 knots shortly after. The arrival was stable up to the point we were cleared for the visual approach without any altitude restrictions. At the time we were at 5000 ft MSL. Once cleared for the visual; the FO set the altitude alerter to 2900 feet. To meet the altitude and speed reduction the FO had the spoilers deployed at full. I asked him if he wanted me to put the gear down and he declined. He was slowing to 200 knots and I could see that he was getting himself into trouble staying too high. At 200 knots he asked for flaps 8. I switched to flaps 8 and he turned off the autopilot and began a hurried pitch down to catch the glide slope. The air speed rose to 210 knots and I told him we needed the gear down. He agreed and I put the gear down. He immediately asked for flaps 20 and I told him we needed to slow a bit (we were still at 210 knots). I was concentrating on the air speed to give him flaps 20 immediately at 200 knots.He was continuing to slow and I was watching for 180 knots to give him flaps 30. Around this time approach called us with an altitude alert and I looked up and saw 4 red lights on the PAPI. The FO responded by increasing power and beginning to pitch up. It was somewhere around this time I realized (or was alerted; I can't remember) that the spoilers were deployed at full. I said 'spoilers' and raised them. He began to level off and I could see we were still below glide slope and had 4 red lights on the PAPI. I told him to keep climbing and he complied right away. He reached the correct altitude but was having some trouble tracking the localizer and I saw that we had no approach capture. I reset the automation to the give him an intercept and re-armed the approach so that he could just follow the flight director. At some point we went to full flaps outside of the final fix and the approach was stable and on speed reaching 1500 ft AGL. We landed on Runway XZL without incident and; after a circus on the ramp; made it to our gate about 30 minutes later.The most glaring threats were an inexperienced FO combined with an unusual approach into ZZZ being kept high and fast and landing on a runway not normally used from that arrival; especially given how busy it was. I believe the error that contributed most to our low approach was the spoilers being fully deployed followed closely by my poor monitoring. I was so fixated on the airspeed that I was neglecting the altitude of the aircraft. I forget that visual approaches into ZZZ are routine for me; but not for new FOs. My subconscious incorrectly assumed the FO was handing the attitude of the aircraft without any problems. It should not have taken an altitude alert by approach to make me aware of our mistake. The undesired aircraft state was being high; fast; and spoilers deployed for too long. I believe this incident falls mostly on my shoulders. I should have been more vigilant in my monitoring. My FO had about 150 hours on the aircraft and I had assumed his previous aviation experience made him more comfortable on the CRJ than he was. In hindsight; I should have been more considerate of his history since he hadn't flown much in the years prior to joining [carrier]. I need to be more proactive with FO's when I can see threats coming. We did discuss the threats of being high and fast before it was an issue because I could see it coming but it wasn't enough just to talk about it. I don't believe we busted any altitude assignments since we were last assigned 5000 feet and cleared on the visual approach without an altitude assignment further out than usual. My biggest take away from this incident is to be more aware when flying with both experienced and inexperienced FO's. It can get away from us quickly and the ability for pilots to get it back under control varies widely. Once everything was settled; the FO did a great job completing the approach to a landing.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.