Narrative:

This event report documents an A321 low energy landing. The flight was routine up to the top of descent. At that time I was the flying pilot. When it was time to start the managed arrival I pushed the altitude selector button on the FCU. At this point we suffered an FMGC1 malfunction which resulted in loss of my map display as well as a minor ECAM and loss of GPS primary positioning on the captain's side. This resulted in a transfer of control to the first officer. After that I took care of a minor cabin attendant pr ldg elev fault ECAM; which I assume was due to the FMGC1 problem. The first officer flew the arrival and the landing. When I briefed the arrival I had briefed a flaps 3 landing. I knew that the first officer liked to land with flaps set at full for his own reasons based on his experience with the A321. I asked him if he wanted to re-brief the landing for a flaps full configuration. He said that flaps 3 would be alright. At the 1;000 ft AGL call the first officer call 'stable' and I confirmed that we were on glide path and within a couple of knots on the low side of vapp. At the 500 ft call I called 'stable; reference minus 3 to 4'. Because we were a little slow I made a conscious decision to watch the airspeed as the A321 tends to be less forgiving if energy gets low. I made a call of 'reference minus 5' at some point closer in and another call of 'reference minus 8' as we were approaching 50 ft AGL. I was expecting the a/thr to have spooled the engines by now but it had not changed the trend downward in airspeed. I remember thinking don't touch the throttles when the 'retard' command is given but I did not say it. We landed hard and I was expecting a bounce but we did not get one. It was an ugly landing and it unnerved both of us. The weather was not a factor as far as I could tell. It was just an average day with light winds. I can not remember anything unusual about the gap between vls and the target speed. It must have looked pretty normal. I do remember looking at the vapp speed displayed on the first officer's mcdu since mine was not working and it showed 144 KTS which seemed about right. Which reminds me that the gross weight was showing amber X's on the lower ECAM display which is why I check vapp on the first officer's mcdu; because I was not sure that the automation was going to compute proper performance numbers for us. The 144 vapp seemed about right. The bottom line is that the airspeed drifted downward below vapp during the last 500 ft of the approach without the a/thr spooling up the engines. I had not seen this before. Up till now; I have experienced pretty reliable performance from the a/thr. Upon later reflection I wondered what a go around would have looked like. We were low on energy. The increase in thrust as well as increase in pitch for the go around would have put the tail of the aircraft very closed to the runway surface. I am reasonably sure we would have made contact with the runway; wheels first; during the go around. More a/thr off practice so it is more instinctive to intervene to skillfully restore proper energy during an approach in the middle of an approach. We are losing our ability to hand fly the airplane.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A321 Captain experienced a low energy approach with the autothrust system (and the pilot flying) allowing the airspeed to drop to Vref minus 8 approaching the flare; with a hard landing to follow.

Narrative: This event report documents an A321 low energy landing. The flight was routine up to the top of descent. At that time I was the flying pilot. When it was time to start the managed arrival I pushed the altitude selector button on the FCU. At this point we suffered an FMGC1 malfunction which resulted in loss of my map display as well as a minor ECAM and loss of GPS primary positioning on the Captain's side. This resulted in a transfer of control to the First Officer. After that I took care of a minor CAB PR LDG ELEV FAULT ECAM; which I assume was due to the FMGC1 problem. The First Officer flew the arrival and the landing. When I briefed the arrival I had briefed a Flaps 3 landing. I knew that the First Officer liked to land with flaps set at FULL for his own reasons based on his experience with the A321. I asked him if he wanted to re-brief the landing for a flaps FULL configuration. He said that flaps 3 would be alright. At the 1;000 FT AGL call the First Officer call 'stable' and I confirmed that we were on glide path and within a couple of knots on the low side of Vapp. At the 500 FT call I called 'stable; REF minus 3 to 4'. Because we were a little slow I made a conscious decision to watch the airspeed as the A321 tends to be less forgiving if energy gets low. I made a call of 'REF minus 5' at some point closer in and another call of 'REF minus 8' as we were approaching 50 FT AGL. I was expecting the A/THR to have spooled the engines by now but it had not changed the trend downward in airspeed. I remember thinking don't touch the throttles when the 'RETARD' command is given but I did not say it. We landed hard and I was expecting a bounce but we did not get one. It was an ugly landing and it unnerved both of us. The weather was not a factor as far as I could tell. It was just an average day with light winds. I can not remember anything unusual about the gap between Vls and the target speed. It must have looked pretty normal. I do remember looking at the Vapp speed displayed on the First Officer's MCDU since mine was not working and it showed 144 KTS which seemed about right. Which reminds me that the gross weight was showing amber X's on the lower ECAM display which is why I check Vapp on the First Officer's MCDU; because I was not sure that the automation was going to compute proper performance numbers for us. The 144 Vapp seemed about right. The bottom line is that the airspeed drifted downward below Vapp during the last 500 FT of the approach without the A/THR spooling up the engines. I had not seen this before. Up till now; I have experienced pretty reliable performance from the A/THR. Upon later reflection I wondered what a go around would have looked like. We were low on energy. The increase in thrust as well as increase in pitch for the go around would have put the tail of the aircraft very closed to the runway surface. I am reasonably sure we would have made contact with the runway; wheels first; during the go around. More A/THR OFF practice so it is more instinctive to intervene to skillfully restore proper energy during an approach in the middle of an approach. We are losing our ability to hand fly the airplane.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.