Narrative:

We were assigned the ewr stadium visual approach to runway 29. As it was both mine and the first officer's (pilot monitoring) first time landing on runway 29 and it was night VMC; we requested the RNAV rnp Y but were denied by ATC; citing the need for same ground track due to heavy traffic.I put tet (3000 ft) and gimee (500 ft) in the box; with a fix off of gimee 190/4.9 to represent slimr. Chumr; the last fix on the chart; was not available in the database; nor was it possible to create a significantly accurate fix. Bearing in mind the weather; the company policy that we should not build approaches to the runway; and positive that we would have the runway in sight I did not put anything in the FMC that would provide a possible runway position.I had the preceding aircraft and the runway environment in sight. The approach notes call for the aircraft to be fully configured and at 500 ft crossing the railway bridge on the extended centerline and I feel that I complied with that instruction. I had actually begun to level the aircraft. At 500 ft the papis became apparent to me; indicating four reds. The pm (pilot monitoring) was talking about the runway; making sure I was aware of the four reds and making helpful observations as I corrected the glideslope. During a very busy time on the approach; with plenty of ATC chatter on the frequency; I heard a single undetermined audio alert. With the runway in sight; very slightly right of centerline and almost immediately correcting to the glidepath it happened so quickly that I had no idea what I had heard. I continued with the approach and landed uneventfully. It was only after we landed that I asked the pm if he had heard the alert. He replied that he had but again; considering how busy we were; was unable to determine or recall the exact nature of the alert.the stadium visual to runway 29 procedure should not be flown at night by crews who have never landed on 29 before. The runway lights are inadequate for early visual acquisition. There needs to be an RNAV visual like in las; dca and lga. In an attempt to comply with ATC instructions; the workload was very high and; with an unknown single audio event in the cockpit; I can easily see how this can lead to an unstable approach.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier crew was on a night time EWR Stadium Visual Approach to Runway 29 with an improperly programmed FMS. It was the first time conducting this approach for both pilots. At 500 feet; PAPI indicated four reds followed by an unidentified alert; correction was made immediately. This procedure should not be flown at night by crews who have never landed on runway 29 before.

Narrative: We were assigned the EWR STADIUM Visual Approach to Runway 29. As it was both mine and the First Officer's (Pilot Monitoring) first time landing on Runway 29 and it was night VMC; we requested the RNAV RNP Y but were denied by ATC; citing the need for same ground track due to heavy traffic.I put TET (3000 ft) and GIMEE (500 ft) in the box; with a fix off of GIMEE 190/4.9 to represent SLIMR. CHUMR; the last fix on the chart; was not available in the database; nor was it possible to create a significantly accurate fix. Bearing in mind the weather; the Company policy that we should not build approaches to the runway; and positive that we would have the runway in sight I did not put anything in the FMC that would provide a possible runway position.I had the preceding aircraft and the runway environment in sight. The approach notes call for the aircraft to be fully configured and at 500 ft crossing the railway bridge on the extended centerline and I feel that I complied with that instruction. I had actually begun to level the aircraft. At 500 ft the PAPIs became apparent to me; indicating four reds. The PM (Pilot Monitoring) was talking about the runway; making sure I was aware of the four reds and making helpful observations as I corrected the glideslope. During a very busy time on the approach; with plenty of ATC chatter on the frequency; I heard a single undetermined audio alert. With the runway in sight; very slightly right of centerline and almost immediately correcting to the glidepath it happened so quickly that I had no idea what I had heard. I continued with the approach and landed uneventfully. It was only after we landed that I asked the PM if he had heard the alert. He replied that he had but again; considering how busy we were; was unable to determine or recall the exact nature of the alert.The STADIUM Visual to Runway 29 procedure should not be flown at night by Crews who have never landed on 29 before. The runway lights are inadequate for early visual acquisition. There needs to be an RNAV visual like in LAS; DCA and LGA. In an attempt to comply with ATC instructions; the workload was very high and; with an unknown single audio event in the cockpit; I can easily see how this can lead to an unstable approach.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.