Narrative:

After being cleared for takeoff; the captain called for takeoff thrust to be set. I set the takeoff thrust which took a little extra time being that we were operating an older model airplane (no autothrottles). Once power was set; I took a quick scan of the engine instruments which were all in the green and then took a quick glance outside to see that we were tracking down the center line. At this point I usually also take a quick look at the magnetic compass to verify runway heading. I came back inside to scan the flight instruments and get ready to make the 80 knot call when I realized that something was missing. It took a second or two for me to realize that the missing info was no airspeed indication. I instinctively looked at the captain's airspeed indicator to see if it was indicating properly and I did see needle movement; but had difficulty reading the actual indication. I came back and took another look at my airspeed indicator to verify what I was seeing when I noticed the airspeed flag. At this point I stated to the captain; 'I have no airspeed;' and 'you have to call it.' with the second statement; I was referring to the V1 and rotate call outs. Unfortunately; the captain may have thought I was prompting an abort decision; which added some complexity to his decision. Either way; it was probably too ambiguous of a call out. By this time the airspeed was probably over 100 knots and the abort was initiated around 120 knots approximately. (V1 was 142 knots.) the rejected takeoff went smoothly and we easily stopped the aircraft on the remaining runway.after exiting the runway and notifying ATC that no assistance would be needed; we computed the brake cooling and reviewed the rejected takeoff checklist in the non-normal section of the QRH. We held out from the gate for 30 minutes. It is unclear when my airspeed indicator became inoperative; but it was probably sometime before we took the runway. More vigilance in scanning the flight instruments before taking the runway is needed on my part. As pilot monitoring; the call out of the failure should have been more timely and clear.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-300 flight crew reports discovering that the First Officer's airspeed indicator is inoperative above 80 knots when the he calls it out. The Captain takes time to analyze the situation and initiates a reject at 120 knots.

Narrative: After being cleared for takeoff; the Captain called for takeoff thrust to be set. I set the takeoff thrust which took a little extra time being that we were operating an older model airplane (no autothrottles). Once power was set; I took a quick scan of the engine instruments which were all in the green and then took a quick glance outside to see that we were tracking down the center line. At this point I usually also take a quick look at the magnetic compass to verify runway heading. I came back inside to scan the flight instruments and get ready to make the 80 knot call when I realized that something was missing. It took a second or two for me to realize that the missing info was no airspeed indication. I instinctively looked at the Captain's airspeed indicator to see if it was indicating properly and I did see needle movement; but had difficulty reading the actual indication. I came back and took another look at my airspeed indicator to verify what I was seeing when I noticed the airspeed flag. At this point I stated to the Captain; 'I have no airspeed;' and 'you have to call it.' With the second statement; I was referring to the V1 and rotate call outs. Unfortunately; the Captain may have thought I was prompting an abort decision; which added some complexity to his decision. Either way; it was probably too ambiguous of a call out. By this time the airspeed was probably over 100 knots and the abort was initiated around 120 knots approximately. (V1 was 142 knots.) The rejected takeoff went smoothly and we easily stopped the aircraft on the remaining runway.After exiting the runway and notifying ATC that no assistance would be needed; we computed the brake cooling and reviewed the Rejected Takeoff Checklist in the non-normal section of the QRH. We held out from the gate for 30 minutes. It is unclear when my airspeed indicator became inoperative; but it was probably sometime before we took the runway. More vigilance in scanning the flight instruments before taking the runway is needed on my part. As Pilot Monitoring; the call out of the failure should have been more timely and clear.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.