Narrative:

On departure roll; the captain stated; 'set power.' I checked the engine instruments and stated; 'power set.' the events that followed occurred rapidly as we were on the departure roll. I had noticed the captain pull back on the yoke. I was not sure of the reason for this. I did however initially assume it was to get the nose gear off of the runway center line lights. I did also notice the response of the aircraft control to be inadequate when he pulled back on the yoke. At that point; I began rapidly scanning for what may have been the problem. While scanning; I lost situational awareness of the airspeed. I don't recall if I had stated any further call outs after 'power set.' I don't recall if there was anything said or done on my part that may have initiated the situation. The captain pulled back on the yoke one or two more times with little or no control response. He began the abort sequence and commanded me to call the abort with the tower. As we were exiting the runway; the tower controller asked us if we were in need of any assistance. I informed him that we were not. He then instructed us to contact ground and to inform them that we were not in need of assistance. We informed ground that we needed to return to the gate. We were held on taxiway X until we received our gate assignment. While waiting I pulled out the immediate action checklist and ran the items for aborted takeoff. After verifying that the boxed items were complete; I proceeded to the QRH. While going through the checklist; I asked the captain if he needed me to make a PA to the passengers. He informed me that he already had. I did later realize however that I did not read out loud the checklist into the microphone of my headset. We were informed by company that we had a gate assignment and in turn; informed ground. We taxied back to the gate without further incident. There were some major threats and errors that led to the undesired aircraft state of the takeoff abort. The threat of this flight being the first flight of a four day trip after a set of off days for instance. The truth is that no matter how experienced an individual; it does sometimes take a little bit of time to get settled back into the routine. Routine being both a threat and error. Sometimes when things happen a certain way so often for so long; when there is a change; there is a slow reaction in recognition and correction. A very large threat to the event was the time constraint in that the departure roll is a very quick event. There was very little time if at all; to discuss what the problem was. It is better to abort the takeoff and figure out what the problem was later than to discuss the situation while losing runway. The fact is that we are humans and humans do make errors. The captain may have perceived a rotation call from something on the radio or I may have said something that may have initiated a rotation response from him. In either case; neither of us maintained situational awareness of the airspeed on the departure. Maintaining situational awareness alone could have prevented the takeoff abort.I do believe that the captain calling for the abort was the correct decision. Once something was recognized to be wrong; he decided to stop instead of continue. However; I do believe that there were lessons learned and/or relearned in this situation. Recognizing that alertness is not as high at the beginning of a trip or a day for that matter is very important. It means that one must be that much more diligent in their tasks. It also means to strive harder for maintaining situational awareness. Also that no matter how routine a task is there is always something different every time. Routine can also go from normal to abnormal very quickly. The moral is to expect the unexpected. Also; when it comes to crew communication; if I had queried the captain on the initial pull back of the yoke; there may have been time to remedy the situation then. I still think that the abort was the safer option. But I do believe that the key to this event was/is situational awareness. Remembering that there are times when it may need to be applied more diligently.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CRJ900 Captain rotated the aircraft at a low airspeed after he understood the First Officer to state V1; when in fact he said 'Power Set.' The aircraft would not rotate so the Captain rejected the takeoff.

Narrative: On departure roll; the Captain stated; 'Set power.' I checked the engine instruments and stated; 'Power set.' The events that followed occurred rapidly as we were on the departure roll. I had noticed the Captain pull back on the yoke. I was not sure of the reason for this. I did however initially assume it was to get the nose gear off of the runway center line lights. I did also notice the response of the aircraft control to be inadequate when he pulled back on the yoke. At that point; I began rapidly scanning for what may have been the problem. While scanning; I lost situational awareness of the airspeed. I don't recall if I had stated any further call outs after 'Power set.' I don't recall if there was anything said or done on my part that may have initiated the situation. The Captain pulled back on the yoke one or two more times with little or no control response. He began the abort sequence and commanded me to call the abort with the Tower. As we were exiting the runway; the Tower Controller asked us if we were in need of any assistance. I informed him that we were not. He then instructed us to contact Ground and to inform them that we were not in need of assistance. We informed Ground that we needed to return to the gate. We were held on Taxiway X until we received our gate assignment. While waiting I pulled out the Immediate Action Checklist and ran the items for Aborted Takeoff. After verifying that the boxed items were complete; I proceeded to the QRH. While going through the checklist; I asked the Captain if he needed me to make a PA to the passengers. He informed me that he already had. I did later realize however that I did not read out loud the checklist into the microphone of my headset. We were informed by Company that we had a gate assignment and in turn; informed Ground. We taxied back to the gate without further incident. There were some major threats and errors that led to the undesired aircraft state of the takeoff abort. The threat of this flight being the first flight of a four day trip after a set of off days for instance. The truth is that no matter how experienced an individual; it does sometimes take a little bit of time to get settled back into the routine. Routine being both a threat and error. Sometimes when things happen a certain way so often for so long; when there is a change; there is a slow reaction in recognition and correction. A very large threat to the event was the time constraint in that the departure roll is a very quick event. There was very little time if at all; to discuss what the problem was. It is better to abort the takeoff and figure out what the problem was later than to discuss the situation while losing runway. The fact is that we are humans and humans do make errors. The Captain may have perceived a rotation call from something on the radio or I may have said something that may have initiated a rotation response from him. In either case; neither of us maintained situational awareness of the airspeed on the departure. Maintaining situational awareness alone could have prevented the takeoff abort.I do believe that the Captain calling for the abort was the correct decision. Once something was recognized to be wrong; he decided to stop instead of continue. However; I do believe that there were lessons learned and/or relearned in this situation. Recognizing that alertness is not as high at the beginning of a trip or a day for that matter is very important. It means that one must be that much more diligent in their tasks. It also means to strive harder for maintaining situational awareness. Also that no matter how routine a task is there is always something different every time. Routine can also go from normal to abnormal very quickly. The moral is to expect the unexpected. Also; when it comes to crew communication; if I had queried the Captain on the initial pull back of the yoke; there may have been time to remedy the situation then. I still think that the abort was the safer option. But I do believe that the key to this event was/is situational awareness. Remembering that there are times when it may need to be applied more diligently.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.