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| Attributes | |
| ACN | 1196921 |
| Time | |
| Date | 201408 |
| Local Time Of Day | 0001-0600 |
| Place | |
| Locale Reference | SEA.Airport |
| State Reference | WA |
| Aircraft 1 | |
| Make Model Name | B737-700 |
| Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
| Flight Phase | Takeoff |
| Flight Plan | IFR |
| Component | |
| Aircraft Component | Pitot/Static Ice System |
| Person 1 | |
| Function | Pilot Not Flying Captain |
| Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
| Events | |
| Anomaly | Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
Conducted low speed rejected takeoff due to master caution light. Discovered the pitot probe heat switches were off. Redid the after start; taxi; and takeoff checklists. Notified dispatch and departed. After push back; I elected to do the delayed engine [start] checklist and taxi out single engine. The first officer started the #2 engine and I called for the after start checklist; while the push crew was still connected. Activity outside the aircraft by the push crew redirected my attention away from the checklist and I missed getting the pitot probe switches on. My decision to call for the after-start checklist while I was monitoring the push back was a contributing factor; as well as workload distribution and cross verification.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B737-700 Captain reports forgetting to turn on the pitot heat switches after engine start and responding without checking at the checklist prompt. As takeoff thrust is set a Master Caution Light illuminates due to the omission; and the takeoff is rejected.
Narrative: Conducted low speed rejected takeoff due to Master Caution Light. Discovered the Pitot Probe Heat switches were off. Redid the After Start; Taxi; and Takeoff checklists. Notified Dispatch and departed. After push back; I elected to do the Delayed Engine [Start] Checklist and taxi out single engine. The First Officer started the #2 engine and I called for the After Start checklist; while the push crew was still connected. Activity outside the aircraft by the push crew redirected my attention away from the checklist and I missed getting the Pitot Probe switches on. My decision to call for the After-Start Checklist while I was monitoring the push back was a contributing factor; as well as workload distribution and cross verification.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.