Narrative:

Reporting pilot was leader of a flight of four warbirds on a formation proficiency mission. All aircraft were receiving and transmitting on a formation common frequency and all aircraft were briefed to follow and monitor ATC frequencies on their second radio. Completed pre-takeoff checks and called for takeoff clearance on the ground frequency by mistake. Ground responded and advised me to switch to tower frequency. I misunderstood this as clearance to taxi on to the runway which I did while switching to tower frequency. Tower did not notice the flight movement until the entire flight of four were lined up on the runway and no flight member realized the mistake or transmitted to me to hold short. There was no traffic conflict and; after a brief exchange between tower and me; the tower cleared the flight for takeoff.the mistake was entirely with me as flight leader. Neither of the two potential 'fail-safes' prevented this incident. 1.) my flight team should have realized the lack of clearance and transmitted for me to hold short. 2.) the tower could have seen the movement and transmitted for me to hold short.the mistake occurred because of lead pilot overload and confusion in managing the pre-takeoff operations of a flight of four aircraft. In the future I will take more time and be absolutely sure of radio clearances from ATC. I will also brief and execute mandated radio frequency changes on both primary and secondary radio frequencies. I will also re-brief the wingmen responsibilities for situational awareness and intervention on the radio when an unsafe condition exists.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Lead pilot in a flight of four reported a runway incursion when none of the four recognized they were not actually cleared into position.

Narrative: Reporting pilot was leader of a flight of four warbirds on a formation proficiency mission. All aircraft were receiving and transmitting on a formation common frequency and all aircraft were briefed to follow and monitor ATC frequencies on their second radio. Completed pre-takeoff checks and called for takeoff clearance on the Ground frequency by mistake. Ground responded and advised me to switch to Tower frequency. I misunderstood this as clearance to taxi on to the runway which I did while switching to Tower frequency. Tower did not notice the flight movement until the entire flight of four were lined up on the runway and no flight member realized the mistake or transmitted to me to hold short. There was no traffic conflict and; after a brief exchange between Tower and me; the Tower cleared the flight for takeoff.The mistake was entirely with me as flight leader. Neither of the two potential 'fail-safes' prevented this incident. 1.) My flight team should have realized the lack of clearance and transmitted for me to hold short. 2.) The Tower could have seen the movement and transmitted for me to hold short.The mistake occurred because of lead pilot overload and confusion in managing the pre-takeoff operations of a flight of four aircraft. In the future I will take more time and be absolutely sure of radio clearances from ATC. I will also brief and execute mandated radio frequency changes on both primary and secondary radio frequencies. I will also re-brief the wingmen responsibilities for situational awareness and intervention on the radio when an unsafe condition exists.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.