Narrative:

Maintenance delay. First swapped airplanes. Then maintenance found the battery switch cover missing and it turned out to 'not' be deferrable. They decided to swap switches with left flight control hydraulic shutoff switch and MEL that system with the valve locked 'open'. This was accomplished and signed off. I was quickly briefed by maintenance and was told there were no operational issues. A quick review of the MEL verified that. Many other distractions included other MEL items and the inevitable customer issues with agents and flight attendants. Lots of foreign and domestic connects pressuring us to get going. We re-ran all our checks after maintenance finished (after having shut down the airplane) and checklists. We pushed back over an hour late and taxied to runway. On the 'before takeoff check'; the first officer noticed a left flight cont hydraulic EICAS message; but we assumed it was associated with the locked hydraulic flight control valve. We noticed no other indications and took off. After takeoff and cleanup we [saw] on the EICAS display: left yaw damper and rudder ratio and associated lights. Ran and followed QRH checklists. In addition; we noticed an off light in the left flight control shutoff switch; the left flight cont hydraulic EICAS message was still there; and an elev left hydraulic press status message came up. We analyzed the situation and determined that the left flight control hydraulic valve had been locked 'closed' rather than 'open'. Looking at the QRH procedures we felt it would be safe to continue to ZZZ1 with QRH restrictions - primarily 15 knot crosswind restriction. In addition; the left flight control system was MEL'd because the switch had no guard. It would have been possible to restore the system by resetting the circuit breaker (circuit breaker) and turning the switch on if needed. We called maintenance control and brought in the dispatcher and duty manager. They later brought in a flight training manager and all concurred with that assessment. We safely continued and landed at ZZZ1. Flight deck systems interpretation. Operation in non-compliance. Fars. Interpretation of MEL.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Captain and First Officer report about their misunderstanding of a L FLT CONT HYD EICAS message that appeared during a rushed pre-departure check on a B757-200 aircraft. An MEL of the Left Hydraulic Flight Control Shutoff Valve switch clear cover guard required Maintenance to wire the valve to the 'Open' position. Aircraft departed with the Shutoff valve wired to the 'Closed' position.

Narrative: Maintenance delay. First swapped airplanes. Then Maintenance found the battery switch cover missing and it turned out to 'not' be deferrable. They decided to swap switches with Left Flight Control Hydraulic Shutoff switch and MEL that system with the valve locked 'Open'. This was accomplished and signed off. I was quickly briefed by Maintenance and was told there were no operational issues. A quick review of the MEL verified that. Many other distractions included other MEL items and the inevitable customer issues with agents and flight attendants. Lots of Foreign and Domestic connects pressuring us to get going. We re-ran all our checks after Maintenance finished (after having shut down the airplane) and checklists. We pushed back over an hour late and taxied to runway. On the 'Before Takeoff Check'; the First Officer noticed a L FLT CONT HYD EICAS message; but we assumed it was associated with the locked hydraulic Flight Control Valve. We noticed no other indications and took off. After takeoff and cleanup we [saw] on the EICAS display: L YAW DAMPER and RUDDER RATIO and associated lights. Ran and followed QRH checklists. In addition; we noticed an OFF light in the Left Flight Control Shutoff switch; the L FLT CONT HYD EICAS message was still there; and an ELEV L HYD PRESS Status message came up. We analyzed the situation and determined that the Left Flight Control Hydraulic Valve had been locked 'Closed' rather than 'Open'. Looking at the QRH procedures we felt it would be safe to continue to ZZZ1 with QRH restrictions - primarily 15 knot crosswind restriction. In addition; the Left Flight Control System was MEL'd because the switch had no guard. It would have been possible to restore the system by resetting the Circuit Breaker (CB) and turning the switch on if needed. We called Maintenance Control and brought in the Dispatcher and Duty Manager. They later brought in a Flight Training Manager and all concurred with that assessment. We safely continued and landed at ZZZ1. Flight Deck Systems interpretation. Operation in Non-compliance. FARs. Interpretation of MEL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.