Narrative:

XA38: departed gate. Anti-skid inoperative and 5 KT wind out of south led to decision to use 17L. XA55: arrived R17L, completed abnormal takeoff data worksheet and card. Xb:00: sent 'miscellaneous ii' ACARS ETD XB05. Delayed engine start completed and ready for takeoff. Several aircraft are taking off on 35R. XB08: second officer received interphone call from fsm that a 'ticking' or 'clicking' noise was coming from 1ST class overhead bin. Captain asked fsm into the cockpit for discussion. Fsm indicated that a 'middle-eastern looking' passenger was possibly the owner of the bag from which the noise was coming. Captain asked fsm to return to cabin and asked for the owner of the bag to identify themselves. XB15: fsm returned to cockpit and said that 1) a passenger had already opened the bag, found a tape player running and turned it off. 2) no passenger had responded to the inquiry about ownership of the bag. 3) other passenger in the area now were expressing anxiety over the incident. Cockpit discussion followed with a decision to discontinue flight and asked operations for assistance in identifying the device. XB20: called operations on 129.92 for advice on where to bring aircraft and to contact system control. Aircraft was moved out of 'ready' position onto parallel taxiway, but remained at north end of airport. PA was made that we would be returning to terminal area to look into a mechanical problem. XB25: operations said they were calling 'company' for input and we should switch to 130.52. 'After landing' checklist completed, APU started, #3 engine shut down. On 130.52, operations said they were talking with system control. XB30: lost contact with operations on 130.52, went back to 129.92 operations relayed from system control advice to return to concourse gate and have an 'agent' remove and investigate the bag. Crew reviewed 'bomb threat' procedures in operations manual. Captain asked operations and ground control for airport procedures in handling suspected bomb. Advice was to bring aircraft to safe area by firehouse and have bomb squad investigate. XB35: captain decided that aircraft would go to firehouse and asked ground control to make arrangements. Operations said buses would meet aircraft and take passenger to terminal. XB45: captain was advised by ground control that safe area was ready and aircraft began taxi to firehouse. XB55: parked at firehouse. PA made that there had been a security problem and passenger would be riding buses back to terminal. XC00: aircraft shut down and fsm lowered airstairs. XC05: security agents (den airport second) came on board. XC10: buses arrive. XC15: passenger begin to deplane. XC25: last passenger off aircraft. We are advised that passenger will reboard at firehouse, return to gate onboard aircraft. XC35: bag removed by detective. XC40: passenger reboard aircraft. XC55: engine start and taxi. XD00: arrive at gate south. Passenger deplane for phones. Aircraft refueled. XE00: aircraft departs gate for ewr.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW DIVERTS ACFT TO BOMB DISPOSAL AREA AS CAB REPORTS SUSPICION OF BOMB ON ACFT WHILE AWAITING TKOF. COMPANY SAYS TO PROCEED TO GATE WHILE FLT CREW ALERTS ARPT AS PER BOMB THREAT PROC.

Narrative: XA38: DEPARTED GATE. ANTI-SKID INOP AND 5 KT WIND OUT OF SOUTH LED TO DECISION TO USE 17L. XA55: ARRIVED R17L, COMPLETED ABNORMAL TKOF DATA WORKSHEET AND CARD. XB:00: SENT 'MISC II' ACARS ETD XB05. DELAYED ENGINE START COMPLETED AND READY FOR TKOF. SEVERAL ACFT ARE TAKING OFF ON 35R. XB08: S/O RECEIVED INTERPHONE CALL FROM FSM THAT A 'TICKING' OR 'CLICKING' NOISE WAS COMING FROM 1ST CLASS OVERHEAD BIN. CAPT ASKED FSM INTO THE COCKPIT FOR DISCUSSION. FSM INDICATED THAT A 'MIDDLE-EASTERN LOOKING' PAX WAS POSSIBLY THE OWNER OF THE BAG FROM WHICH THE NOISE WAS COMING. CAPT ASKED FSM TO RETURN TO CABIN AND ASKED FOR THE OWNER OF THE BAG TO IDENTIFY THEMSELVES. XB15: FSM RETURNED TO COCKPIT AND SAID THAT 1) A PAX HAD ALREADY OPENED THE BAG, FOUND A TAPE PLAYER RUNNING AND TURNED IT OFF. 2) NO PAX HAD RESPONDED TO THE INQUIRY ABOUT OWNERSHIP OF THE BAG. 3) OTHER PAX IN THE AREA NOW WERE EXPRESSING ANXIETY OVER THE INCIDENT. COCKPIT DISCUSSION FOLLOWED WITH A DECISION TO DISCONTINUE FLT AND ASKED OPS FOR ASSISTANCE IN IDENTIFYING THE DEVICE. XB20: CALLED OPS ON 129.92 FOR ADVICE ON WHERE TO BRING ACFT AND TO CONTACT SYSTEM CONTROL. ACFT WAS MOVED OUT OF 'READY' POSITION ONTO PARALLEL TXWY, BUT REMAINED AT NORTH END OF ARPT. PA WAS MADE THAT WE WOULD BE RETURNING TO TERMINAL AREA TO LOOK INTO A MECHANICAL PROBLEM. XB25: OPS SAID THEY WERE CALLING 'COMPANY' FOR INPUT AND WE SHOULD SWITCH TO 130.52. 'AFTER LNDG' CHECKLIST COMPLETED, APU STARTED, #3 ENGINE SHUT DOWN. ON 130.52, OPS SAID THEY WERE TALKING WITH SYSTEM CONTROL. XB30: LOST CONTACT WITH OPS ON 130.52, WENT BACK TO 129.92 OPS RELAYED FROM SYSTEM CONTROL ADVICE TO RETURN TO CONCOURSE GATE AND HAVE AN 'AGENT' REMOVE AND INVESTIGATE THE BAG. CREW REVIEWED 'BOMB THREAT' PROCS IN OPS MANUAL. CAPT ASKED OPS AND GND CTL FOR ARPT PROCS IN HANDLING SUSPECTED BOMB. ADVICE WAS TO BRING ACFT TO SAFE AREA BY FIREHOUSE AND HAVE BOMB SQUAD INVESTIGATE. XB35: CAPT DECIDED THAT ACFT WOULD GO TO FIREHOUSE AND ASKED GND CTL TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS. OPS SAID BUSES WOULD MEET ACFT AND TAKE PAX TO TERMINAL. XB45: CAPT WAS ADVISED BY GND CTL THAT SAFE AREA WAS READY AND ACFT BEGAN TAXI TO FIREHOUSE. XB55: PARKED AT FIREHOUSE. PA MADE THAT THERE HAD BEEN A SECURITY PROBLEM AND PAX WOULD BE RIDING BUSES BACK TO TERMINAL. XC00: ACFT SHUT DOWN AND FSM LOWERED AIRSTAIRS. XC05: SECURITY AGENTS (DEN ARPT SEC) CAME ON BOARD. XC10: BUSES ARRIVE. XC15: PAX BEGIN TO DEPLANE. XC25: LAST PAX OFF ACFT. WE ARE ADVISED THAT PAX WILL REBOARD AT FIREHOUSE, RETURN TO GATE ONBOARD ACFT. XC35: BAG REMOVED BY DETECTIVE. XC40: PAX REBOARD ACFT. XC55: ENGINE START AND TAXI. XD00: ARRIVE AT GATE S. PAX DEPLANE FOR PHONES. ACFT REFUELED. XE00: ACFT DEPARTS GATE FOR EWR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.