Narrative:

I assumed responsibility of the sector. The off-going controller gave a somewhat ambiguous briefing. This is probably due to multiple controllers briefing the situation regarding aircraft X. I was briefed that aircraft X departed plch VFR; and the source of the departure information was ambiguous and/or no where to be found. Atop was showing the aircraft overdue on a position report (due to system requirement) and I asked the off-going controller if any paperwork had been started. The off-going controller also advised that no paperwork was started because the aircraft was VFR and that the flm on duty was aware of the situation. In the aircraft messages; there were minimal details on the situation because everything that occurred up to this point; had occurred via land line communication with somebody at plch. Much later on in my session; I was able to obtain a target for relay (aircraft Y) and utilized this aircraft to raise aircraft X. Aircraft Y was cpdlc equipped; I sent up links directly to the aircraft for aircraft X's clearance to phko. Aircraft Y was able to obtain aircraft X's present position lat/long and issue the IFR clearance. There were some other details that were confirmed and then I started utilizing arinc to conduct the relay; so that they were in the loop. After the aircraft confirmed their tarde est; aircraft Y lost communication with the aircraft. ZOA started incerfa and alerfa procedures after this loss of communication. Later in the session; I would have a two other aircraft that caused other problems and increased my workload/complexity substantially. I also went over 2 hours on position before being offered a break. I am not sure of the procedural specifics of incerfa or alerfa other than the over due time requirements. I think ZOA should have started something up on this aircraft 30 min (incerfa) and then 60 min (alerfa) after receipt of ambiguous departure time. If this aircraft went down; we could have had a more accurate search area by initiating our procedures sooner than later. Going over 2 hours on position could have been mitigated with better planning and notification to the crew on duty.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZOA Oceanic Controller reports of loss of communication with aircraft and finds another aircraft that relays its position to the Controller. Oceanic Controller then loses communication link with first aircraft again.

Narrative: I assumed responsibility of the sector. The off-going Controller gave a somewhat ambiguous briefing. This is probably due to multiple controllers briefing the situation regarding Aircraft X. I was briefed that Aircraft X departed PLCH VFR; and the source of the departure information was ambiguous and/or no where to be found. ATOP was showing the aircraft overdue on a position report (due to system requirement) and I asked the off-going Controller if any paperwork had been started. The off-going Controller also advised that no paperwork was started because the aircraft was VFR and that the FLM on duty was aware of the situation. In the aircraft messages; there were minimal details on the situation because everything that occurred up to this point; had occurred via land line communication with somebody at PLCH. Much later on in my session; I was able to obtain a target for relay (Aircraft Y) and utilized this aircraft to raise Aircraft X. Aircraft Y was CPDLC equipped; I sent up links directly to the aircraft for Aircraft X's clearance to PHKO. Aircraft Y was able to obtain Aircraft X's present position lat/long and issue the IFR clearance. There were some other details that were confirmed and then I started utilizing ARINC to conduct the relay; so that they were in the loop. After the aircraft confirmed their TARDE est; Aircraft Y lost communication with the aircraft. ZOA started INCERFA and ALERFA procedures after this loss of communication. Later in the session; I would have a two other aircraft that caused other problems and increased my workload/complexity substantially. I also went over 2 hours on position before being offered a break. I am not sure of the procedural specifics of INCERFA or ALERFA other than the over due time requirements. I think ZOA should have started something up on this aircraft 30 min (INCERFA) and then 60 min (ALERFA) after receipt of ambiguous departure time. If this aircraft went down; we could have had a more accurate search area by initiating our procedures sooner than later. Going over 2 hours on position could have been mitigated with better planning and notification to the crew on duty.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.