Narrative:

Upon reaching our cruise altitude while flying south I attempted to use the aircraft sun visor. The visor was loosed at the point where the visor rod attaches to the ball making it swing freely and not very useful. The friction nut that tightens the ball in place was also stripped beyond a certain tightness level. I attempted to spin the visor clockwise in order to hopefully tighten the rod into the ball as to be able to make the visor stay in place. During the rotation; as the visor went around the overhead panel and more specifically the cargo fire detection panel; the visor hit a small c shape metal piece that allows the fwd cargo agent discharge cover to rest. The visor came into contact with this metal tab; bending it under the guard and pushing it against the discharge button causing the agent to discharge into the fwd cargo compartment. We received an ECAM and corresponding light indicating the fire suppression agent was discharged into the compartment. The captain contacted operations and maintenance to inform them of the incident. The rest of the flight proceeded uneventfully and we landed at destination where the aircraft was grounded awaiting maintenance. We followed the ECAM message to not open the cargo hold until all passengers were deplaned. The captain also made the appropriate entries in the aircraft logbook. 1 for the cargo hold fire suppression agent being discharged and 1 for the sun visor not being functional. Me and the captain both noticed that this is a design flaw in the airbus. My visor is able to inadvertently activate the fwd cargo suppression system and his is able to activate the ram air turbine since the same design flaw occurs with that switch on his side. A suggestion would be to have a rail of other device preventing the window visor from reaching any switch. At the very least inform crew member of this potential scenario.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A319 First Officer experienced difficulties with a balky sun visor and attempted to tighten the attachment ball by rotating the entire visor clockwise several times. The visor came into contact with a metal tab by the forward cargo fire bottle; bending it; and causing the agent to be discharged. The flight continued to destination.

Narrative: Upon reaching our cruise altitude while flying south I attempted to use the aircraft sun visor. The visor was loosed at the point where the visor rod attaches to the ball making it swing freely and not very useful. The friction nut that tightens the ball in place was also stripped beyond a certain tightness level. I attempted to spin the visor clockwise in order to hopefully tighten the rod into the ball as to be able to make the visor stay in place. During the rotation; as the visor went around the overhead panel and more specifically the cargo fire detection panel; the visor hit a small c shape metal piece that allows the FWD cargo agent discharge cover to rest. The visor came into contact with this metal tab; bending it under the guard and pushing it against the discharge button causing the agent to discharge into the FWD cargo compartment. We received an ECAM and corresponding light indicating the fire suppression agent was discharged into the compartment. The captain contacted operations and maintenance to inform them of the incident. The rest of the flight proceeded uneventfully and we landed at destination where the aircraft was grounded awaiting maintenance. We followed the ECAM message to not open the cargo hold until all passengers were deplaned. The captain also made the appropriate entries in the aircraft logbook. 1 for the cargo hold fire suppression agent being discharged and 1 for the sun visor not being functional. Me and the captain both noticed that this is a design flaw in the Airbus. My visor is able to inadvertently activate the FWD cargo suppression system and his is able to activate the Ram Air Turbine since the same design flaw occurs with that switch on his side. A suggestion would be to have a rail of other device preventing the window visor from reaching any switch. At the very least inform crew member of this potential scenario.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.