Narrative:

Aircraft X was receiving VFR advisories at 035 to psk. I started communications with him from crza and I advised him of precipitation along his route of flight. He eventually asked if he could pick up an IFR clearance. I verified that he was qualified and capable of IFR flight and that he could maintain his own terrain and obstruction clearance to 060. The MVA in his area was 057 but raised to 059 ahead. He said he could only maintain his own clearance to 050. There was an area to the south of him that was 047 so I advised he head toward that area and report 050 and I'd give his clearance. This took place; and he ran the edge of the terrain areas for a few minutes after receiving his clearance. He said he had a VFR flight plan with flight service so I didn't get any further information from him. Then after reaching 060 and on course for psk aircraft X advised he thought he was picking up icing due to some vibrations he was feeling in the aircraft. He seemed very uncomfortable with the situation and asked for descent. I told him I didn't have lower. He said he was going to descend. I said he could maintain 058. He indicated he was going to descend further. I had advised the flm by now and he was standing nearby. I asked if aircraft X could maintain VFR; and he said he had ground contact. I told him to maintain VFR. The flm pushed for me to find out if the pilot was canceling IFR. I told aircraft X IFR services were canceled; but I shouldn't have said that. I was just trying to think of something to say to go along with what the flm was trying to push for. I was then told to confirm he was canceling IFR; so I asked aircraft X that question. He didn't seem like he wanted to say that necessarily but he said something back to me; I don't recall what; and I said roger; IFR cancellation received; maintain your present squawk code for advisories. An associate position was added to the sector. Aircraft X advised he was only getting rain now and no longer getting ice. Eventually the aircraft was lost in radar contact and put on roa approach's frequency; but psk was OVC020 so I'm not sure how he was going to get in there VFR. I had received a break before he was radar contact lost. Thinking back on the event now; I wish and know things could have been done differently and better. In the heat of an emergency type situation it's hard to think of everything and my supervisor kept trying to control what I said so I complied. I think in an emergency type event; the aircraft could have gone lower and I could try to advise of the obstacles nearby; or maybe have gotten him to land blf; or put him on an airway that had lower MEA. I don't know if these things would have worked; but I don't feel we provided a good service to the pilot. If I had been able to think for myself instead of the inexperienced flm trying to puppet the situation I may have been able to perform better. I'm not even sure if the pilot landed ok anywhere before I went home; and that's not an easy feeling to deal with. Maybe a reference to emergency in IFR conditions could be readily available at the sector or in erids (en route information display system); or the flm could have pulled up a checklist for us to refer to instead of just panicking that we can't give lower.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZID Controller and Front Line Manager (FLM) reported of an aircraft that was encountering icing conditions and had to descend. The aircraft advised ATC and started a descent below the MVA. Controller asked if the aircraft had the terrain insight and was VFR. FLM confused the Controller and the Controller then cancelled the aircraft's IFR clearance. The Controller was relieved before knowing if the aircraft landed at its destination safely.

Narrative: Aircraft X was receiving VFR advisories at 035 to PSK. I started communications with him from CRZA and I advised him of precipitation along his route of flight. He eventually asked if he could pick up an IFR clearance. I verified that he was qualified and capable of IFR flight and that he could maintain his own terrain and obstruction clearance to 060. The MVA in his area was 057 but raised to 059 ahead. He said he could only maintain his own clearance to 050. There was an area to the south of him that was 047 so I advised he head toward that area and report 050 and I'd give his clearance. This took place; and he ran the edge of the terrain areas for a few minutes after receiving his clearance. He said he had a VFR flight plan with flight service so I didn't get any further information from him. Then after reaching 060 and on course for PSK Aircraft X advised he thought he was picking up icing due to some vibrations he was feeling in the aircraft. He seemed very uncomfortable with the situation and asked for descent. I told him I didn't have lower. He said he was going to descend. I said he could maintain 058. He indicated he was going to descend further. I had advised the FLM by now and he was standing nearby. I asked if Aircraft X could maintain VFR; and he said he had ground contact. I told him to maintain VFR. The FLM pushed for me to find out if the pilot was canceling IFR. I told Aircraft X IFR services were canceled; but I shouldn't have said that. I was just trying to think of something to say to go along with what the FLM was trying to push for. I was then told to confirm he was canceling IFR; so I asked Aircraft X that question. He didn't seem like he wanted to say that necessarily but he said something back to me; I don't recall what; and I said Roger; IFR cancellation received; maintain your present squawk code for advisories. An associate position was added to the sector. Aircraft X advised he was only getting rain now and no longer getting ice. Eventually the aircraft was lost in radar contact and put on ROA approach's frequency; but PSK was OVC020 so I'm not sure how he was going to get in there VFR. I had received a break before he was radar contact lost. Thinking back on the event now; I wish and know things could have been done differently and better. In the heat of an emergency type situation it's hard to think of everything and my supervisor kept trying to control what I said so I complied. I think in an emergency type event; the aircraft could have gone lower and I could try to advise of the obstacles nearby; or maybe have gotten him to land BLF; or put him on an airway that had lower MEA. I don't know if these things would have worked; but I don't feel we provided a good service to the pilot. If I had been able to think for myself instead of the inexperienced FLM trying to puppet the situation I may have been able to perform better. I'm not even sure if the pilot landed ok anywhere before I went home; and that's not an easy feeling to deal with. Maybe a reference to emergency in IFR conditions could be readily available at the sector or in ERIDS (En Route Information Display System); or the FLM could have pulled up a checklist for us to refer to instead of just panicking that we can't give lower.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.