 |
37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
A maintenance controller reports he missed a 'note' on an engineering repair order (ero) for an R-1 door threshold crack deferral that stated the ero was 'not effective' for B737-900ER aircraft. Adding to the confusion; a later entry by maintenance had revised the ero without informing maintenance control.
| Attributes | |
| ACN | 1207992 |
| Time | |
| Date | 201409 |
| Place | |
| Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
| State Reference | US |
| Aircraft 1 | |
| Make Model Name | B737-900 |
| Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
| Flight Phase | Parked |
| Component | |
| Aircraft Component | Fuselage Door Frame |
| Person 1 | |
| Function | Other / Unknown |
| Qualification | Maintenance Powerplant Maintenance Airframe |
| Events | |
| Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
ZZZ maintenance found a 1.5 inch crack on the R-1 door threshold. They referenced engineering repair order (ero) 53-xx as the document to place the threshold crack on a deferral requiring repetitive inspections. When I reviewed the document before issuing the deferral; I missed that the ero was not effective for a 737-900ER. Sometime after the deferral was issued; someone from ZZZ maintenance entered into the maintenance computer program a revised ero with a 'check each flight' inspection requirement but failed to notify anyone in maintenance control of the change.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A Maintenance Controller reports he missed a 'note' on an Engineering Repair Order (ERO) for an R-1 door threshold crack deferral that stated the ERO was 'not effective' for B737-900ER aircraft. Adding to the confusion; a later entry by Maintenance had revised the ERO without informing Maintenance Control.
Narrative: ZZZ Maintenance found a 1.5 inch crack on the R-1 door threshold. They referenced Engineering Repair Order (ERO) 53-XX as the document to place the threshold crack on a deferral requiring Repetitive Inspections. When I reviewed the document before issuing the Deferral; I missed that the ERO was not effective for a 737-900ER. Sometime after the Deferral was issued; someone from ZZZ Maintenance entered into the Maintenance Computer program a revised ERO with a 'check each flight' inspection requirement but failed to notify anyone in Maintenance Control of the change.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.