Narrative:

The plane was late inbound and also carried an ACARS inoperative MEL. Otherwise everything else was normal for the plane. It was our (first officer and myself) first flight of the day and first flight together. Everything was normal until we started our descent into ZZZ [our destination]. Somewhere between FL360 and FL320 during our descent; and a total fuel load of 3600lbs; we received a fuel 1 low level EICAS master warning. Our nose pitch was approx. 5 degrees down. We ran the QRH and it was clear this message would necessitate a diversion for the obvious safety implications. We leveled per our clearance at FL320 and had slowed to long range cruise. After a few moments the warning message had disappeared. At this point we were about 50nm south of ZZZ1; 90nm north or ZZZ2; and 120nm northeast of ZZZ (approx. Positions.) since the message no longer persisted we elected to continue to our destination. We received a second descent into the mid 20s and once established the EICAS warning came back. At this point we were almost equal distance from ZZZ and ZZZ2 (within 15 miles either way with ZZZ2 being closer). We immediately {advised ATC] and asked for direct to the ZZZ airport. We also kept the flight attendant in the loop and once the situation had stabilized we ran through the NTSB checklist with her. The fuel totalizer and FMS fob number were in agreement so we were thinking that this was all due to a faulty sensor (or system component). However we were also acutely aware that the fuel level sensor could be faulty leading to incorrect assumptions about our true fuel remaining.as our descent continued the master warning once again disappeared from the EICAS and this time it stayed off for the remainder of the flight. We elected for a flaps 22 landing on the off chance we lost the #1 engine and briefed the likely scenarios that would follow that during our approach briefing. We were cleared for a visual approach in ZZZ and we kept the base leg inside the outer marker. It was a normal landing and roll out and we were greeted by emergency equipment and personnel. Once clear of the runway we notified ATC that we no longer required assistance and taxied to gate where we were met by maintenance. The last thing we did was stick the tanks to verify the accuracy of the fuel level indications which proved to be working correctly. In the end; it was a system component failure that necessitated this emergency and not an actual low fuel situation. Two major threats come to mind when reflecting back upon this event. The biggest one is our ACARS being on MEL which made it very difficult to keep dispatch in the loop and also consult with maintenance. The second threat is the lack of response when we tried to call commercial radio (on several different frequencies). We were left with calling the station and asking them to notify our company of the situation. An emergency this close to landing adds even more stress and greatly increases the work load of both crew members. Couple that with the lack of ACARS functionality and the situation had more variables than it otherwise should have. Also; we did not receive a fuel slip when we departed. This would have been useful information as we could have verified how much fuel was uploaded. My biggest take away is how much the lack of ACARS can increase the stress level and the workload of both the pilot flying and the pilot monitoring. I would suggest that the company fix these mels in a more timely manner as this particular one had been on MEL for 2 days. In addition; I will actively seek out the fuel slip as this piece of information would have been helpful when dealing with a low fuel warning.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An EMB-145 EICAS intermittently alerted FUEL 1 LOW LEVEL during descent; so the crew; uncertain about the actual fuel state advised ATC and after landing dipped the tank which revealed a faulty totalizer.

Narrative: The plane was late inbound and also carried an ACARS INOP MEL. Otherwise everything else was normal for the plane. It was our (First Officer and myself) first flight of the day and first flight together. Everything was normal until we started our descent into ZZZ [our destination]. Somewhere between FL360 and FL320 during our descent; and a total fuel load of 3600lbs; we received a FUEL 1 LOW LEVEL EICAS master warning. Our nose pitch was approx. 5 degrees down. We ran the QRH and it was clear this message would necessitate a diversion for the obvious safety implications. We leveled per our clearance at FL320 and had slowed to long range cruise. After a few moments the warning message had disappeared. At this point we were about 50nm South of ZZZ1; 90nm N or ZZZ2; and 120nm NE of ZZZ (approx. Positions.) Since the message no longer persisted we elected to continue to our destination. We received a second descent into the mid 20s and once established the EICAS warning came back. At this point we were almost equal distance from ZZZ and ZZZ2 (within 15 miles either way with ZZZ2 being closer). We immediately {advised ATC] and asked for direct to the ZZZ airport. We also kept the flight attendant in the loop and once the situation had stabilized we ran through the NTSB checklist with her. The fuel totalizer and FMS FOB number were in agreement so we were thinking that this was all due to a faulty sensor (or system component). However we were also acutely aware that the fuel level sensor could be faulty leading to incorrect assumptions about our true fuel remaining.As our descent continued the master warning once again disappeared from the EICAS and this time it stayed off for the remainder of the flight. We elected for a flaps 22 landing on the off chance we lost the #1 engine and briefed the likely scenarios that would follow that during our approach briefing. We were cleared for a visual approach in ZZZ and we kept the base leg inside the outer marker. It was a normal landing and roll out and we were greeted by emergency equipment and personnel. Once clear of the runway we notified ATC that we no longer required assistance and taxied to gate where we were met by maintenance. The last thing we did was stick the tanks to verify the accuracy of the fuel level indications which proved to be working correctly. In the end; it was a system component failure that necessitated this emergency and not an actual low fuel situation. Two major threats come to mind when reflecting back upon this event. The biggest one is our ACARS being on MEL which made it very difficult to keep dispatch in the loop and also consult with maintenance. The second threat is the lack of response when we tried to call Commercial Radio (on several different frequencies). We were left with calling the station and asking them to notify our company of the situation. An emergency this close to landing adds even more stress and greatly increases the work load of both crew members. Couple that with the lack of ACARS functionality and the situation had more variables than it otherwise should have. Also; we did not receive a fuel slip when we departed. This would have been useful information as we could have verified how much fuel was uploaded. My biggest take away is how much the lack of ACARS can increase the stress level and the workload of both the pilot flying and the pilot monitoring. I would suggest that the company fix these MELs in a more timely manner as this particular one had been on MEL for 2 days. In addition; I will actively seek out the fuel slip as this piece of information would have been helpful when dealing with a low fuel warning.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.