Narrative:

It all started at ZZZ. It was our second boarding and taxi out attempt to go to ZZZ1. We were a bit slow pushing off the gate due to differences in flight attendant passenger count vs. The second gate of departure count. The flight attendant's each counted several times. The gate agents came onboard and counted passengers. They all still disagreed. So; I went into the cabin and counted myself. My count agreed with the flight attendant's in the cabin. I made a note on our second release that we handed to the gate as to the discrepancy and made the decision to close the main cabin door and depart. It is turning into a long story. The gist of it is we were burning fuel. Probably about 10 minutes of APU fuel just to figure out the passenger count. We pushed off the gate and were eventually given taxi instructions to hold for our wheels up time for ZZZ1. The holding pad was located at the full length. I was probably about two minutes late in getting the aircraft configured for APU burn only in the pad for our approximate 25 minute hold for departure. Again we were burning fuel. So our flight closes the main cabin door and departs. The flight went airborne. The approach into ZZZ1 was to be runway xxl. The winds were at the time of the approach were westerly/northwesterly. From 290 degrees gusting to 29kts. The second approach over to runway xyl was discontinued inside of the final approach fix due to winds reported from the tower once and then twice for verification of approximately 300-310 degrees gusting to 39kts. The last fuel noted prior to discontinuance was our reserve and alternate fuel minimum requirement. As we proceeded towards the alternate airport; I was closely watching fuel and doing fuel calculations. There were all the other distractions that were going on along with all the duty and duty delineations. Such as ACARS notification to dispatcher as to go around and destination ZZZ2. Flight attendant and passenger notifications. Dealing with radio chatter and concentrating on flying the airplane and trying to get us to ZZZ2. Approximately 20 minutes to our eventual touchdown at our alternate I [advised ATC of our fuel situation] and made my/our wishes known as to what fixes were required and descended on our own cognizance in order to be appropriately fixed; located and configured for a safe approach to the runway at ZZZ2. The approach was uneventful and the last fuel amount noted on landing with all wheels on the ground was 2000 lbs.so; there were a whole string of failures on this day. The way we learn prevention; identify failures. Make an assessment of those failures. Then incorporate the lessons learned into the future.1. Fuel was wasted twice prior to departure due to operational inefficiency.2. After a go around from runway xxl ATC was vectoring us for a right downwind for a 2nd attempt. I opted to request runway xyl. Bad choice because we could have had a shorter sequencing had we just stayed with runway xxl. There was a good reason for the request. The building on the right side of runway xxl greatly affects the movement and flow of wind from the northwest. So fuel was wasted in a poor choice of rwy change with the hope that the sequencing would work out and that the winds would do at least 1 of 2 things. At a minimum; and with the lack of a cargo building; not change speed or direction or hope for a lessening in xwind strength or direction. Unfortunately; speed and direction worsened beyond published xwind limits inside the final approach fix on the second approach to the airport.3. Our first contact with the center controller was a perfect example of poor communication. She gave us routing to ZZZ2. She only cleared us up to 13 thousand. The routing was the problem. The controller that sends us to a fix; when queried as to the phonetics should have used the radar scope in front of them to spell the fix. I made a guess; then asked for phonetics. The phonetics was incorrect. The first officer asked for clarification. The phonetics were given again. The phonetics were incorrect again. Center controller apologizes and finally gives the correct spelling for the route. Anyway; the problem isn't really all of #3. The #3 text is just a distraction. The problem is truly this. If all that remains is reserve fuel and alternate fuel upon a balked landing/go-around. The problem is that it is already a minimum fuel advisory situation. Not that it is supposed to mean anything to controllers; I have never seen a delay using this term/phrase and until this day because of my personal failure I have never burned into reserve fuel because of my willingness to advise ATC of minimum fuel advisory. So; all that other stuff about the first center controller; was just a detail. A detail that helped to lead me down the yellow brick road of failure. Why? I know that we are supposed to do all that we can do in order to not burn into reserve fuel. With the next controller I did make the statement no undue delay requested. Not exactly the words; minimum fuel advisory. The second controller did issue an immediate clearance towards ZZZ2.3a. After all that; 3 or 3a is actually reserve fuel and alternate fuel equals an automatic minimum fuel advisory.3b. Distractions at times can be everywhere and we have to overcome distractions. Unfortunately; the first contact with center control was nothing but one big distraction. So; climb. Get up into the mid to upper FL200's. Should have done it and in the future will do it.4. I eventually made the decision to [advise] the current center controller. I had been watching the fuel closely. I knew that I was going to [use] those words. I really should have said those words earlier instead of 20 minutes prior to touchdown. I probably should have [used] these words instead of requesting no undue delay. That would have been with the 2nd center controller vs. The third and final center controller prior to ZZZ2 approach control.5. This event occurred on day 1 of a 4 day trip. Strangely enough this 4 day trip is full of ZZZ1-ZZZ3-ZZZ1 turns. On all these turns I fly by ZZZ2. The final lesson relates to the major event of discussion in this report but also incorporates my observations of fuel burns on repeated flybys of ZZZ2. The final lesson is; pad the fuel. I need to go back to doing all that I can do to not dip into reserve fuel. So; I shall round up for padding and add 100 lbs. If no rounding is to occur. Add 100 lbs and an additional 50 lbs for padding. My future go arounds with diversions to alternates will follow this model at a bare minimum.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier Captain reports that a lengthy ground delay and adverse winds at the destination airport required a diversion to the alternate. This resulted in landing with a low fuel state.

Narrative: It all started at ZZZ. It was our second boarding and taxi out attempt to go to ZZZ1. We were a bit slow pushing off the gate due to differences in FA passenger count vs. the second gate of departure count. The FA's each counted several times. The gate agents came onboard and counted passengers. They all still disagreed. So; I went into the cabin and counted myself. My count agreed with the FA's in the cabin. I made a note on our second release that we handed to the gate as to the discrepancy and made the decision to close the main cabin door and depart. It is turning into a long story. The gist of it is we were burning fuel. Probably about 10 minutes of APU fuel just to figure out the passenger count. We pushed off the gate and were eventually given taxi instructions to hold for our wheels up time for ZZZ1. The holding pad was located at the full length. I was probably about two minutes late in getting the aircraft configured for APU burn only in the pad for our approximate 25 minute hold for departure. Again we were burning fuel. So our flight closes the main cabin door and departs. The flight went airborne. The approach into ZZZ1 was to be Runway XXL. The winds were at the time of the approach were westerly/northwesterly. From 290 degrees gusting to 29kts. The second approach over to Runway XYL was discontinued inside of the final approach fix due to winds reported from the tower once and then twice for verification of approximately 300-310 degrees gusting to 39kts. The last fuel noted prior to discontinuance was our reserve and alternate fuel minimum requirement. As we proceeded towards the alternate airport; I was closely watching fuel and doing fuel calculations. There were all the other distractions that were going on along with all the duty and duty delineations. Such as ACARS notification to dispatcher as to go around and destination ZZZ2. Flight Attendant and passenger notifications. Dealing with radio chatter and concentrating on flying the airplane and trying to get us to ZZZ2. Approximately 20 minutes to our eventual touchdown at our alternate I [advised ATC of our fuel situation] and made my/our wishes known as to what fixes were required and descended on our own cognizance in order to be appropriately fixed; located and configured for a safe approach to the runway at ZZZ2. The approach was uneventful and the last fuel amount noted on landing with all wheels on the ground was 2000 lbs.So; there were a whole string of failures on this day. The way we learn prevention; identify failures. Make an assessment of those failures. Then incorporate the lessons learned into the future.1. Fuel was wasted twice prior to departure due to operational inefficiency.2. After a go around from Runway XXL ATC was vectoring us for a right downwind for a 2nd attempt. I opted to request Runway XYL. Bad choice because we could have had a shorter sequencing had we just stayed with Runway XXL. There was a good reason for the request. The building on the right side of Runway XXL greatly affects the movement and flow of wind from the northwest. So fuel was wasted in a poor choice of rwy change with the hope that the sequencing would work out and that the winds would do at least 1 of 2 things. At a minimum; and with the lack of a cargo building; not change speed or direction or hope for a lessening in xwind strength or direction. Unfortunately; speed and direction worsened beyond published xwind limits inside the final approach fix on the second approach to the airport.3. Our first contact with the center controller was a perfect example of poor communication. She gave us routing to ZZZ2. She only cleared us up to 13 thousand. The routing was the problem. The controller that sends us to a fix; when queried as to the phonetics should have used the radar scope in front of them to spell the fix. I made a guess; then asked for phonetics. The phonetics was incorrect. The FO asked for clarification. The phonetics were given again. The phonetics were incorrect again. Center controller apologizes and finally gives the correct spelling for the route. Anyway; the problem isn't really all of #3. The #3 text is just a distraction. The problem is truly this. If all that remains is reserve fuel and alternate fuel upon a balked landing/go-around. The problem is that it is already a minimum fuel advisory situation. Not that it is supposed to mean anything to controllers; I have never seen a delay using this term/phrase and until this day because of my personal failure I have never burned into reserve fuel because of my willingness to advise ATC of MINIMUM FUEL ADVISORY. So; all that other stuff about the first center controller; was just a detail. A detail that helped to lead me down the yellow brick road of failure. Why? I know that we are supposed to do all that we can do in order to not burn into reserve fuel. With the next controller I did make the statement No Undue Delay Requested. Not exactly the words; minimum fuel advisory. The second controller did issue an immediate clearance towards ZZZ2.3a. After all that; 3 or 3a is actually reserve fuel and alternate fuel equals an automatic MINIMUM FUEL ADVISORY.3b. Distractions at times can be everywhere and we have to overcome distractions. Unfortunately; the first contact with center control was nothing but one big distraction. So; climb. Get up into the mid to upper FL200's. Should have done it and in the future will do it.4. I eventually made the decision to [advise] the current center controller. I had been watching the fuel closely. I knew that I was going to [use] those words. I really should have said those words earlier instead of 20 minutes prior to touchdown. I probably should have [used] these words instead of requesting no undue delay. That would have been with the 2nd center controller vs. the third and final center controller prior to ZZZ2 approach control.5. This event occurred on day 1 of a 4 day trip. Strangely enough this 4 day trip is full of ZZZ1-ZZZ3-ZZZ1 turns. On all these turns I fly by ZZZ2. The final lesson relates to the major event of discussion in this report but also incorporates my observations of fuel burns on repeated flybys of ZZZ2. The final lesson is; pad the fuel. I need to go back to doing all that I can do to not dip into reserve fuel. So; I shall round up for padding and add 100 lbs. If no rounding is to occur. Add 100 lbs and an additional 50 lbs for padding. My future go arounds with diversions to alternates will follow this model at a bare minimum.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.