Narrative:

After gear retraction; the captain noted that the number 2 hydraulic quantity was low. We continued to climb out and requested a clearance to circle the airport so that we could run checklist. Note that the preflight inspection showed no signs of a hydraulic leak. Also; the checklist prior to takeoff; indicated that the hydraulic quantities were appropriate. The captain; who was the pilot not flying; noted that the number 2 hydraulic quantity was one quart; with no associated caution lights. Upon gear retraction; a hydraulic line in the nose wheel well began leaking.we completed all checklist after takeoff and requested a right traffic pattern on runway 34. Then; we ran the loss of number 2 hydraulic quantity emergency checklist and stopped prior to the alternate gear extension checklist. We contacted maintenance. We asked if we should do a normal gear extension or the alternate extension. We were instructed to complete a normal gear extension. We decided to transfer controls in the event that we lost all [hydraulic] quantity and had to complete an alternate gear extension; which should be done from the right seat. Upon selecting gear 'down'; the gear came down normally; but the number 2 hydraulic quantity went to .7. Two caution lights illuminated: the number 2 iso valve and outboard roll spoilers. The landing gear doors also remained open. We landed on runway 34 due to favorable winds (runway 9 had only 6;500 ft of usable runway). [Incident] unavoidable per maintenance; the [hydraulic] flex line was within its cycle limitation. Loss of number 2 hydraulic quantity. Operated in degraded conditions. Air turnback. Flight cancelled.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Captain and First Officer return to a departure airport after noticing the Number 2 Hydraulic Quantity was down to one quart on their DHC-8-100 aircraft and no caution lights had illuminated. After Normal Gear Extension the Number 2 Hydraulic Quantity went to .7; Caution lights illuminated. Maintenance noticed a hydraulic flex line had failed in the Nose wheel well; even though the line was still within duty cycle limitations.

Narrative: After gear retraction; the Captain noted that the Number 2 Hydraulic Quantity was low. We continued to climb out and requested a clearance to circle the airport so that we could run checklist. Note that the Preflight Inspection showed no signs of a hydraulic leak. Also; the checklist prior to takeoff; indicated that the hydraulic quantities were appropriate. The Captain; who was the pilot not flying; noted that the Number 2 Hydraulic Quantity was one quart; with no associated caution lights. Upon gear retraction; a hydraulic line in the Nose Wheel Well began leaking.We completed all checklist after takeoff and requested a right traffic pattern on Runway 34. Then; we ran the loss of Number 2 Hydraulic Quantity Emergency Checklist and stopped prior to the Alternate Gear Extension Checklist. We contacted Maintenance. We asked if we should do a Normal Gear Extension or the Alternate Extension. We were instructed to complete a Normal Gear Extension. We decided to transfer controls in the event that we lost all [hydraulic] quantity and had to complete an Alternate Gear Extension; which should be done from the right seat. Upon selecting Gear 'Down'; the gear came down normally; but the Number 2 Hydraulic Quantity went to .7. Two Caution lights illuminated: the Number 2 ISO Valve and Outboard Roll Spoilers. The Landing Gear Doors also remained open. We landed on Runway 34 due to favorable winds (Runway 9 had only 6;500 FT of usable runway). [Incident] unavoidable per Maintenance; the [Hydraulic] Flex Line was within its cycle limitation. Loss of Number 2 Hydraulic Quantity. Operated in degraded conditions. Air Turnback. Flight cancelled.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.