Narrative:

On approach to runway 11 msy; I was flying; at about 200 feet AGL we received a momentary windshear warning. I turned off the autopilot and landed uneventfully. On the roll out I asked the captain if that was a plus or a minus. He said it was a minus. The warning came and went so fast I'm not sure I ever saw it on the screen; I was about to disconnect the autopilot and fully transition to a visual landing. The weather in the area was widespread rain and very windy from the southeast. There was no convective activity. It was very bumpy on the approach and just monitoring the instruments was taxing. When the windshear warning went off I honestly thought it was a gain and not a loss as I had major tunnel vision on flying the airplane. Had I not made that obvious error I would have gone around. A contributing factor to my error in judging the windshear warning was that I had flown over 8 hours that day and was a little spent. I think that if I had briefed windshear escape procedures better I would have been better prepared for a go-around; expected the go-around and thus executed the go-around when the need arose.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ900 First Officer experienced a momentary windshear warning at 200 feet during approach and continued to landing. He cited fatigue and concentration on flying the approach as factors preventing him from initiating a go around.

Narrative: On approach to Runway 11 MSY; I was flying; at about 200 feet AGL we received a momentary windshear warning. I turned off the autopilot and landed uneventfully. On the roll out I asked the Captain if that was a plus or a minus. He said it was a minus. The warning came and went so fast I'm not sure I ever saw it on the screen; I was about to disconnect the autopilot and fully transition to a visual landing. The weather in the area was widespread rain and very windy from the southeast. There was no convective activity. It was very bumpy on the approach and just monitoring the instruments was taxing. When the windshear warning went off I honestly thought it was a gain and not a loss as I had major tunnel vision on flying the airplane. Had I not made that obvious error I would have gone around. A contributing factor to my error in judging the windshear warning was that I had flown over 8 hours that day and was a little spent. I think that if I had briefed windshear escape procedures better I would have been better prepared for a go-around; expected the go-around and thus executed the go-around when the need arose.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.