Narrative:

Flap gauge indicated split flap condition while configuring for landing. Autopilot engaged on vectors to final; 120 knots; I called for flaps 1. I noted a significant split in the flap position gauge pointers: left pointer at '1' and right pointer about half way between '1' and 'up.' after concurring on the condition; first officer and I coordinated with approach control to hold while we worked the problem. We ran the quick reference handbook (QRH) checklist; 'trailing edge flap asymmetry' and determined the condition would likely require a non-normal flap configuration and landing. We were tankering 8;600 pounds of fuel; QRH called for reducing fuel load to minimize approach speed and braking requirements. We coordinated with ops for a dedicated dispatch phone patch. We asked for a maintenance rep and chief pilot. I gave flying duties to the first officer (pilot monitoring) and worked with maintenance; the chief pilot; and dispatcher on problem analysis and course of action. We were in agreement: reduce fuel load; and fly a non-normal flap configuration approach. I briefed my flight attendant crew on the problem and briefed the passengers. (I updated passengers regularly as we worked the problem; and prior to beginning approach.) we relayed our intent to approach and coordinated landing on the longest available runway. Final configuration was to be trailing edge flaps up; and leading edge devices extended. As a brake cooling advisory was annunciated; and an estimated 5400 feet of runway would remain with minimum braking; we elected to leave autobrakes off; and apply wheel brakes manually. We completed QRH configuration procedures; arriving at a leading edge device full extend condition. We re-ran performance numbers; coordinated a rejected landing plan; and set up for the approach. The approach was captain flown; autopilot off; without incident. Touchdown occurred approximately 1500 feet beyond runway threshold. Autospeed brake deployment was normal. Reverse thrust was employed until 60 knots; when wheel braking was commenced. Emergency response vehicles were debriefed and released by radio. We proceeded to the gate without further incident. Maintenance personnel were debriefed; and logbook discrepancy completed. Dispatch and chief pilot were debriefed.we were fortunate: tankering extra fuel; weather was cavu; 16;000 foot long dry runway available; dedicated phone patch with dispatch; chief pilot and maintenance; and an excellent boeing checklist. Both pilots were experienced. Recent training reinforced non-normal procedure handling; including vvmi; challenge-response-response and QRH methodology. Nothing was rushed; or missed. We had complete confidence in our ability to successfully fly the aircraft to a safe landing; although neither of us had previously experienced a 'flaps up' condition on the line. Although flare and touchdown were notably different than normal; handling requirements were well within the capabilities of B-737 rated pilots. The new boeing checklist was also clear and concise; a notable improvement over the previous QRH for this non-normal condition.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 Captain reported a normal zero-flap landing after noting a split flap condition in the trailing edge flaps.

Narrative: Flap gauge indicated split flap condition while configuring for landing. Autopilot engaged on vectors to final; 120 knots; I called for flaps 1. I noted a significant split in the flap position gauge pointers: left pointer at '1' and right pointer about half way between '1' and 'up.' After concurring on the condition; First Officer and I coordinated with Approach Control to hold while we worked the problem. We ran the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) Checklist; 'Trailing Edge Flap Asymmetry' and determined the condition would likely require a non-normal flap configuration and landing. We were tankering 8;600 pounds of fuel; QRH called for reducing fuel load to minimize approach speed and braking requirements. We coordinated with Ops for a dedicated Dispatch phone patch. We asked for a Maintenance Rep and Chief Pilot. I gave flying duties to the First Officer (Pilot Monitoring) and worked with Maintenance; the Chief Pilot; and Dispatcher on problem analysis and course of action. We were in agreement: reduce fuel load; and fly a non-normal flap configuration approach. I briefed my Flight Attendant Crew on the problem and briefed the Passengers. (I updated Passengers regularly as we worked the problem; and prior to beginning approach.) We relayed our intent to Approach and coordinated landing on the longest available runway. Final configuration was to be Trailing Edge Flaps up; and Leading Edge Devices extended. As a Brake Cooling advisory was annunciated; and an estimated 5400 feet of runway would remain with minimum braking; we elected to leave autobrakes off; and apply wheel brakes manually. We completed QRH configuration procedures; arriving at a Leading Edge Device Full Extend condition. We re-ran performance numbers; coordinated a rejected landing plan; and set up for the approach. The approach was Captain flown; autopilot off; without incident. Touchdown occurred approximately 1500 feet beyond runway threshold. Autospeed brake deployment was normal. Reverse thrust was employed until 60 knots; when wheel braking was commenced. Emergency response vehicles were debriefed and released by radio. We proceeded to the gate without further incident. Maintenance personnel were debriefed; and logbook discrepancy completed. Dispatch and Chief Pilot were debriefed.We were fortunate: Tankering extra fuel; weather was CAVU; 16;000 foot long dry runway available; dedicated phone patch with Dispatch; Chief Pilot and Maintenance; and an excellent Boeing checklist. Both Pilots were experienced. Recent training reinforced non-normal procedure handling; including VVMI; Challenge-Response-Response and QRH methodology. Nothing was rushed; or missed. We had complete confidence in our ability to successfully fly the aircraft to a safe landing; although neither of us had previously experienced a 'Flaps Up' condition on the line. Although flare and touchdown were notably different than normal; handling requirements were well within the capabilities of B-737 rated Pilots. The new Boeing checklist was also clear and concise; a notable improvement over the previous QRH for this non-normal condition.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.