Narrative:

Landing uneventful; we were given an expedited crossing of the departure runway. We accomplished the after landing checklist but; due to the expedited crossing; I wasn't sure if the first officer (first officer) started the APU (which had been consistent/standard practice so far in the trip). We were cleared to enter the ramp and I consciously elected to leave both engines running (which was contrary to my standard practice during the trip). As we turned to pull into the gate; a white; unmarked van cut across our path. We saw him coming so no immediate stop was necessary but we both remarked about the various fueling and vendor traffic driving habits causing a conflict with aircraft. We pulled to a stop normally; parked the brakes and I believe I commanded 'shut down engines'. The first officer believes he heard 'shut down the left engine' (which had been the standard command throughout the trip). He shut down the left engine. The right engine continued to run and we finished the parking checklist and departed the cockpit.minutes later (approximately three--the running engine burned 155 lbs of fuel since the counter had been reset at left engine shutdown) I received a page as I left the gate area requesting I return to the gate. I returned to find the right engine running. I immediately shut off the fuel lever. No damage or injuries occurred. The aircraft was chocked and the brakes parked. In my estimation; there are three distinct contributing factors in this event.1.) complacency when reading the checklist. I assumed items had been accomplished; therefore; I felt no need to follow up the response with a tactile and visual check.2.) complacency when relying on past actions as a predictor of future actions. We had done things the same way each leg; therefore; we would continue to do them the same way on every leg. 3.) distractions. The expedited crossing to the ramp side of the runway; compressed time frame for completing the after landing checklists and vehicular traffic all led to this event. We are frequently admonished to be aware of all of these issues yet they still keep happening. Strict--unyielding adherence to policy and procedures is a must. No one is perfect and that is why policies and procedures exist. An event like this will happen if you allow yourself to become too comfortable.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD82 flight crew describes the circumstances leading up to both crew members leaving the aircraft parked at the gate with the right engine still running.

Narrative: Landing uneventful; we were given an expedited crossing of the departure runway. We accomplished the after landing checklist but; due to the expedited crossing; I wasn't sure if the First Officer (FO) started the APU (which had been consistent/standard practice so far in the trip). We were cleared to enter the ramp and I consciously elected to leave both engines running (which was contrary to my standard practice during the trip). As we turned to pull into the gate; a white; unmarked van cut across our path. We saw him coming so no immediate stop was necessary but we both remarked about the various fueling and vendor traffic driving habits causing a conflict with aircraft. We pulled to a stop normally; parked the brakes and I believe I commanded 'shut down engines'. The FO believes he heard 'shut down the left engine' (which had been the standard command throughout the trip). He shut down the left engine. The right engine continued to run and we finished the parking checklist and departed the cockpit.Minutes later (approximately three--the running engine burned 155 lbs of fuel since the counter had been reset at left engine shutdown) I received a page as I left the gate area requesting I return to the gate. I returned to find the right engine running. I immediately shut off the fuel lever. No damage or injuries occurred. The aircraft was chocked and the brakes parked. In my estimation; there are three distinct contributing factors in this event.1.) Complacency when reading the checklist. I assumed items had been accomplished; therefore; I felt no need to follow up the response with a tactile and visual check.2.) Complacency when relying on past actions as a predictor of future actions. We had done things the same way each leg; therefore; we would continue to do them the same way on every leg. 3.) Distractions. The expedited crossing to the ramp side of the runway; compressed time frame for completing the after landing checklists and vehicular traffic all led to this event. We are frequently admonished to be aware of all of these issues yet they still keep happening. Strict--unyielding adherence to policy and procedures is a must. No one is perfect and that is why policies and procedures exist. An event like this WILL happen if you allow yourself to become too comfortable.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.