Narrative:

Our event occurred shortly after takeoff on runway 16R from the van nuys airport. I was the captain of the flight and the pilot flying. We were assigned the canoga 1 departure avenal transition to be at or below 1;700 feet MSL with a right turn to 210 degrees at the vny 2.2 DME and further climb to 4;000 feet.we thoroughly briefed the departure prior to takeoff as well as checking both FMS's to see that it was loaded correctly in both boxes; which it was; and cross checked. This is our standard company procedure. Prior to taxi out I briefed the high interest items as well as the threat. In this case; and in this particular airport; I told the co-pilot that there is more than one threat today; i.e. High terrain; short runway and high density traffic area. I've flown in and out of here on numerous occasions and I'm also familiar with the noise sensitive area and higher terrain off of the end of the runway.the co-pilot is new and is still getting familiar with the aircraft but is a sharp pilot. I was hand flying the aircraft and as we were approaching the mandatory 1;700 foot level off; which is about 900 feet above the ground; I previously briefed that we would be making a substantial power reduction to maintain a slower speed and a smoother 1;700 foot level off. It was as we were approaching the 2.2 DME turn point that I made the call to select heading which would have commanded the right turn to 210 degrees as was briefed on the pre-departure briefing in the chocks and again as we were about to take the runway. As he reached up to select the heading bug his seat let go and he slid rearward with such a bang that it totally startled him as well as me and I'm pretty sure the passengers heard it as well. I instinctively reached for him with my right hand; it was just a reaction; but as I did so and with my left hand on the yoke I inadvertently turned about 20 degree to the left. It was a distraction in the cockpit that I just didn't plan on or could see coming. I looked back immediately and saw that I was already on a heading to the left and it was too late to start making a turn back to the right with the higher terrain and the noise sensitive area directly off our right side now. I was committed. I cleared the airspace in front of us looking for possible conflicting traffic and didn't notice any at that time. ATC called almost immediately and I gave him our heading and altitude at that time. An explanation to him at that time would not have been prudent since he had other concerns to worry about and handle.the situation was further compounded by the fact that the controller was not receiving our transponder. It appeared to be on but I believe that possibly on the preflight; during the test; it may have not have been reselected. That's my best guess. The co-pilot tried deselecting and re-selecting the transponder several more times to no avail while I was complying with ATC's instructions. A short time later when we were on a stable heading I managed to restore the transponder capability.never in my life and a career of more than 35 years did I see something like this coming. On top of all of this I'm the safety officer for the company. The co-pilot thought his seat was locked in the proper position; but it wasn't. It indeed made such a loud noise at such a critical juncture that it was a major distraction. We work hard at our company to be thorough; brief possible contingencies and possible situations to keep our customers and crew members safe. This definitely will be something new we will be adding to our briefings and training in the future.we both feel terrible about what happened as well as feeling sick inside.we work a lot on standardization; not only on procedures but standard callouts; as well; to make things safer and better for our passengers and our company. I'll get the word out on our situation to the rest of the pilots in our fleet and incorporate the importance ofseat adjustment and locking in the training and local checkout program of our new pilots.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Captain; distracted by his new First Officer's seat problem and the transponder not squawking; deviated from VNY 16R CANOGA One AVENAL transition SID.

Narrative: Our event occurred shortly after takeoff on runway 16R from the Van Nuys airport. I was the Captain of the flight and the pilot flying. We were assigned the CANOGA 1 departure AVENAL transition to be at or below 1;700 feet MSL with a right turn to 210 degrees at the VNY 2.2 DME and further climb to 4;000 feet.We thoroughly briefed the departure prior to takeoff as well as checking both FMS's to see that it was loaded correctly in both boxes; which it was; and cross checked. This is our standard company procedure. Prior to taxi out I briefed the high interest items as well as the Threat. In this case; and in this particular airport; I told the co-pilot that there is more than one threat today; i.e. high terrain; short runway and high density traffic area. I've flown in and out of here on numerous occasions and I'm also familiar with the noise sensitive area and higher terrain off of the end of the runway.The co-pilot is new and is still getting familiar with the aircraft but is a sharp pilot. I was hand flying the aircraft and as we were approaching the mandatory 1;700 foot level off; which is about 900 feet above the ground; I previously briefed that we would be making a substantial power reduction to maintain a slower speed and a smoother 1;700 foot level off. It was as we were approaching the 2.2 DME turn point that I made the call to select Heading which would have commanded the right turn to 210 degrees as was briefed on the pre-departure briefing in the chocks and again as we were about to take the runway. As he reached up to select the heading bug his seat let go and he slid rearward with such a bang that it totally startled him as well as me and I'm pretty sure the passengers heard it as well. I instinctively reached for him with my right hand; it was just a reaction; but as I did so and with my left hand on the yoke I inadvertently turned about 20 degree to the left. It was a distraction in the cockpit that I just didn't plan on or could see coming. I looked back immediately and saw that I was already on a heading to the left and it was too late to start making a turn back to the right with the higher terrain and the noise sensitive area directly off our right side now. I was committed. I cleared the airspace in front of us looking for possible conflicting traffic and didn't notice any at that time. ATC called almost immediately and I gave him our heading and altitude at that time. An explanation to him at that time would not have been prudent since he had other concerns to worry about and handle.The situation was further compounded by the fact that the controller was not receiving our transponder. It appeared to be on but I believe that possibly on the preflight; during the test; it may have not have been reselected. That's my best guess. The co-pilot tried deselecting and re-selecting the transponder several more times to no avail while I was complying with ATC's instructions. A short time later when we were on a stable heading I managed to restore the transponder capability.Never in my life and a career of more than 35 years did I see something like this coming. On top of all of this I'm the safety officer for the company. The co-pilot thought his seat was locked in the proper position; but it wasn't. It indeed made such a loud noise at such a critical juncture that it was a major distraction. We work hard at our company to be thorough; brief possible contingencies and possible situations to keep our customers and crew members safe. This definitely will be something new we will be adding to our briefings and training in the future.We both feel terrible about what happened as well as feeling sick inside.We work a lot on standardization; not only on procedures but standard callouts; as well; to make things safer and better for our passengers and our company. I'll get the word out on our situation to the rest of the pilots in our fleet and incorporate the importance ofseat adjustment and locking in the training and local checkout program of our new pilots.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.