Narrative:

Cleared for VOR runway 14 at rap; turned inbound and while rolling out broke out of the clouds and saw what we believed to be the airport 12 o'clock and about 5 miles. Requested and received visual approach clearance; switched to tower; received landing clearance. Landed; taxied off the runway; and realized that we had landed on runway 13 at rca (ellsworth) air force base; rather than on runway 14 at rap.the problem arose when we determined that the airport in the window was our destination simply because it was approximately where we expected it to be; and the runway was aligned approximately as we expected it to be. Contributing factors include a late descent which left less time than should have been allowed to verify position and confirmation bias; wherein both crewmembers believed without verification in what they expected to see.clearly; one action which could have prevented the occurrence would have been to check the inbound course with either FMS; as well as the distance to the runway. Another possible action which might have prevented or mitigated the occurrence would have been to request decent vectors rather than rushing to get the aircraft configured and down; allowing for more time to verify aircraft position; etc.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: During a VOR Approach to Runway 14 at RAP; a small jet flight crew mistakes RCA for RAP and lands there on Runway 13.

Narrative: Cleared for VOR Runway 14 at RAP; turned inbound and while rolling out broke out of the clouds and saw what we believed to be the airport 12 o'clock and about 5 miles. Requested and received visual approach clearance; switched to tower; received landing clearance. Landed; taxied off the runway; and realized that we had landed on Runway 13 at RCA (Ellsworth) Air Force base; rather than on Runway 14 at RAP.The problem arose when we determined that the airport in the window was our destination simply because it was approximately where we expected it to be; and the runway was aligned approximately as we expected it to be. Contributing factors include a late descent which left less time than should have been allowed to verify position and confirmation bias; wherein both crewmembers believed without verification in what they expected to see.Clearly; one action which could have prevented the occurrence would have been to check the inbound course with either FMS; as well as the distance to the runway. Another possible action which might have prevented or mitigated the occurrence would have been to request decent vectors rather than rushing to get the aircraft configured and down; allowing for more time to verify aircraft position; etc.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.