Narrative:

I was acting as pilot flying while on approach to runway 36L at dfw. The approach was typical and stabilized. We were following an airbus A320 in visual conditions and had the aircraft in sight. The wind at the time of the incident was a quartering headwind. I believe a 10 knot additive was added to vref as calculated by recent reports. While in the landing flare approximately 10 feet from the runway surface we encountered what I would describe as 'severe wake turbulence'. The aircraft gained between 20 to 30 feet of altitude and experienced a desire to roll. Realizing that the landing must be rejected I called aloud 'go-around'. Since my eyes were already fixed down the runway during the flare I kept my sight picture outside; pushed the thrust levers to max power; rotated to approximately 10 degrees (takeoff sight picture); countered the roll moment; called for 'flaps 2' and then called aloud for 'positive rate; gear up' at the appropriate time. This entire moment took both of us by complete surprise. With the speed so low and the attitude of the plane upset I forced the throttles to max power without regard for the go-around button. When sufficient altitude had been gained I returned my attention to my pfd. I noticed that my flight director was still attempting to direct me on the localizer. I disregarded this information and flew a heading assigned by tower control and a pitch attitude at or near 10 degrees. The rest of the go-around procedure occurred as typically trained. We cleaned the airplane up; leveled at 3;000 feet; rejoined downwind; and made a successful visual approach and landing on 36L. I would suggest that more unanticipated balked landings occur during training. The 'startle factor' of a wake turbulence upset near the runway was intense. I believe this 'startle factor' was what led me to abandon my duty to push the go-around button; thus upsetting the normal flow for a go-around.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ERJ-170 Captain encountered 'severe' wake turbulence just before touchdown at DFW in trail of an Airbus A320. A somewhat confused and non-SOP go-around was executed.

Narrative: I was acting as pilot flying while on approach to Runway 36L at DFW. The approach was typical and stabilized. We were following an Airbus A320 in visual conditions and had the aircraft in sight. The wind at the time of the incident was a quartering headwind. I believe a 10 knot additive was added to Vref as calculated by recent reports. While in the landing flare approximately 10 feet from the runway surface we encountered what I would describe as 'severe wake turbulence'. The aircraft gained between 20 to 30 feet of altitude and experienced a desire to roll. Realizing that the landing must be rejected I called aloud 'go-around'. Since my eyes were already fixed down the runway during the flare I kept my sight picture outside; pushed the thrust levers to max power; rotated to approximately 10 degrees (takeoff sight picture); countered the roll moment; called for 'flaps 2' and then called aloud for 'positive rate; gear up' at the appropriate time. This entire moment took both of us by complete surprise. With the speed so low and the attitude of the plane upset I forced the throttles to max power without regard for the go-around button. When sufficient altitude had been gained I returned my attention to my PFD. I noticed that my flight director was still attempting to direct me on the localizer. I disregarded this information and flew a heading assigned by Tower Control and a pitch attitude at or near 10 degrees. The rest of the go-around procedure occurred as typically trained. We cleaned the airplane up; leveled at 3;000 feet; rejoined downwind; and made a successful visual approach and landing on 36L. I would suggest that more unanticipated balked landings occur during training. The 'startle factor' of a wake turbulence upset near the runway was intense. I believe this 'startle factor' was what led me to abandon my duty to push the go-around button; thus upsetting the normal flow for a go-around.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.