Narrative:

Arrival conditions in chicago were IFR in clouds and light to moderate rain with continuous light and occasional moderate turbulence. After a one hour edct delay on the ground; we arrived in the chicago terminal area and were issued vectors to the GPS Z approach to runway 22L. Outside of the keeel intersection; we heard the tower controller give line up and wait runway 22L instructions to a B737. After we crossed keeel and made visual contact with the airport; we saw the boeing 737 on our runway. Between keeel and zudvi; the tower controller asked us if we had the airport in sight; to which we responded in the affirmative. He then instructed us to sidestep to land runway 22R and issued us a landing clearance to that runway. The available runway for landing on [runway] 22R is 4;629 ft. Our factored wet landing distance was approximately 4;500 ft. Our SOP and sms declare a minimum runway length for our use of 5;000 ft unless a written risk analysis is completed and approved by management prior to the use of said runway. After an hour delay getting a sequence into chicago; the ramifications of a go around were obvious. Our options were to decline the sidestep to [runway] 22R and face at the best; the wake turbulence of the B737; or decline [runway] 22R and take the go-around and possibly hold for another hour in the turbulence waiting to get back in the sequence for runway 22L; or do what we did. With fluctuating weather conditions and the turbulence; we elected to land on [runway] 22R and complete this written report as well as an exceedance report for out sms. I strongly suspect that the tower controller was more than aware of the situation he was putting us in when he taxied the B737 into position. He used the situation and the conditions to put pressure on us to accept a runway of marginal length and of possible contamination. This is from an airport that not too long ago had a B737 out in an adjoining street with an associated fatality. Is flow a more motivating factor for mdw tower controllers than safety? Had we known prior to commencing the approach that the sidestep was imminent; at least we could have made a more thorough in cockpit analysis of the associated risks and had an opportunity to mitigate them. If mdw tower purposely taxied the B737 into position and deliberately delayed notifying us of the sidestep when he had prior knowledge that it would happen; his conduct is at best reprehensible. If ATC management at mdw endorses his behavior; they too have grossly misplaced their priorities.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CL300 Captain reports being issued a sidestep to Runway 22R after the Tower puts a B737 in position on Runway 22L at MDW. The runway length does not meet the runway length required by company SOP but is accepted by the Captain rather than go-around or land in the wake turbulence of the B737.

Narrative: Arrival conditions in Chicago were IFR in clouds and light to moderate rain with continuous light and occasional moderate turbulence. After a one hour EDCT delay on the ground; we arrived in the Chicago terminal area and were issued vectors to the GPS Z approach to Runway 22L. Outside of the KEEEL Intersection; we heard the Tower Controller give line up and wait Runway 22L instructions to a B737. After we crossed KEEEL and made visual contact with the airport; we saw the Boeing 737 on our runway. Between KEEEL and ZUDVI; the Tower Controller asked us if we had the airport in sight; to which we responded in the affirmative. He then instructed us to sidestep to land Runway 22R and issued us a landing clearance to that runway. The available runway for landing on [Runway] 22R is 4;629 FT. Our factored wet landing distance was approximately 4;500 FT. Our SOP and SMS declare a minimum runway length for our use of 5;000 FT unless a written risk analysis is completed and approved by management prior to the use of said runway. After an hour delay getting a sequence into Chicago; the ramifications of a go around were obvious. Our options were to decline the sidestep to [Runway] 22R and face at the best; the wake turbulence of the B737; or decline [Runway] 22R and take the go-around and possibly hold for another hour in the turbulence waiting to get back in the sequence for Runway 22L; or do what we did. With fluctuating weather conditions and the turbulence; we elected to land on [Runway] 22R and complete this written report as well as an exceedance report for out SMS. I strongly suspect that the Tower Controller was more than aware of the situation he was putting us in when he taxied the B737 into position. He used the situation and the conditions to put pressure on us to accept a runway of marginal length and of possible contamination. This is from an airport that not too long ago had a B737 out in an adjoining street with an associated fatality. Is flow a more motivating factor for MDW Tower controllers than safety? Had we known prior to commencing the approach that the sidestep was imminent; at least we could have made a more thorough in cockpit analysis of the associated risks and had an opportunity to mitigate them. If MDW Tower purposely taxied the B737 into position and deliberately delayed notifying us of the sidestep when he had prior knowledge that it would happen; his conduct is at best reprehensible. If ATC management at MDW endorses his behavior; they too have grossly misplaced their priorities.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.