Narrative:

We were cleared to descend via the STAR. We were linked to runway 26L we had both reviewed the charts and missed the constraint of zzzzz intersection at or above FL240. The database in FMC didn't have this constraint. At about 19;000 feet the center controller queried us whether we had the constraint and we told him it wasn't in the database. His response was that we were not the only crew missing the constraint and he recommended reporting it through company and he would report it through ATC atsap. We had reviewed the charts and database but we just didn't catch this.now let's add in the environmental aspects - while we were mostly flying in VMC the better part of our flight was in light to moderate chop; at FL260 or 240 because we simply could not find and maintain any ride that did not have turbulence in it. We had the flight attendants down and the seat belt sign on for substantial portions of the flight. By the time we got to ZZZ I felt physically beaten up like a 'frog in a blender' and I am not certain what else I might have missed. It had turned into a long day. I had risen early to get to work; and while cleaning off the car; I slipped on black ice and fell. I had a minor abrasion on my right hand and I struck my right knee. I monitored my progress closely as I proceeded to work; got on the bus; signed fit for duty and flew the first leg. We sat at the intermediate stop for nearly 4 hours before flying to ZZZ1. Physically I was fine but apparently; the event stuck with me and became a focal distraction; further aggravated by being in continuous turbulence enroute. But with an early morning report and a short ride from my icy driveway; I knew there would be opportunities to further assess fitness; continue or not continue and report to the duty manager if it was not possible to continue. But the fatigue issue is only one element - why wasn't the constraint in the database? It just wasn't there; and when we use these procedures; we come to rely on them being accurate --it wasn't. We got caught by this and back checking I see now that we were in error and responsible for confirming and double checking the chart against the database. ATC was very accommodating but that doesn't correct the problem. The problem is in the database publication and it needs to be addressed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: When cleared to descend via a STAR; the flight crew of an A320 failed to cross an intersection at or above FL240 as charted. Both pilots advised the restriction was not in the aircraft's NAV database.

Narrative: We were cleared to descend via the STAR. We were linked to runway 26L we had both reviewed the charts and missed the constraint of ZZZZZ intersection at or above FL240. The database in FMC didn't have this constraint. At about 19;000 feet the center controller queried us whether we had the constraint and we told him it wasn't in the database. His response was that we were not the only crew missing the constraint and he recommended reporting it through company and he would report it through ATC ATSAP. We had reviewed the charts and database but we just didn't catch this.Now let's add in the environmental aspects - while we were mostly flying in VMC the better part of our flight was in light to moderate chop; at FL260 or 240 because we simply could not find and maintain any ride that did not have turbulence in it. We had the flight attendants down and the seat belt sign on for substantial portions of the flight. By the time we got to ZZZ I felt physically beaten up like a 'frog in a blender' and I am not certain what else I might have missed. It had turned into a long day. I had risen early to get to work; and while cleaning off the car; I slipped on black ice and fell. I had a minor abrasion on my right hand and I struck my right knee. I monitored my progress closely as I proceeded to work; got on the bus; signed fit for duty and flew the first leg. We sat at the intermediate stop for nearly 4 hours before flying to ZZZ1. Physically I was fine but apparently; the event stuck with me and became a focal distraction; further aggravated by being in continuous turbulence enroute. But with an early morning report and a short ride from my icy driveway; I knew there would be opportunities to further assess fitness; continue or not continue and report to the duty manager if it was not possible to continue. But the fatigue issue is only one element - why wasn't the constraint in the database? It just wasn't there; and when we use these procedures; we come to rely on them being accurate --It wasn't. We got caught by this and back checking I see now that we were in error and responsible for confirming and double checking the chart against the database. ATC was very accommodating but that doesn't correct the problem. The problem is in the Database publication and it needs to be addressed.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.