Narrative:

After arriving at the gate from our flight we deplaned the passengers; the post flight walk around was completed and everything was noted normal. We then began to receive our fuel load for the return flight which would be a ferry flight to end the trip. The weather was approximately 2SM visibility with snow falling and the ramp; taxiways; and runways were covered in snow at this point. We coordinated with operations to arrange deicing and pushback from the gate. After leaving the gate we were deiced (types 1&4; full body) and ready to leave. We taxied to runway 22; during the taxi out all the required checklists were completed as necessary and no abnormalities were noted. At this point all the doors were indicating closed and no EICAS messages were present either. During the taxi out tower reported the braking action as fair to good. It was my leg to fly. We received our take off clearance and began our take off roll [following] an initial back taxi on the runway which was approved in order to use all the available runway. At 80K airspeed was cross checked; and at approximately 100K there was a master caution bell and EICAS message for the baggage door open. The captain called for the abort of the take off and took control of the aircraft while I notified the tower that we were aborting our takeoff on runway 22. Tower inquired whether assistance would be needed; it was not and we taxied to the gate after coming to a stop on the runway. At this point the captain (pilot monitoring) called for the aborted takeoff checklist which was completed followed by the after landing checklist and parking checklists. The captain then contacted maintenance to coordinate our next steps of action while I coordinated with [station] ops to meet the aircraft again at the gate for more fuel and jetway connection.weather; night time IMC in snow with reduced visibility. Braking action reports; de icing and winter operations in general are not always in the norm. Rejected takeoff above 80 knots; not necessarily a mandatory abort item however it was called for by the captain. [We should] continue to review the [operation manual] and its checklists and procedures as well as reviewing what the mandatory aborts are and even taking it one step further to identify other situations that might occur and how to possibly handle them appropriately.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An EMB145 flight crew rejected their takeoff at ~100KIAS upon receipt of an EICAS baggage door open message. The reporter cited snow covered runways; braking action fair reports; reduced visibility and being well above 80KIAS as factors making the go/no go decision difficult.

Narrative: After arriving at the gate from our flight we deplaned the passengers; the post flight walk around was completed and everything was noted normal. We then began to receive our fuel load for the return flight which would be a ferry flight to end the trip. The weather was approximately 2SM visibility with snow falling and the ramp; taxiways; and runways were covered in snow at this point. We coordinated with operations to arrange deicing and pushback from the gate. After leaving the gate we were deiced (types 1&4; full body) and ready to leave. We taxied to Runway 22; during the taxi out all the required checklists were completed as necessary and no abnormalities were noted. At this point all the doors were indicating closed and no EICAS messages were present either. During the taxi out tower reported the Braking Action as Fair to good. It was my leg to fly. We received our take off clearance and began our take off roll [following] an initial back taxi on the runway which was approved in order to use all the available runway. At 80K airspeed was cross checked; and at approximately 100K there was a Master Caution bell and EICAS message for the Baggage door Open. The Captain called for the abort of the take off and took control of the aircraft while I notified the tower that we were aborting our takeoff on runway 22. Tower inquired whether assistance would be needed; it was not and we taxied to the gate after coming to a stop on the runway. At this point the Captain (pilot monitoring) called for the aborted takeoff checklist which was completed followed by the after landing checklist and parking checklists. The Captain then contacted maintenance to coordinate our next steps of action while I coordinated with [station] ops to meet the aircraft again at the gate for more fuel and jetway connection.Weather; night time IMC in snow with reduced visibility. Braking action reports; De icing and winter operations in general are not always in the norm. Rejected takeoff above 80 knots; not necessarily a mandatory abort item however it was called for by the Captain. [We should] continue to review the [operation manual] and its checklists and procedures as well as reviewing what the mandatory aborts are and even taking it one step further to identify other situations that might occur and how to possibly handle them appropriately.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.