Narrative:

I was LC1/LC2/ground control. The events happened on c-radar/C-sector. Aircraft X requested vectors for a GPS runway 14L approach. This approach would possibly put him in conflict with aircraft (gliders) that appeared to be returning to the ephrata airport; VFR and not requesting advisories. C-radar issued a descent to 40 and heading 320. Near the base turn; an aircraft on a glider code; was 4 miles and 1500 ft away about 90 KTS. I do not believe the controller issued a traffic advisory. The controller cleared aircraft X for the approach (approximately nine mile final) out of 7;000; he came back five hundred feet later and requested vectors to rejoin final for his descent. The controller instructed aircraft X to make a left 360 degree turn back to final. Aircraft X was still at 200 KTS. A 360 would put him in conflict with the previous traffic again; and the controller still had not issued an advisory. I would have mentioned this; except that aircraft X questioned the turn and reported the traffic on TCAS. The controller instructed aircraft X to make a left or right turn to final. Aircraft X would have had more traffic in a right turn; two to three more aircraft appeared to be descending into the ephrata airport out of 45 or lower. Aircraft X accepted the left turn and controlled it himself remain clear of the traffic.while aircraft X was in the tower pattern; we received a message through the fdio that there was a call for release (crash fire rescue equipment) to [departure airport]. Moments after; aircraft X requested to return to departure and remain VFR to the west. I confirmed that aircraft X did not want to execute another instrument approach; at least not at that moment. I assumed that he would at some point though; after his VFR work. I should have assumed that he might request to return to [departure airport]; and advised him of the crash fire rescue equipment. I coordinated aircraft X; VFR to the west; and shipped him to departure. Aircraft X requested his clearance with departure almost immediately. The controller instructed aircraft X to change codes; and issued the clearance to [departure airport]. I asked the controller; 'didn't you just tell me that there was a crash fire rescue equipment to [departure airport]?' he immediately began trying to coordinate a release time. It was not until aircraft X was leaving 60 in the climb that a release was issued. Aircraft X was never advised that there might be a delay.there was only one aircraft on c-radar frequency during both situations.I do not believe that there is a procedural change that can fix these issues. Similar situations have been reported many times; and not just by myself. In each situation; there is some rule/procedure not being followed. I believe that this controller has become complacent because he is not held accountable. I have brought these kind of situations up to the controller himself; and to management. At this point; I do not believe that he will change.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MWH Tower Controller reports of another Controller who the reporter thinks is complacent in their duties. Reporting Controller reports of a Call for Release(CFR) for traffic that is in the pattern and eventually going back to the airport that has the CFR. Aircraft leaves the traffic pattern and goes to departure who then issues a beacon code and clearance. Controller did not call for release on the aircraft. Reporter states the other controller is not held accountable for his actions.

Narrative: I was LC1/LC2/GC. The events happened on C-Radar/C-Sector. Aircraft X requested vectors for a GPS RWY 14L approach. This approach would possibly put him in conflict with aircraft (gliders) that appeared to be returning to the Ephrata airport; VFR and not requesting advisories. C-Radar issued a descent to 40 and heading 320. Near the base turn; an aircraft on a glider code; was 4 miles and 1500 FT away about 90 KTS. I do not believe the controller issued a traffic advisory. The controller cleared Aircraft X for the approach (approximately nine mile final) out of 7;000; he came back five hundred feet later and requested vectors to rejoin final for his descent. The controller instructed Aircraft X to make a left 360 degree turn back to final. Aircraft X was still at 200 KTS. A 360 would put him in conflict with the previous traffic again; and the controller still had not issued an advisory. I would have mentioned this; except that Aircraft X questioned the turn and reported the traffic on TCAS. The controller instructed Aircraft X to make a left or right turn to final. Aircraft X would have had more traffic in a right turn; two to three more aircraft appeared to be descending into the Ephrata airport out of 45 or lower. Aircraft X accepted the left turn and controlled it himself remain clear of the traffic.While Aircraft X was in the tower pattern; we received a message through the FDIO that there was a Call for Release (CFR) to [departure airport]. Moments after; Aircraft X requested to return to departure and remain VFR to the west. I confirmed that Aircraft X did not want to execute another instrument approach; at least not at that moment. I assumed that he would at some point though; after his VFR work. I should have assumed that he might request to return to [departure airport]; and advised him of the CFR. I coordinated Aircraft X; VFR to the west; and shipped him to departure. Aircraft X requested his clearance with departure almost immediately. The controller instructed Aircraft X to change codes; and issued the clearance to [departure airport]. I asked the controller; 'Didn't you just tell me that there was a CFR to [departure airport]?' He immediately began trying to coordinate a release time. It was not until Aircraft X was leaving 60 in the climb that a release was issued. Aircraft X was never advised that there might be a delay.There was only one aircraft on C-Radar frequency during both situations.I do not believe that there is a procedural change that can fix these issues. Similar situations have been reported many times; and not just by myself. In each situation; there is some rule/procedure not being followed. I believe that this controller has become complacent because he is not held accountable. I have brought these kind of situations up to the controller himself; and to management. At this point; I do not believe that he will change.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.