Narrative:

During the arrival to teb we were cleared for the ILS 6 approach. The PIC let the autopilot drift left of center line and [I told him] that the airport was in sight at 1 o'clock. The PIC's comment was; look at how much correction this thing is putting in; and we continued to drift left. We continued to drift left; I told him again the center line was to the right and the airport was in sight. The PIC turned right and started to descend. Then he said that he had lost sight of the [airport and] I told him the airport was at 11 o'clock and that he was way too low for where we were at. I called the towers south of teb to him twice; he then said he had them and ask where the stadium was. At this time teb tower came on frequency and gave us a low altitude alert and the airport was at our 10 o'clock; at this point; I had lost sight of the airport and told the PIC to go around; at this point; we both picked up the airport visually and landed without further incident. The trip was extremely rough and had been for the preceding 20 minutes the wind at 4000 was out of the northwest at 65kts. The wind at teb for landing was 330 [at] 19 [kts] [gusting] 25 [kts]. This [is] a classic example of how automation dependency can cause a very experience pilot to lose track of situational awareness and ignore the basics of fly the aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: The First Officer of a Gulfstream G200 related repeated attempts to get the Captain's attention to their divergent track and altitude while attempting to fly the ILS Runway 6 to TEB during turbulent but VMC. Following a low altitude alert from the Tower they began a go-around but then picked up the airport and landed safely. The reporter attributed the Captain's disorientation to automation dependency.

Narrative: During the arrival to TEB we were cleared for the ILS 6 approach. The PIC let the autopilot drift left of center line and [I told him] that the airport was in sight at 1 o'clock. The PIC's comment was; look at how much correction this thing is putting in; and we continued to drift left. We continued to drift left; I told him again the center line was to the right and the airport was in sight. The PIC turned right and started to descend. Then he said that he had lost sight of the [airport and] I told him the airport was at 11 o'clock and that he was way too low for where we were at. I called the towers south of TEB to him twice; he then said he had them and ask where the Stadium was. At this time TEB tower came on frequency and gave us a low altitude alert and the airport was at our 10 o'clock; At this point; I had lost sight of the airport and told the PIC to go around; at this point; we both picked up the airport visually and landed without further incident. The trip was extremely rough and had been for the preceding 20 minutes the wind at 4000 was out of the NW at 65kts. The wind at TEB for landing was 330 [at] 19 [kts] [gusting] 25 [kts]. This [is] a classic example of how automation dependency can cause a very experience pilot to lose track of situational awareness and ignore the basics of fly the aircraft.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.