Narrative:

The flight was an early morning report; but there were no errors leading up to the event. On the arrival briefing; I mentioned we use white-needles to give us vertical guidance; since the atl 9R glide path (gp) was out of service (OTS); the captain agreed. While being vectored by ATC; we had a tailwind of about 12 knots. ATC was busy trying to sequence all the early arrivals into atl.due to their workload; we received a late vector to intercept the localizer and we were going through the course by 1/2 scale. The captain disengaged the autopilot to correct this error. While I was watching him correct course; ATC issued traffic at 1 o'clock. The TCAS was deferred; so I dedicated my monitoring for the traffic. ATC then gave us a speed reduction to 210 knots then descend to 3;000. At this point; I glanced at the snowflake and saw us 1 dot above. ATC then asked for the traffic again; but there was no contact. We were high so the captain wanted auto-pilot on and vertical speed to catch the snowflake. He then asked to put a fix behind us; so I did because we were getting busy. I should have queried him; because this caused the snowflake to disappear. ATC then assigned a speed reduction to 180 knots and I was concentrating on why the snowflake dropped out. Immediately; the captain called for flaps 8 and flaps 20. When I went to look up again; he called for gear down. I was able to look up again quickly and my mind saw the red PAPI; but then the captain called for flaps 45; landing check before I could process it. I then completed the landing check and when I put the checklist back; I saw 4 red PAPI lights. The captain also saw this and we leveled off at 2;200 feet at burny. We were able to continue normal stabilized approach to landing; after that. Tower informed us of a low altitude alert and loss of communication with approach.the threats consisted of a very early departure time; night; atl 9R gp OTS; and a late vector to final by ATC; being rushed. The error was not looking visually at the PAPI outside to cross-check the vertical path. The undesired aircraft state happened because of multi-tasking; being rushed; communication with ATC; and operations that were not normal with the glideslope out.from this event; I would make a company policy to not touch the FMS below 4;000 feet; if it was already 'cleaned up.' additionally; with gp OTS I would include brief items for vertical path cross-check with the PAPI more than usual.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CRJ-200 First Officer reported a low altitude event on approach to ATL Runway 9R when the crew lost situational awareness and descended below the glideslope.

Narrative: The flight was an early morning report; but there were no errors leading up to the event. On the arrival briefing; I mentioned we use white-needles to give us vertical guidance; since the ATL 9R Glide Path (GP) was Out of Service (OTS); the Captain agreed. While being vectored by ATC; we had a tailwind of about 12 knots. ATC was busy trying to sequence all the early arrivals into ATL.Due to their workload; we received a late vector to intercept the localizer and we were going through the course by 1/2 scale. The Captain disengaged the autopilot to correct this error. While I was watching him correct course; ATC issued traffic at 1 o'clock. The TCAS was deferred; so I dedicated my monitoring for the traffic. ATC then gave us a speed reduction to 210 knots then descend to 3;000. At this point; I glanced at the snowflake and saw us 1 dot above. ATC then asked for the traffic again; but there was no contact. We were high so the Captain wanted auto-pilot on and vertical speed to catch the snowflake. He then asked to put a fix behind us; so I did because we were getting busy. I should have queried him; because this caused the snowflake to disappear. ATC then assigned a speed reduction to 180 knots and I was concentrating on why the snowflake dropped out. Immediately; the Captain called for flaps 8 and flaps 20. When I went to look up again; he called for gear down. I was able to look up again quickly and my mind saw the red PAPI; but then the Captain called for flaps 45; landing check before I could process it. I then completed the landing check and when I put the checklist back; I saw 4 red PAPI lights. The Captain also saw this and we leveled off at 2;200 feet at BURNY. We were able to continue normal stabilized approach to landing; after that. Tower informed us of a low altitude alert and loss of communication with approach.The threats consisted of a very early departure time; night; ATL 9R GP OTS; and a late vector to final by ATC; being rushed. The error was not looking visually at the PAPI outside to cross-check the vertical path. The undesired aircraft state happened because of multi-tasking; being rushed; communication with ATC; and operations that were not normal with the glideslope out.From this event; I would make a company policy to not touch the FMS below 4;000 feet; if it was already 'cleaned up.' Additionally; with GP OTS I would include brief items for vertical path cross-check with the PAPI more than usual.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.