Narrative:

Mia landing west. From curso 2 RNAV arrival; on initial contact; miami approach control assigned vectors to localizer DME runway 26R. We were vectored north of the field on a right downwind. Right base turn was outside hinku; then we were cleared to intercept 26R localizer at 3000 ft. We intercepted the localizer; but when inbound noticed spacing with preceding aircraft was approximately 3 nm (on TCAS). Approach then assigned a left turn heading 240 while advising us we would be brought back on downwind for the approach; which we presumed was for separation. After being established on a 240 heading (south towards active rwys 27 and 30) we received an unexpected/conflicting clearance to turn back right to intercept the 26R localizer. By this time we were inside hinku; still at 3000 feet; without approach clearance; and judging whether or not to continue the approach or request additional vectors. We were then cleared to 2000 feet; at which time we acquired a visual with runway 26R; below the cloud layer; and called the runway in sight. Approach control then cleared us for a visual approach to runway 26R; contact mia tower. On initial contact with tower; inside jodax; at approximately 1300 ft.; were cleared to change runways; and cleared to land on runway 26L. Pilot flying (PF)/pilot monitoring (pm) agreed and we accepted the clearance; reverted to the lowest level of automation; confirmed landing checklist complete; and landed visually and uneventfully; on runway 26L. Three days in a row; [operating air carrier X flight] ZZZZ-mia; we initially received ILS runway 30; then a change of runway to localizer DME 26R. Two out of three days; we were issued a last minute change to runway 26L below 1500 ft. On the occasion of this as soon as possible report; the approach controller communication was less than professional. The controller appeared task saturated and situationally disconnected with spacing of arrivals. Indeed; both PF and pm; when assigned the 240 heading off the 26 right localizer; began internal cockpit questioning whether the controller actually knew which flight he was communicating that clearance to. Speed assignments; sequencing; and spacing should be better managed by approach control so as to mitigate the risk of miscommunication; confusion; and last minute runway changes which increase potential for errors.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A319 pilot reported receiving multiple late runway changes from MIA ATC on several different days that led to confusion and increased workload.

Narrative: MIA landing west. From Curso 2 RNAV ARR; on initial contact; Miami Approach control assigned vectors to LOC DME RWY 26R. We were vectored north of the field on a right downwind. Right base turn was outside HINKU; then we were cleared to intercept 26R localizer at 3000 FT. We intercepted the LOC; but when inbound noticed spacing with preceding aircraft was approximately 3 nm (on TCAS). Approach then assigned a left turn heading 240 while advising us we would be brought back on downwind for the approach; which we presumed was for separation. After being established on a 240 heading (south towards active RWYs 27 and 30) we received an unexpected/conflicting clearance to turn back right to intercept the 26R LOC. By this time we were inside HINKU; still at 3000 feet; without approach clearance; and judging whether or not to continue the approach or request additional vectors. We were then cleared to 2000 feet; at which time we acquired a visual with RWY 26R; below the cloud layer; and called the runway in sight. Approach control then cleared us for a visual approach to RWY 26R; contact MIA Tower. On initial contact with tower; inside JODAX; at approximately 1300 ft.; were cleared to change runways; and cleared to land on RWY 26L. Pilot flying (PF)/Pilot Monitoring (PM) agreed and we accepted the clearance; reverted to the lowest level of automation; confirmed landing checklist complete; and landed visually and uneventfully; on RWY 26L. Three days in a row; [operating Air Carrier X flight] ZZZZ-MIA; we initially received ILS RWY 30; then a change of RWY to LOC DME 26R. Two out of three days; we were issued a last minute change to RWY 26L below 1500 FT. On the occasion of this ASAP report; the approach controller communication was less than professional. The controller appeared task saturated and situationally disconnected with spacing of arrivals. Indeed; both PF and PM; when assigned the 240 heading off the 26 R LOC; began internal cockpit questioning whether the controller actually knew which flight he was communicating that clearance to. Speed assignments; sequencing; and spacing should be better managed by Approach Control so as to mitigate the risk of miscommunication; confusion; and last minute runway changes which increase potential for errors.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.