Narrative:

En route to deadhorse airport (scc) crew monitored ATIS which reported possibility of caribou in vicinity. We asked FSS to check the runway for caribou by calling on 122.2 above 10,000'. Tops were about 1000' and RVR was 1800. We stayed in contact with FSS (requesting status of a recent fdc NOTAM for scc) while still being worked by zan on 134.4. FSS called us at about 8 mi out with a long narrative about the NOTAM. I talked to FSS while first officer (at controls) received final intercept heading and approach clearance from center. #1 communication radio was switched to 123.6, while #2 communication remained on 122.2, on which FSS was still talking. Both radios remained tuned to these 2 FSS frequencys until engine shutdown. FSS ceased explaining the fdc NOTAM about 1200' and we continued approach, seeing approach lights about 50' above decision height, and the runway 04 threshold by decision height. A normal touchdown was made by first officer, and rollout was normal to approximately runway midpoint, at which point first officer directed my attention to a yellow state of alaska pickup truck sighted on right side of runway, inside the lights. First officer maneuvered the aircraft to left of centerline as truck steered to right as we passed the vehicle. Clearing runway I asked FSS about the truck and they appeared to have no knowledge of it. After shutdown I spoke with truck driver who stated that he had been asked by FSS on phone to check for caribou and had not used his radio or contacted FSS prior to going on runway because he thought that FSS meant we were '17 minutes out' when they meant we were 17 mi out on final. A phone conversation confirmed that FSS had phoned the state to get a runway status, but that they were unaware that the truck was on or near the runway. Normal procedure was for a vehicle to make radio contact prior to entering any taxiway or runway surface, and maintain contact until well clear. The driver was a state mechanic who did not normally do such 'sweeps' but did it as a favor to FSS. A large decal or sticker on the glove box or dashboard of all state vehicles requiring radio contact with FSS would have prevented this potentially dangerous situation, since FSS and we would have monitored his presence on 123.6. Supplemental information from acn 119651: this could have been avoided if caribou access to runway 4-22 at the deadhorse airport was controled.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MLG ACFT ON LNDG ROLLOUT AVOIDED AN ARPT VEHICLE THAT MOVED OFF RWY TO AVOID THE ACFT.

Narrative: ENRTE TO DEADHORSE ARPT (SCC) CREW MONITORED ATIS WHICH REPORTED POSSIBILITY OF CARIBOU IN VICINITY. WE ASKED FSS TO CHECK THE RWY FOR CARIBOU BY CALLING ON 122.2 ABOVE 10,000'. TOPS WERE ABOUT 1000' AND RVR WAS 1800. WE STAYED IN CONTACT WITH FSS (REQUESTING STATUS OF A RECENT FDC NOTAM FOR SCC) WHILE STILL BEING WORKED BY ZAN ON 134.4. FSS CALLED US AT ABOUT 8 MI OUT WITH A LONG NARRATIVE ABOUT THE NOTAM. I TALKED TO FSS WHILE F/O (AT CONTROLS) RECEIVED FINAL INTERCEPT HDG AND APCH CLRNC FROM CENTER. #1 COM RADIO WAS SWITCHED TO 123.6, WHILE #2 COM REMAINED ON 122.2, ON WHICH FSS WAS STILL TALKING. BOTH RADIOS REMAINED TUNED TO THESE 2 FSS FREQS UNTIL ENGINE SHUTDOWN. FSS CEASED EXPLAINING THE FDC NOTAM ABOUT 1200' AND WE CONTINUED APCH, SEEING APCH LIGHTS ABOUT 50' ABOVE DECISION HEIGHT, AND THE RWY 04 THRESHOLD BY DECISION HEIGHT. A NORMAL TOUCHDOWN WAS MADE BY F/O, AND ROLLOUT WAS NORMAL TO APPROX RWY MIDPOINT, AT WHICH POINT F/O DIRECTED MY ATTN TO A YELLOW STATE OF ALASKA PICKUP TRUCK SIGHTED ON RIGHT SIDE OF RWY, INSIDE THE LIGHTS. F/O MANEUVERED THE ACFT TO LEFT OF CENTERLINE AS TRUCK STEERED TO RIGHT AS WE PASSED THE VEHICLE. CLEARING RWY I ASKED FSS ABOUT THE TRUCK AND THEY APPEARED TO HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE OF IT. AFTER SHUTDOWN I SPOKE WITH TRUCK DRIVER WHO STATED THAT HE HAD BEEN ASKED BY FSS ON PHONE TO CHECK FOR CARIBOU AND HAD NOT USED HIS RADIO OR CONTACTED FSS PRIOR TO GOING ON RWY BECAUSE HE THOUGHT THAT FSS MEANT WE WERE '17 MINUTES OUT' WHEN THEY MEANT WE WERE 17 MI OUT ON FINAL. A PHONE CONVERSATION CONFIRMED THAT FSS HAD PHONED THE STATE TO GET A RWY STATUS, BUT THAT THEY WERE UNAWARE THAT THE TRUCK WAS ON OR NEAR THE RWY. NORMAL PROC WAS FOR A VEHICLE TO MAKE RADIO CONTACT PRIOR TO ENTERING ANY TXWY OR RWY SURFACE, AND MAINTAIN CONTACT UNTIL WELL CLEAR. THE DRIVER WAS A STATE MECHANIC WHO DID NOT NORMALLY DO SUCH 'SWEEPS' BUT DID IT AS A FAVOR TO FSS. A LARGE DECAL OR STICKER ON THE GLOVE BOX OR DASHBOARD OF ALL STATE VEHICLES REQUIRING RADIO CONTACT WITH FSS WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THIS POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS SITUATION, SINCE FSS AND WE WOULD HAVE MONITORED HIS PRESENCE ON 123.6. SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FROM ACN 119651: THIS COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF CARIBOU ACCESS TO RWY 4-22 AT THE DEADHORSE ARPT WAS CTLED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.