Narrative:

During cruise flight; we got an ECAM warning of low green #2 pump pressure. We turned off the pump according to ECAM procedures and checked the QRH. As I was the pilot flying; the first officer read through the checklist and we concurred that since pressure was not lost in the entire green system that we would turn on the electric pumps on approach as a backup. As it turned out; on final approach; we got another ECAM warning that green #1 pump had low pressure and we turned that pump off. The system was still pressurized by the electric pumps and no other indications or warnings were received of loss of system pressure or quantity. We continued to configure for landing and all systems operated normally through touchdown and taxi in. Sometime later in the day after landing and more thoroughly looking at the QRH; it appears some of the procedures may be ambiguous; but since we never had an indication of complete loss of system pressure or quantity; it may have only served to complicate the issue more to drop the gear manually and request a tow-in after landing as the checklist might have led us to accomplish.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A300 flight crew reported green hydraulic system anomalies and stated the QRH procedure is complex and confusing.

Narrative: During cruise flight; we got an ECAM warning of low Green #2 Pump pressure. We turned off the pump according to ECAM procedures and checked the QRH. As I was the pilot flying; the First Officer read through the checklist and we concurred that since pressure was not lost in the entire Green system that we would turn on the electric pumps on approach as a backup. As it turned out; on final approach; we got another ECAM warning that Green #1 Pump had low pressure and we turned that pump off. The system was still pressurized by the electric pumps and no other indications or warnings were received of loss of system pressure or quantity. We continued to configure for landing and all systems operated normally through touchdown and taxi in. Sometime later in the day after landing and more thoroughly looking at the QRH; it appears some of the procedures may be ambiguous; but since we never had an indication of complete loss of system pressure or quantity; it may have only served to complicate the issue more to drop the gear manually and request a tow-in after landing as the checklist might have led us to accomplish.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.