Narrative:

A collision hazard exists and is caused by improper airspace management procedures. There is a high vol of aircraft requesting VFR practice INS approachs to a user-drawn NDB-like approach to a commercial radio station. This broadcast station beacon is located at a point approximately 5 SM east of prc. These aircraft enter the traffic pattern at an angle and altitude that creates a high collision hazard with aircraft arriving and departing runway 21. Runway 21 is the calm wind runway and is in use the majority of time. Additionally, there are a large amount of aircraft requesting VFR practice approachs on the VOR-a procedure to prc. These aircraft are in conflict (opp direction) with those making the approach from the east on the user drawn NDB-like procedure, particularly on the missed approach segment of the procedures. Prc tower is a non-radar VFR tower facility. The facility is already highly taxed with a large vol of traffic. The tower is unable to provide any kind of meaningful traffic information to these aircraft. Contributing factors: management has instructed the controllers at prc tower to restrict the inbound traffic on the VOR-a approach procedure to at or above 6500' MSL, and the inbound traffic on the opp side of the airport on the NDB-type approach to at or above 7000' MSL. This is a very dangerous procedure as the traffic is not in level flight, but actually descending and climbing throughout the procedure--particularly the portion of the procedure that is within the air traffic area. (Note: the air traffic area at love field extends up to approximately 8000' MSL.) (see attached sheets.) the controllers can always deny the approach to the users, however they are under pressure both from management and peer pressure to approve this type of operation. Additionally, most controllers at prc are at their first facility, they follow instructions from seemingly more experienced peers and do not question management's decisions and instructions--even though sometimes, as in this example, hazards are introduced into the system. Corrective actions: notify users that the user-drawn NDB approach is no longer valid. Suggest to users that they draw an approach somewhere that is outside of the air traffic area. Prc has no NDB approach. It is not really necessary that a NDB approach terminate at an airport. This should have little impact on training. Management should be counseled that practice INS approachs constitute a special hazard. At present the management of prc tower states that these operations are 'just another way of entering the traffic pattern.' this is not true. During a practice INS approach, the safety pilot's view is restr by the PF wearing a view restricting device. Many incidents have pointed to the need for extra precautions (reference aim paragraph 244). Additionally, these aircraft enter the traffic pattern at unsafe angles and altitudes.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TRAFFIC CTL PROCS IN EFFECT AT PRC PROTESTED BY CTLR REPORTERS.

Narrative: A COLLISION HAZARD EXISTS AND IS CAUSED BY IMPROPER AIRSPACE MGMNT PROCS. THERE IS A HIGH VOL OF ACFT REQUESTING VFR PRACTICE INS APCHS TO A USER-DRAWN NDB-LIKE APCH TO A COMMERCIAL RADIO STATION. THIS BROADCAST STATION BEACON IS LOCATED AT A POINT APPROX 5 SM E OF PRC. THESE ACFT ENTER THE TFC PATTERN AT AN ANGLE AND ALT THAT CREATES A HIGH COLLISION HAZARD WITH ACFT ARRIVING AND DEPARTING RWY 21. RWY 21 IS THE CALM WIND RWY AND IS IN USE THE MAJORITY OF TIME. ADDITIONALLY, THERE ARE A LARGE AMOUNT OF ACFT REQUESTING VFR PRACTICE APCHS ON THE VOR-A PROC TO PRC. THESE ACFT ARE IN CONFLICT (OPP DIRECTION) WITH THOSE MAKING THE APCH FROM THE E ON THE USER DRAWN NDB-LIKE PROC, PARTICULARLY ON THE MISSED APCH SEGMENT OF THE PROCS. PRC TWR IS A NON-RADAR VFR TWR FAC. THE FAC IS ALREADY HIGHLY TAXED WITH A LARGE VOL OF TFC. THE TWR IS UNABLE TO PROVIDE ANY KIND OF MEANINGFUL TFC INFO TO THESE ACFT. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: MGMNT HAS INSTRUCTED THE CTLRS AT PRC TWR TO RESTRICT THE INBND TFC ON THE VOR-A APCH PROC TO AT OR ABOVE 6500' MSL, AND THE INBND TFC ON THE OPP SIDE OF THE ARPT ON THE NDB-TYPE APCH TO AT OR ABOVE 7000' MSL. THIS IS A VERY DANGEROUS PROC AS THE TFC IS NOT IN LEVEL FLT, BUT ACTUALLY DSNDING AND CLBING THROUGHOUT THE PROC--PARTICULARLY THE PORTION OF THE PROC THAT IS WITHIN THE ATA. (NOTE: THE ATA AT LOVE FIELD EXTENDS UP TO APPROX 8000' MSL.) (SEE ATTACHED SHEETS.) THE CTLRS CAN ALWAYS DENY THE APCH TO THE USERS, HOWEVER THEY ARE UNDER PRESSURE BOTH FROM MGMNT AND PEER PRESSURE TO APPROVE THIS TYPE OF OPERATION. ADDITIONALLY, MOST CTLRS AT PRC ARE AT THEIR FIRST FAC, THEY FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS FROM SEEMINGLY MORE EXPERIENCED PEERS AND DO NOT QUESTION MGMNT'S DECISIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS--EVEN THOUGH SOMETIMES, AS IN THIS EXAMPLE, HAZARDS ARE INTRODUCED INTO THE SYS. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: NOTIFY USERS THAT THE USER-DRAWN NDB APCH IS NO LONGER VALID. SUGGEST TO USERS THAT THEY DRAW AN APCH SOMEWHERE THAT IS OUTSIDE OF THE ATA. PRC HAS NO NDB APCH. IT IS NOT REALLY NECESSARY THAT A NDB APCH TERMINATE AT AN ARPT. THIS SHOULD HAVE LITTLE IMPACT ON TRNING. MGMNT SHOULD BE COUNSELED THAT PRACTICE INS APCHS CONSTITUTE A SPECIAL HAZARD. AT PRESENT THE MGMNT OF PRC TWR STATES THAT THESE OPS ARE 'JUST ANOTHER WAY OF ENTERING THE TFC PATTERN.' THIS IS NOT TRUE. DURING A PRACTICE INS APCH, THE SAFETY PLT'S VIEW IS RESTR BY THE PF WEARING A VIEW RESTRICTING DEVICE. MANY INCIDENTS HAVE POINTED TO THE NEED FOR EXTRA PRECAUTIONS (REF AIM PARAGRAPH 244). ADDITIONALLY, THESE ACFT ENTER THE TFC PATTERN AT UNSAFE ANGLES AND ALTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.