Narrative:

Upon climbing out; we observed an left bleed EICAS message; followed by an right bleed message. We noticed the aircraft was not pressurizing so we told ATC we needed to level off at 11000. The cabin pressure continued to climb so we initiated a descent to 8000. We then received a cabin altitude warning message as we were descending. When I started the QRH procedure; I noticed that the packs were off and the APU was running with the isolation valve open. In short; I had neglected to perform the after start checklist; even though the captain had called for it. There were several distracting factors during and after the engine start but the failure to complete the checklist was my responsibility. We corrected the settings for the pressurization system and once the aircraft cabin was stable continued to destination. During both our descent down to 8000 and our subsequent climb the aircraft exceeded 250 knots below 10;000 feet. The event was caused by my failure to complete the after start checklist. I had just completed [training] the day before this trip but I was also off work for three weeks prior to my training. I was also distracted by events during and after starting the engines. The wind was gusting up to 40 knots before our departure. We delayed the engine start until the aircraft was facing into the wind to prevent a hot start; thus changing the normal pace of operations. Also; we had a difficult time finding the tug driver after he disconnected for our wave-off. The wind was blowing excessively hard and I had my mind on the departure rather than my immediate tasks. It was however my responsibility to perform the checklist. During engine start and immediately afterwards; the first officer is extremely busy. He is ensuring that the engines are starting correctly as well as ensuring that the ground personnel are clear of the aircraft. The after start checklist usually occurs right at the same time we are beginning to taxi and my attention is divided between avoiding a wing strike or the location of our ramp personnel and performing the checklists. I need to slow down and be more deliberate while still ensuring that we are not going to damage the aircraft or harm our ramp staff.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 flight crew experiences an L and R Bleed EICAS message during climb. Examining the overhead panel reveals that the packs are off and the bleeds are off and the APU is running; indicating the after start checklist was never accomplished. The switches are set right and the flight continues to destination.

Narrative: Upon climbing out; we observed an L BLEED EICAS message; followed by an R BLEED message. We noticed the aircraft was not pressurizing so we told ATC we needed to level off at 11000. The cabin pressure continued to climb so we initiated a descent to 8000. We then received a CABIN ALT warning message as we were descending. When I started the QRH procedure; I noticed that the packs were off and the APU was running with the isolation valve open. In short; I had neglected to perform the after start checklist; even though the captain had called for it. There were several distracting factors during and after the engine start but the failure to complete the checklist was my responsibility. We corrected the settings for the pressurization system and once the aircraft cabin was stable continued to destination. During both our descent down to 8000 and our subsequent climb the aircraft exceeded 250 knots below 10;000 feet. The event was caused by my failure to complete the after start checklist. I had just completed [training] the day before this trip but I was also off work for three weeks prior to my training. I was also distracted by events during and after starting the engines. The wind was gusting up to 40 knots before our departure. We delayed the engine start until the aircraft was facing into the wind to prevent a hot start; thus changing the normal pace of operations. Also; we had a difficult time finding the tug driver after he disconnected for our wave-off. The wind was blowing excessively hard and I had my mind on the departure rather than my immediate tasks. It was however my responsibility to perform the checklist. During engine start and immediately afterwards; the FO is extremely busy. He is ensuring that the engines are starting correctly as well as ensuring that the ground personnel are clear of the aircraft. The after start checklist usually occurs right at the same time we are beginning to taxi and my attention is divided between avoiding a wing strike or the location of our ramp personnel and performing the checklists. I need to slow down and be more deliberate while still ensuring that we are not going to damage the aircraft or harm our ramp staff.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.