Narrative:

We were cleared for the FMS bridge visual 28R in sfo. We began to execute the approach (l-a-V-south; with the altitude set to 1;200 which is end of the approach at F101D). We were at 210 KIAS beginning the approach when ATC gave us a traffic advisory to look for an aircraft landing on [runway] 28L. We told him we had traffic and airport in sight. ATC told us to slow down to 160 KIAS and not to overtake landing traffic on [runway] 28L; ATC also cleared us to land. The captain had to take VNAV off and initially used V/south (-200) along with the speed breaks and landing gear lowered to slow the aircraft down below flap extension speeds. Once slower speeds were achieved the flaps were extended on schedule. After 160 KIAS was achieved I thought VNAV was rearmed. It was difficult to see because of the low sun on the horizon behind landing runway 28R and the extreme glare in the cockpit so it may be possible flight level change (flch) was activated instead of VNAV (after V/south was used to slow down). The approach continued with the aircraft leveling off at 1;200 ft around samul which has a 1;500 ft at or above restriction. ATC queried about our current altitude. I responded 1;200 ft. The rest of the approach went uneventful and we landed and taxied to the gate without incident. Preventive measures could have been ATC should have sequenced parallel aircraft better as to not have one aircraft need to slow down 50 KIAS as soon as possible while also descending of the approach profile. Also as a pilot monitoring I should have better backed up the pilot flying when VNAV was taken off to slow the plane down. Keeping the parallel landing aircraft in sight; the extreme sun glare in the cockpit along with configuring the aircraft for landing and doing the landing checklist all contributed to not seeing if VNAV was reengaged.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B757 crew flying the SFO FMS BRIDGE VISUAL 28R was asked to slow for traffic and while distracted configuring; slowing and monitoring traffic apparently selected FLCH which permitted the aircraft to descend below the MCP 1;500 FT SAMUL constraint.

Narrative: We were cleared for the FMS Bridge Visual 28R in SFO. We began to execute the approach (L-A-V-S; with the altitude set to 1;200 which is end of the approach at F101D). We were at 210 KIAS beginning the approach when ATC gave us a traffic advisory to look for an aircraft landing on [Runway] 28L. We told him we had traffic and airport in sight. ATC told us to slow down to 160 KIAS and not to overtake landing traffic on [Runway] 28L; ATC also cleared us to land. The Captain had to take VNAV off and initially used V/S (-200) along with the speed breaks and landing gear lowered to slow the aircraft down below flap extension speeds. Once slower speeds were achieved the flaps were extended on schedule. After 160 KIAS was achieved I thought VNAV was rearmed. It was difficult to see because of the low sun on the horizon behind landing Runway 28R and the extreme glare in the cockpit so It may be possible Flight Level Change (FLCH) was activated instead of VNAV (after V/S was used to slow down). The approach continued with the aircraft leveling off at 1;200 FT around SAMUL which has a 1;500 FT at or above restriction. ATC queried about our current altitude. I responded 1;200 FT. The rest of the approach went uneventful and we landed and taxied to the gate without incident. Preventive Measures could have been ATC should have sequenced parallel aircraft better as to not have one aircraft need to slow down 50 KIAS ASAP while also descending of the approach profile. Also as a pilot monitoring I should have better backed up the pilot flying when VNAV was taken off to slow the plane down. Keeping the parallel landing aircraft in sight; the extreme sun glare in the cockpit along with configuring the aircraft for landing and doing the landing checklist all contributed to not seeing if VNAV was reengaged.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.