Narrative:

The #2 fuel tank gauge was inoperative. The tank was confirmed full at dtw. The gauge read about 7000 pounds less than full and continued to read approximately 7000 pounds less than the other 3 main tanks throughout the flight. Using the fuel used gauges, we had the required fuel at our re-release point to nrt with no alternate. The WX was good at nrt. When turned over to approach control in the nrt area, the uncertainty of exactly how much fuel was remaining became a concern to the crew. The fuel used gauges, the fuel tank gauges, and the pms fuel differed by about 7000 pounds. According to the fuel used gauges, we had sufficient fuel. The pmms fuel showed we had about 3000# less than the fuel used gauges. The fuel gauges showed we were about 7000 pounds less than the fuel used gauges. With #2 fuel gauge being inoperative, and the uncertainty of exactly how much fuel was remaining, we requested priority handling from the tower at nrt and made an uneventful landing at nrt. My suggestion on how to prevent a recurrence is to not allow fuel tank gauges to be inoperative on fuel sensitive flts.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR WDB FLT CREW UNSURE OF FUEL RESERVES ON TRANS-PACIFIC FLT AND REQUESTS PRIORITY HANDLING ON APCH INTO NRT AS A RESULT OF INOPERATIVE FUEL GAUGE.

Narrative: THE #2 FUEL TANK GAUGE WAS INOP. THE TANK WAS CONFIRMED FULL AT DTW. THE GAUGE READ ABOUT 7000 LBS LESS THAN FULL AND CONTINUED TO READ APPROX 7000 LBS LESS THAN THE OTHER 3 MAIN TANKS THROUGHOUT THE FLT. USING THE FUEL USED GAUGES, WE HAD THE REQUIRED FUEL AT OUR RE-RELEASE POINT TO NRT WITH NO ALTERNATE. THE WX WAS GOOD AT NRT. WHEN TURNED OVER TO APCH CTL IN THE NRT AREA, THE UNCERTAINTY OF EXACTLY HOW MUCH FUEL WAS REMAINING BECAME A CONCERN TO THE CREW. THE FUEL USED GAUGES, THE FUEL TANK GAUGES, AND THE PMS FUEL DIFFERED BY ABOUT 7000 LBS. ACCORDING TO THE FUEL USED GAUGES, WE HAD SUFFICIENT FUEL. THE PMMS FUEL SHOWED WE HAD ABOUT 3000# LESS THAN THE FUEL USED GAUGES. THE FUEL GAUGES SHOWED WE WERE ABOUT 7000 LBS LESS THAN THE FUEL USED GAUGES. WITH #2 FUEL GAUGE BEING INOP, AND THE UNCERTAINTY OF EXACTLY HOW MUCH FUEL WAS REMAINING, WE REQUESTED PRIORITY HANDLING FROM THE TWR AT NRT AND MADE AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG AT NRT. MY SUGGESTION ON HOW TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE IS TO NOT ALLOW FUEL TANK GAUGES TO BE INOP ON FUEL SENSITIVE FLTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.