Narrative:

Clearance was UGAAA6 ahn transition. Push clearance was tail north; indicating a 9L departure. The FMS was programmed for 8R and was not changed. The taxi check was completed and the brief was UGAAA6; 10;000; ronii was called as the first fix; I did not catch this. We were issued to line up and wait; followed by a takeoff clearance; RNAV to lidas. We took off with the wrong runway programmed in the FMS and when the navigation was selected at 400 feet we were tracking the wrong course. We received an RA; complied with it; and were then issued a heading to fly to get us back on our appropriate course. We continued without having further incidences.when we were issued the push clearance indicating a 9L departure; I should have reverified the FMS. It was a busy taxi; yet in retrospect I should have set the brake and visually confirmed the FMS and the first fix. Upon accepting the line up and wait clearance I should have verified the runway on the flight plan page. The extra seconds to do these actions would have prevented this loss of separation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ERJ-170 flight crew reported a track deviation and an airborne conflict shortly after takeoff from ATL when they failed to reprogram the FMS following a late runway change on taxi out.

Narrative: Clearance was UGAAA6 AHN transition. Push clearance was tail north; indicating a 9L departure. The FMS was programmed for 8R and was not changed. The taxi check was completed and the brief was UGAAA6; 10;000; RONII was called as the first fix; I did not catch this. We were issued to line up and wait; followed by a takeoff clearance; RNAV to LIDAS. We took off with the wrong runway programmed in the FMS and when the navigation was selected at 400 feet we were tracking the wrong course. We received an RA; complied with it; and were then issued a heading to fly to get us back on our appropriate course. We continued without having further incidences.When we were issued the push clearance indicating a 9L departure; I should have reverified the FMS. It was a busy taxi; yet in retrospect I should have set the brake and visually confirmed the FMS and the first fix. Upon accepting the line up and wait clearance I should have verified the runway on the flight plan page. The extra seconds to do these actions would have prevented this loss of separation.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.