Narrative:

After takeoff; at approx. 1;700 MSL; I heard a loud 'bang' and the aircraft shuddered. The #2 engine EPR began to roll back while the egt rose rapidly; peaking at approx. 746 degrees & staying there. At the sound of the bang and seeing the initial EPR fluctuation; my first thought was compressor stall (which I had experienced in the aircraft before) and I elected to bring the right throttle to idle. I called for 'altitude hold' at 2;000 feet and leveled off while the first officer (first officer) [reported to] tower.after assessing the situation; we noted that the #2 EPR rolled back completely; the high egt; residual N1; N2 (25%) and fuel flow. However; due to the loud bang/shudder and high egt; a flameout was not suspected and no memory items were accomplished. The first officer worked the engine flameout/failure/shutdown checklist; followed by the single engine approach/landing checklist; while I turned the aircraft back towards the airport. Severe damage was suspected and we completed the checklist utilizing that section; which led to an inflight shutdown. I entered a left downwind; but due to our close proximity to the airport at the time of the incident; we needed additional time to finish the single engine approach checklist prior to landing and I requested a left 360 over the airport rather than penetrate the restricted area immediately to the west of the airport. General aviation sightseeing traffic can be common in that area and an extended downwind was not necessary. Without knowing the cause of the engine failure (bird ingestion?) and not knowing if the other engine could possibly fail; I felt it best to remain as close to the airport as possible. The checklist was finished prior to finish the 360 turn and I rejoined a base leg and completed a normal flaps 28 landing. After roll out; I brought the aircraft to a stop on the runway. The first officer communicated with crash/fire/rescue & coordinated an inspection of the aircraft while I made a PA to the passengers to remain seated and advised them of the fire trucks approaching the aircraft. Once crash/fire/rescue gave an all clear; we taxied to the gate and deplaned the passengers.CRM in the flight deck was excellent and first officer provided exceptional support as the non flying pilot. We were not interrupted by the flight attendant's during the [situation] and briefed them and the passengers as directed by the QRH. The flight attendant's did a fantastic job during a particularly stressful event from their point of view; and from my perspective handled the emergency professionally & as they were trained.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD-80 Captain reported returning to departure airport following loss of #2 engine shortly after takeoff.

Narrative: After takeoff; at approx. 1;700 MSL; I heard a loud 'BANG' and the aircraft shuddered. The #2 engine EPR began to roll back while the EGT rose rapidly; peaking at approx. 746 degrees & staying there. At the sound of the bang and seeing the initial EPR fluctuation; my first thought was compressor stall (which I had experienced in the aircraft before) and I elected to bring the right throttle to idle. I called for 'ALT HOLD' at 2;000 feet and leveled off while the First Officer (FO) [reported to] Tower.After assessing the situation; we noted that the #2 EPR rolled back completely; the high EGT; residual N1; N2 (25%) and fuel flow. However; due to the loud BANG/Shudder and high EGT; a flameout was not suspected and no memory items were accomplished. The FO worked the Engine Flameout/Failure/Shutdown checklist; followed by the Single Engine Approach/Landing checklist; while I turned the aircraft back towards the airport. Severe damage was suspected and we completed the checklist utilizing that section; which led to an inflight shutdown. I entered a left downwind; but due to our close proximity to the airport at the time of the incident; we needed additional time to finish the Single Engine Approach checklist prior to landing and I requested a left 360 over the airport rather than penetrate the restricted area immediately to the west of the airport. General Aviation sightseeing traffic can be common in that area and an extended downwind was not necessary. Without knowing the cause of the engine failure (bird ingestion?) and not knowing if the other engine could possibly fail; I felt it best to remain as close to the airport as possible. The checklist was finished prior to finish the 360 turn and I rejoined a base leg and completed a normal Flaps 28 landing. After roll out; I brought the aircraft to a stop on the runway. The FO communicated with Crash/Fire/Rescue & coordinated an inspection of the aircraft while I made a PA to the passengers to remain seated and advised them of the fire trucks approaching the aircraft. Once Crash/Fire/Rescue gave an all clear; we taxied to the gate and deplaned the passengers.CRM in the flight deck was excellent and First Officer provided exceptional support as the non flying pilot. We were not interrupted by the FA's during the [situation] and briefed them and the passengers as directed by the QRH. The FA's did a fantastic job during a particularly stressful event from their point of view; and from my perspective handled the emergency professionally & as they were trained.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.