Narrative:

The maintenance crew chief asked the other pilot and me if we could perform a short maintenance test flight in the falcon 2000 to check the engine anti-ice system. The purpose of the test flight was to determine if a problem had moved to the other engine after maintenance had swapped valves from side to side. This could only be checked in flight at high power settings as this was where the problem appeared. We planned to fly a brief flight up to XXX VOR and back so we could get to a high enough altitude to have an outside air temperature cold enough to turn on the engine anti-ice system. We did not file an IFR flight plan as the weather was clear with unlimited visibility. We did plan to contact approach control for VFR traffic advisories. We were also planning to troubleshoot a continuing nose-wheel steering problem that had been going on for almost a year.after engine start-up another maintenance technician was outside the aircraft to tap on the nose-steering unit with a rubber mallet if the control seemed to be sticking on initial taxi out. We made several short turns but could not duplicate the problem so we proceeded to the runway for departure. After several 90 degree turns we noticed that the plane wanted to constantly track to the right and slight steering inputs to the left would not correct the problem. It was only after larger inputs that the plane would jerk back to the left; the same problem that was seen on the last series of flights.once we got to the approach end we performed the balance of the pre-departure checks and discussed that we would contact approach control once airborne. Once airborne the pilot not flying (PNF) contacted approach requesting traffic advisories while on a maintenance test flight. While on climb-out nfp asked if he should turn on the engine anti-ice system to perform the test. I told him 'not yet' and he thought I said 'yes' so he turned on the one engine. I then told nfp to turn it off because the tat (total air temperature) was still 15 C; 5 degrees above the upper limit. The nfp then turned off the anti-ice and I then noticed that the control yoke was moving forward to a nose down position while I was hand flying the aircraft. At this point I thought that the autopilot had somehow gotten engaged and was leveling off the aircraft. I made the comment of 'what is happening'; when nfp stated that there was traffic crossing in front of us and that he was making corrections to resolve the conflict. As I looked up I saw what appeared to be a single engine bonanza that came into view in my left windshield crossing left to right about 200 feet above us. I was surprised to see the aircraft and that we had no TCAS warning nor did I see any traffic on my mfd. I looked at the transponder display to see if the code was in the display and then I looked at the transponder switch to see that I was in the off position. I immediately switched the transponder on about the same time we heard approach talking to the other aircraft explaining why he hadn't reported traffic (us) to him as he hadn't established radar contact with us because our transponder had was not turned on. The other aircraft reported that we crossed within 200 feet of each other. We continued climb to 10;500 feet; performed our engine anti-ice test; confirmed the failed anti-ice valve and returned to land without further incident. On decent we got a traffic advisory and also got a TA from the TCAS confirming that the system was working correctly.on post flight discussion with the other pilot I noted that this was the second time in the last month of flying with him that he has forgotten to switch on the TCAS system on leaving the blocks. Our checklist had been changed recently to put the TCAS switch as the second item on the checklist after turning on the taxi light instead of the first item to help another pilot who was also having difficulty getting the TCAS switched on. I feel that there were too many distractions during this flight that led up to the crew not being more vigilant about looking for other traffic. When we have ATC and TCAS systems working for us to help keep us clear of traffic we become complacent into thinking that these systems will prevent traffic conflicts. Also we should have briefed that we would not perform any tests until we were above 10;000 feet and clear of most other traffic. Trying to perform the anti-ice test so early in the climb was a major distraction which pulled me from looking outside into the cockpit. When the PNF smoothly but forcefully pushed the control wheel forward without saying anything as he was performing the maneuver; could have cause the PF to attempt to counter the control movement without realizing that it was the other pilot; not a system malfunction; and could have cause a disaster.we have a company safety management system in place and have identified this incident as a hazard to safety and are in the process of conducting a full internal investigation and review with recommendations for changes and improvements to mitigate this from happening in the future.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: The Falcon 2000 crew was on a maintenance check flight and was distracted by maintenance checks which resulted in the transponder being left off despite being on the taxi checklist. This led to a near miss with a Bonanza at approximately 5;000 feet; as the TCAS did not work and Approach Control had not yet established radar contact with the Falcon.

Narrative: The maintenance crew chief asked the other pilot and me if we could perform a short maintenance test flight in the Falcon 2000 to check the engine anti-ice system. The purpose of the test flight was to determine if a problem had moved to the other engine after maintenance had swapped valves from side to side. This could only be checked in flight at high power settings as this was where the problem appeared. We planned to fly a brief flight up to XXX VOR and back so we could get to a high enough altitude to have an outside air temperature cold enough to turn on the engine anti-ice system. We did not file an IFR flight plan as the weather was clear with unlimited visibility. We did plan to contact Approach control for VFR Traffic Advisories. We were also planning to troubleshoot a continuing nose-wheel steering problem that had been going on for almost a year.After engine start-up another Maintenance Technician was outside the aircraft to tap on the nose-steering unit with a rubber mallet if the control seemed to be sticking on initial taxi out. We made several short turns but could not duplicate the problem so we proceeded to the runway for departure. After several 90 degree turns we noticed that the plane wanted to constantly track to the right and slight steering inputs to the left would not correct the problem. It was only after larger inputs that the plane would jerk back to the left; the same problem that was seen on the last series of flights.Once we got to the approach end we performed the balance of the pre-departure checks and discussed that we would contact Approach Control once airborne. Once airborne the Pilot Not Flying (PNF) contacted Approach requesting traffic advisories while on a maintenance test flight. While on climb-out NFP asked if he should turn on the engine anti-ice system to perform the test. I told him 'not yet' and he thought I said 'yes' so he turned on the one engine. I then told NFP to turn it off because the TAT (total air temperature) was still 15 C; 5 degrees above the upper limit. The NFP then turned off the anti-ice and I then noticed that the control yoke was moving forward to a nose down position while I was hand flying the aircraft. At this point I thought that the autopilot had somehow gotten engaged and was leveling off the aircraft. I made the comment of 'what is happening'; when NFP stated that there was traffic crossing in front of us and that he was making corrections to resolve the conflict. As I looked up I saw what appeared to be a single engine Bonanza that came into view in my left windshield crossing left to right about 200 feet above us. I was surprised to see the aircraft and that we had no TCAS warning nor did I see any traffic on my MFD. I looked at the Transponder display to see if the code was in the display and then I looked at the Transponder switch to see that I was in the OFF position. I immediately switched the Transponder ON about the same time we heard Approach talking to the other aircraft explaining why he hadn't reported traffic (us) to him as he hadn't established radar contact with us because our transponder had was not turned on. The other aircraft reported that we crossed within 200 feet of each other. We continued climb to 10;500 feet; performed our engine anti-ice test; confirmed the failed anti-ice valve and returned to land without further incident. On decent we got a traffic advisory and also got a TA from the TCAS confirming that the system was working correctly.On post flight discussion with the other pilot I noted that this was the second time in the last month of flying with him that he has forgotten to switch on the TCAS system on leaving the blocks. Our checklist had been changed recently to put the TCAS switch as the second item on the checklist after turning on the taxi light instead of the first item to help another pilot who was also having difficulty getting the TCAS switched on. I feel that there were too many distractions during this flight that led up to the crew not being more vigilant about looking for other traffic. When we have ATC and TCAS systems working for us to help keep us clear of traffic we become complacent into thinking that these systems will prevent traffic conflicts. Also we should have briefed that we would not perform any tests until we were above 10;000 feet and clear of most other traffic. Trying to perform the anti-ice test so early in the climb was a major distraction which pulled me from looking outside into the cockpit. When the PNF smoothly but forcefully pushed the control wheel forward without saying anything as he was performing the maneuver; could have cause the PF to attempt to counter the control movement without realizing that it was the other pilot; not a system malfunction; and could have cause a disaster.We have a company Safety Management System in place and have identified this incident as a Hazard to safety and are in the process of conducting a full internal investigation and review with recommendations for changes and improvements to mitigate this from happening in the future.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.