Narrative:

At the time I was doing an over-the-shoulder skill check for recertification due to my lapse in currency in attending rtf training. This was my first day back and first session; that day; working traffic. Aircraft X had filed a flight plan direct from gtf to rap at 9;000. Prior to initial call for clearance; I knew that that because of the mvas in our airspace aircraft X would not be able to go direct to rap at 9;000; so I asked if he would be able to maintain 13;000. The pilot's response was 'negative.' the supervisor during the over-the-shoulder and I had talked about the altitude to clear the mvas previously and had been discussion 12;000; which was decided against due to the wrong altitude for direction of flight. So after the response in the negative I turned to the supervisor to inquire about how to proceed; being unsure because of my recent time away. The supervisor's response was for me to clear the aircraft at 9;000. It did not feel right; but I proceeded to clear the aircraft as filed at 9;000. We continued our discussion; because of my unsure feeling. I later asked the aircraft of his on course heading to rap to which he responded 106 as we looked at the MVA maps. The aircraft called for taxi and then for takeoff and he was cleared for both. I never involved the controller in charge in the discussion. The information that I did know was not [given] to the departure control about the aircraft being unable to maintain 13;000 and his on course heading as a result of the distraction of our discussion and later when the aircraft was having troubles with it transponder squawking the correct code. The error finally caught by the departure controller and center controller prior to the aircraft reaching an MVA higher than the aircrafts clearance.for myself; have the confidence to not allow or issue a clearance that does not meet the requirements for the safety of the flight even if I am given miss information. I should have involved someone outside of our discussion to bring a level head and new perspective to the problem such as the controller in charge. I could have also involve the center controller when I first became aware of the issue and inquired to the lowest possible altitude that they could accept the aircraft direct rap. Pass the information I did have directly to the departure controller sooner; so that they were aware of the problem and could have helped solve the issue before the aircraft called for taxi and other distractions arose. When I received the 'unable' response to 13;000; I should have asked the aircraft for the highest altitude he was able to maintain and then coordinated that information with departure and center controllers prior to issuing the clearance. Attention to the relationship dynamic with the controller in charge and a supervisor performing a function in the controller work area; a little closer attention by the controller in charge; even though the individual that has more experience is conducting the over-the-shoulder.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Reporter has problem with not knowing what to do when a pilot files an altitude on a route below the MVA.

Narrative: At the time I was doing an over-the-shoulder skill check for recertification due to my lapse in currency in attending RTF training. This was my first day back and first session; that day; working traffic. Aircraft X had filed a flight plan direct from GTF to RAP at 9;000. Prior to initial call for clearance; I knew that that because of the MVAs in our airspace Aircraft X would not be able to go direct to RAP at 9;000; so I asked if he would be able to maintain 13;000. The pilot's response was 'Negative.' The Supervisor during the over-the-shoulder and I had talked about the altitude to clear the MVAs previously and had been discussion 12;000; which was decided against due to the wrong altitude for direction of flight. So after the response in the negative I turned to the Supervisor to inquire about how to proceed; being unsure because of my recent time away. The Supervisor's response was for me to clear the aircraft at 9;000. It did not feel right; but I proceeded to clear the aircraft as filed at 9;000. We continued our discussion; because of my unsure feeling. I later asked the aircraft of his on course heading to RAP to which he responded 106 as we looked at the MVA maps. The aircraft called for taxi and then for takeoff and he was cleared for both. I never involved the CIC in the discussion. The information that I did know was not [given] to the Departure Control about the aircraft being unable to maintain 13;000 and his on course heading as a result of the distraction of our discussion and later when the aircraft was having troubles with it transponder squawking the correct code. The error finally caught by the Departure Controller and Center Controller prior to the aircraft reaching an MVA higher than the aircrafts clearance.For myself; have the confidence to not allow or issue a clearance that does not meet the requirements for the safety of the flight even if I am given miss information. I should have involved someone outside of our discussion to bring a level head and new perspective to the problem such as the CIC. I could have also involve the Center Controller when I first became aware of the issue and inquired to the lowest possible altitude that they could accept the aircraft direct RAP. Pass the information I did have directly to the Departure Controller sooner; so that they were aware of the problem and could have helped solve the issue before the aircraft called for taxi and other distractions arose. When I received the 'unable' response to 13;000; I should have asked the aircraft for the highest altitude he was able to maintain and then coordinated that information with Departure and Center controllers prior to issuing the clearance. Attention to the relationship dynamic with the CIC and a Supervisor performing a function in the controller work area; a little closer attention by the CIC; even though the individual that has more experience is conducting the over-the-shoulder.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.