Narrative:

We were preparing to depart to bfi to end the work day. As I was running the after battery flows/checks; I noticed that our back-up battery was not testing correctly. We knew the battery itself was working but the test light was not illuminating and the light inside of the stand-by attitude gyro was also not illuminating. My captain; and I brought out the MEL to see what we could do about the issue. After reading the MEL and speaking with maintenance about it; we decided we could & were allowed to take off VFR with the stand-by attitude gyro 'inop'; as long as we stayed under the clouds. I had never flown [this] aircraft VFR and since I have little experience with the airplane; I was hesitant on doing so. After talking with dispatch; we were released. The captain and I came up with a route and a plan on how we would get back to seattle safely and legally & so we decided to take off. Now; at this point; even after reviewing the current weather and forecast weather; which indicated that we could make the flight possible with no issues; I had not realized the severity of this decision until further on into the flight. For this leg; I was the pilot flying and the captain was the pilot monitoring. After our initial climb-out; the captain had mentioned that he wanted to take control of the airplane once we were going to descend and fly through the pass we had planned for since he had experience flying through this specific area of terrain. The original pass we wanted to fly through was snoqualmie pass. Once we were nearing ellensburg VOR; we initiated a positive exchange of control and had begun our descent. He leveled off and passed the city of cle elum at 1;500 feet AGL. The plan was to pass the 3 lakes ahead; cle elum; kachess; and keechelus. Once we reached keechelus lake; we were to follow it northbound to arrive in the snoqualmie pass. This is when my doubts of a successful flight began.upon entering the south side of keechelus lake; it was apparent that there was no way we could make it without inadvertently going IMC. The pass and peaks around it were covered with an overcast layer. This was when I made my first attempt at voicing my opinion that I did not feel it was safe to continue. I then asked the captain to return or at the very least; turn around & get out of the situation we were about to be in. He tried to assure me that there were other routes and passes we had as options. His new plan was to follow the I-90 highway near bandera until we made it past the terrain. It was at this point that I again; voiced my concerns about the continuation of this flight. I knew once we passed the ski area; things were only going to get worse. I saw that with each attempt I made to speak up with my concern; it wasn't the captain I was talking to anymore. I was talking to a pilot who almost; in a way; wanted to prove to himself that he could make this flight happen. Whenever I voiced my concerns; he either ignored it; or replied in a way that made my opinion feel irrelevant and childish. This continued as the airplane continued down the pass. As this was happening; I really felt trapped. I felt that there was nothing else I could do but try and talk some sense into him. Looking back now; I know I should have taken control of the airplane.as we continued down the pass; visibility was only getting worse. Rain began to fall. The captain had to slow down to around 180 knots just to keep in control of the situation. At this point; the GPWS had begun to go off and stayed on for the remainder of the time we were in the pass. The captain had complete disregard for the alarm. As we neared a bend in the I-90; I could feel my absolute limit coming up. There were two specific peaks I remember being on either side of the I-90. One at 5;584 feet MSL and the other at 5;162 feet MSL. Looking as far forward as I could; I couldn't even see the tops of these peaks or even some of the other surrounding mountains. It came to the point where iknew we made the turn around the bend; it would be a death sentence. This is when I began calling the captain by his first name; trying to snap him out of the mindset he had. I had attempted 4+ times; warning him that we were not going to make it past the bend. Not only did I now have to worry about the bend; but also how we were going to make a full 180 degree turn in the tightest point of this pass. Finally; after at least 10 more seconds after my last plead to turn the airplane around; the captain realized that he needed to turn around. He asked for flaps 15 and to call out the airspeed as it decreased in the turn. Even with a steep turn; it was a close call. Once the airplane had made a full 180 degree turn; we returned to our original point of entry; keechelus lake. After escaping the situation we had been in and exiting the harsh conditions; I voiced one last recommendation. I recommended that we returned to our original departure airport; for the night. Instead; the captain insisted that we pick up an IFR flight plan in the air and return to seattle. And so; after experiencing what we just did; I agreed and contacted ATC. We then continued the flight normally without any problems back to bfi. Looking back now; there were a number of times that I; as a first officer; failed to act on my instincts. I feel like there were a number of things I could have done. I could have declared an emergency to 121.5 or any surrounding ARTCC or even taken control of the airplane. In a way; I feel like I let this incident happen by not taking control of that airplane. While everything was happening; I really felt as if my experience was surpassed by the captain's. Also; the situation was so delicate that I felt that fighting for control over the airplane would have been a costly decision as well. And it was for that reason I allowed him to keep control of the airplane. I know that was the wrong decision to make; and it was a decision that almost cost me my own life. This experience taught me a life lesson: to never allow a captain or anyone else push or set your own personal limits and to understand that even though I am second in command; sometimes it is necessary to take control of the situation. It is my duty as sic to make sure the flight is completed in a safe and legal manner. And I should never allow another person to make choices that will put everyone on board and the airplane at risk.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Light twin flight crew describes an attempted VFR flight through Snoqualmie Pass in an attempt to remain in VMC to comply with an MEL. After passing through the pass the clouds lower to the surface and a very tight turn is required to maintain VFR and avoid the terrain. Once clear an IFR clearance is picked up to destination.

Narrative: We were preparing to depart to BFI to end the work day. As I was running the After Battery flows/checks; I noticed that our Back-Up Battery was not testing correctly. We knew the battery itself was working but the test light was not illuminating and the light inside of the Stand-by Attitude Gyro was also not illuminating. My captain; and I brought out the MEL to see what we could do about the issue. After reading the MEL and speaking with maintenance about it; we decided we could & were allowed to take off VFR with the Stand-By Attitude Gyro 'Inop'; as long as we stayed under the clouds. I had never flown [this] aircraft VFR and since I have little experience with the airplane; I was hesitant on doing so. After talking with dispatch; we were released. The Captain and I came up with a route and a plan on how we would get back to Seattle safely and legally & so we decided to take off. Now; at this point; even after reviewing the current weather and forecast weather; which indicated that we could make the flight possible with no issues; I had not realized the severity of this decision until further on into the flight. For this leg; I was the pilot flying and the Captain was the pilot monitoring. After our initial climb-out; the Captain had mentioned that he wanted to take control of the airplane once we were going to descend and fly through the pass we had planned for since he had experience flying through this specific area of terrain. The original pass we wanted to fly through was Snoqualmie Pass. Once we were nearing Ellensburg VOR; we initiated a positive exchange of control and had begun our descent. He leveled off and passed the city of Cle Elum at 1;500 Feet AGL. The plan was to pass the 3 lakes ahead; Cle Elum; Kachess; and Keechelus. Once we reached Keechelus Lake; we were to follow it northbound to arrive in the Snoqualmie pass. This is when my doubts of a successful flight began.Upon entering the South side of Keechelus Lake; it was apparent that there was no way we could make it without inadvertently going IMC. The pass and peaks around it were covered with an overcast layer. This was when I made my first attempt at voicing my opinion that I did not feel it was safe to continue. I then asked the Captain to return or at the very least; turn around & get out of the situation we were about to be in. He tried to assure me that there were other routes and passes we had as options. His new plan was to follow the I-90 Highway near Bandera until we made it past the terrain. It was at this point that I again; voiced my concerns about the continuation of this flight. I knew once we passed the ski area; things were only going to get worse. I saw that with each attempt I made to speak up with my concern; it wasn't the Captain I was talking to anymore. I was talking to a pilot who almost; in a way; wanted to prove to himself that he could make this flight happen. Whenever I voiced my concerns; he either ignored it; or replied in a way that made my opinion feel irrelevant and childish. This continued as the airplane continued down the pass. As this was happening; I really felt trapped. I felt that there was nothing else I could do but try and talk some sense into him. Looking back now; I know I should have taken control of the airplane.As we continued down the pass; visibility was only getting worse. Rain began to fall. The Captain had to slow down to around 180 Knots just to keep in control of the situation. At this point; the GPWS had begun to go off and stayed on for the remainder of the time we were in the pass. The Captain had complete disregard for the alarm. As we neared a bend in the I-90; I could feel my absolute limit coming up. There were two specific peaks I remember being on either side of the I-90. One at 5;584 Feet MSL and the other at 5;162 Feet MSL. Looking as far forward as I could; I couldn't even see the tops of these peaks or even some of the other surrounding mountains. It came to the point where Iknew we made the turn around the bend; it would be a death sentence. This is when I began calling the Captain by his first name; trying to snap him out of the mindset he had. I had attempted 4+ times; warning him that we were not going to make it past the bend. Not only did I now have to worry about the bend; but also how we were going to make a full 180 Degree turn in the tightest point of this pass. Finally; after at least 10 more seconds after my last plead to turn the airplane around; the Captain realized that he needed to turn around. He asked for Flaps 15 and to call out the airspeed as it decreased in the turn. Even with a steep turn; it was a close call. Once the airplane had made a full 180 Degree turn; we returned to our original point of entry; Keechelus Lake. After escaping the situation we had been in and exiting the harsh conditions; I voiced one last recommendation. I recommended that we returned to our original departure airport; for the night. Instead; the Captain insisted that we pick up an IFR flight plan in the air and return to Seattle. And so; after experiencing what we just did; I agreed and contacted ATC. We then continued the flight normally without any problems back to BFI. Looking back now; there were a number of times that I; as a First Officer; failed to act on my instincts. I feel like there were a number of things I could have done. I could have declared an emergency to 121.5 or any surrounding ARTCC or even taken control of the airplane. In a way; I feel like I let this incident happen by not taking control of that airplane. While everything was happening; I really felt as if my experience was surpassed by the Captain's. Also; the situation was so delicate that I felt that fighting for control over the airplane would have been a costly decision as well. And it was for that reason I allowed him to keep control of the airplane. I know that was the wrong decision to make; and it was a decision that almost cost me my own life. This experience taught me a life lesson: To never allow a captain or anyone else push or set your own personal limits and to understand that even though I am second in command; sometimes it is necessary to take control of the situation. It is my duty as SIC to make sure the flight is completed in a safe and legal manner. And I should never allow another person to make choices that will put everyone on board and the airplane at risk.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.