Narrative:

We were cleared to taxi to runway 19C and hold short. The first officer (first officer) read back both the taxi and the hold short instructions. While at the hold short; the tower asked us to confirm that we were indeed holding short. We confirmed that we were. While waiting for some corporate jets to land; we discussed the fact that it seemed the tower couldn't see us. He had asked one airplane where he was; and where he was exiting the runway; plus he asked us about holding short. We discussed the fog and that perhaps the tower's visibility was restricted or nil. The ground vis was ok; current weather was reported as: kiad 21007KT 1SM R01R/P6000FT br OVC004 05/04 A3007 rmk AO2 SLP183 T00500044.we were instructed to line up and wait; [then] we were cleared for takeoff. The tower transmitted; '[company]; let me know when you're rolling.' our speed at that time was 120 KIAS; according to the captain pilot flying (PF). (I'm not 100% sure; but I think V1 was around 138K. Our TOGW was about 635K). On climb-out; the captain and I agreed that as soon as we heard '[company]' we were expecting a tower-directed abort. I thought that perhaps because of the heavy fog and apparent lack of visibility; there was a tenerife-type runway incursion in the making. All this happened at 120 knots.it was not the best time for the tower to ask us a relatively routine question. I'm sure the controller has a passing familiarity with how takeoff aborts are conducted in the cockpit; but he probably has no idea of the huge emphasis placed on pilots (at least [company] pilots) with the go-no go decision; and how incredibly focused and critical everything becomes in the high-speed regime.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B777 First Officer reported the flight crew was distracted at a critical time in the takeoff roll when Tower radioed with a non-essential question.

Narrative: We were cleared to taxi to Runway 19C and hold short. The First officer (FO) read back both the taxi and the hold short instructions. While at the hold short; the tower asked us to confirm that we were indeed holding short. We confirmed that we were. While waiting for some corporate jets to land; we discussed the fact that it seemed the Tower couldn't see us. He had asked one airplane where he was; and where he was exiting the runway; plus he asked us about holding short. We discussed the fog and that perhaps the tower's visibility was restricted or nil. The ground vis was ok; current weather was reported as: KIAD 21007KT 1SM R01R/P6000FT BR OVC004 05/04 A3007 RMK AO2 SLP183 T00500044.We were instructed to line up and wait; [then] we were cleared for takeoff. The Tower transmitted; '[Company]; let me know when you're rolling.' Our speed at that time was 120 KIAS; according to the Captain Pilot Flying (PF). (I'm not 100% sure; but I think V1 was around 138K. Our TOGW was about 635K). On climb-out; the Captain and I agreed that as soon as we heard '[Company]' we were expecting a tower-directed abort. I thought that perhaps because of the heavy fog and apparent lack of visibility; there was a Tenerife-type runway incursion in the making. All this happened at 120 knots.It was not the best time for the Tower to ask us a relatively routine question. I'm sure the controller has a passing familiarity with how takeoff aborts are conducted in the cockpit; but he probably has no idea of the huge emphasis placed on pilots (at least [Company] pilots) with the go-no go decision; and how incredibly focused and critical everything becomes in the high-speed regime.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.