Narrative:

Pushback from gate on time, with a short taxi to the end of the runway for takeoff. No delays were anticipated, just as fast as the aircraft was prepared for takeoff, we'd be on takeoff roll. After engine start, it is company procedure to perform 'after start checklist', and set flaps for takeoff. Area was confined out of the gate. Flaps were called for as part of the 'litany', but the first officer was looking around to clear aircraft, and finishing up the checklist items, he didn't get around to actually setting the flaps. I was busy looking around to turn around. I didn't watch him move the flap handle. With the short taxi for takeoff and confined area, throttles were not advanced, just residual power was used for taxi. Since power was not advanced, takeoff warning horn did not sound to jog anyone's memory as to flap position. Takeoff checklist was called for and performed. However, distractions interrupted its proper performance. The CDU kept dumping the v-speeds, and there was discussion on the correctness of the count and accuracy of the 'zero fuel weight'. All the while, there was no delays for takeoff, just as fast as we could get done, we could go! We were cleared for takeoff (a rolling takeoff) and we finished the 'final' items on the checklist (normally done after clearance is received). The first officer hurriedly put the checklist away and took the controls (it was his leg), advanced the throttles for takeoff, and immediately got the takeoff warning horn! He quickly retarded the throttles (wisely) before I could take control and abort the takeoff, then I took control. He called aborting (to tower) then called out that the 'flaps were not set for takeoff'. We cleared the runway, slowly and properly prepared the aircraft for takeoff, taxied to the end of the runway, and proceeded normally. We screwed up! In our haste, we'd missed setting and/or checking the flaps. We also either skipped them on the checklist, or failed to resume the checklist after our interruptions until it was time to do the 'final items'. I think the latter was the case, but I can't remember precisely, this was an event where haste and human error entered into the 'normal routine', and it was left to the installed warning systems to prevent possible disaster! I am still doing some 'soul searching' because of this occurrence. Supplemental information from acn 115251: I think there were 2 factors which contributed to the incident: 1) 'rushed checklist' - this being the last day of the month the captain and I had been flying together, we had become fairly comfortable with each other's idiosyncrasies. One of the captain's was to call for the pre-takeoff check and to set the flaps prior to the first officer completing his after engine start checklists, setting the stage for a rushed environment. This particular incident was no different. 2) 'nonstandard flow' - on this occasion the CDU was dumping the takeoff speeds, which had to be manually entered. I had entered the speeds prior to pushback and engine start. After engine start and transfer of the electrical power from the APU to engine generators, the takeoff speeds 'dumped' which caught me off guard for the captain's early call for flaps and checklist. I reset the speeds, and entered the zero fuel weight in the CDU. I started the pre-takeoff check and when it came time to check the v-speeds, they had dumped again. I think this is where the checklist stopped. The flap check was several times down the checklist from the v-speed check.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACFT ABORTED TKOF AT LOW SPEED WHEN TKOF WARNING HORN ALERTED CREW THAT WING FLAPS WERE NOT EXTENDED FOR TKOF. FL FLYING. FO INTO FOURTH MONTH OF EXPERIENCE IN ACFT.

Narrative: PUSHBACK FROM GATE ON TIME, WITH A SHORT TAXI TO THE END OF THE RWY FOR TKOF. NO DELAYS WERE ANTICIPATED, JUST AS FAST AS THE ACFT WAS PREPARED FOR TKOF, WE'D BE ON TKOF ROLL. AFTER ENGINE START, IT IS COMPANY PROC TO PERFORM 'AFTER START CHECKLIST', AND SET FLAPS FOR TKOF. AREA WAS CONFINED OUT OF THE GATE. FLAPS WERE CALLED FOR AS PART OF THE 'LITANY', BUT THE F/O WAS LOOKING AROUND TO CLEAR ACFT, AND FINISHING UP THE CHECKLIST ITEMS, HE DIDN'T GET AROUND TO ACTUALLY SETTING THE FLAPS. I WAS BUSY LOOKING AROUND TO TURN AROUND. I DIDN'T WATCH HIM MOVE THE FLAP HANDLE. WITH THE SHORT TAXI FOR TKOF AND CONFINED AREA, THROTTLES WERE NOT ADVANCED, JUST RESIDUAL POWER WAS USED FOR TAXI. SINCE POWER WAS NOT ADVANCED, TKOF WARNING HORN DID NOT SOUND TO JOG ANYONE'S MEMORY AS TO FLAP POSITION. TKOF CHECKLIST WAS CALLED FOR AND PERFORMED. HOWEVER, DISTRACTIONS INTERRUPTED ITS PROPER PERFORMANCE. THE CDU KEPT DUMPING THE V-SPEEDS, AND THERE WAS DISCUSSION ON THE CORRECTNESS OF THE COUNT AND ACCURACY OF THE 'ZERO FUEL WEIGHT'. ALL THE WHILE, THERE WAS NO DELAYS FOR TKOF, JUST AS FAST AS WE COULD GET DONE, WE COULD GO! WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF (A ROLLING TKOF) AND WE FINISHED THE 'FINAL' ITEMS ON THE CHECKLIST (NORMALLY DONE AFTER CLRNC IS RECEIVED). THE F/O HURRIEDLY PUT THE CHECKLIST AWAY AND TOOK THE CONTROLS (IT WAS HIS LEG), ADVANCED THE THROTTLES FOR TKOF, AND IMMEDIATELY GOT THE TKOF WARNING HORN! HE QUICKLY RETARDED THE THROTTLES (WISELY) BEFORE I COULD TAKE CONTROL AND ABORT THE TKOF, THEN I TOOK CONTROL. HE CALLED ABORTING (TO TWR) THEN CALLED OUT THAT THE 'FLAPS WERE NOT SET FOR TKOF'. WE CLRED THE RWY, SLOWLY AND PROPERLY PREPARED THE ACFT FOR TKOF, TAXIED TO THE END OF THE RWY, AND PROCEEDED NORMALLY. WE SCREWED UP! IN OUR HASTE, WE'D MISSED SETTING AND/OR CHECKING THE FLAPS. WE ALSO EITHER SKIPPED THEM ON THE CHECKLIST, OR FAILED TO RESUME THE CHECKLIST AFTER OUR INTERRUPTIONS UNTIL IT WAS TIME TO DO THE 'FINAL ITEMS'. I THINK THE LATTER WAS THE CASE, BUT I CAN'T REMEMBER PRECISELY, THIS WAS AN EVENT WHERE HASTE AND HUMAN ERROR ENTERED INTO THE 'NORMAL ROUTINE', AND IT WAS LEFT TO THE INSTALLED WARNING SYSTEMS TO PREVENT POSSIBLE DISASTER! I AM STILL DOING SOME 'SOUL SEARCHING' BECAUSE OF THIS OCCURRENCE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FROM ACN 115251: I THINK THERE WERE 2 FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO THE INCIDENT: 1) 'RUSHED CHECKLIST' - THIS BEING THE LAST DAY OF THE MONTH THE CAPT AND I HAD BEEN FLYING TOGETHER, WE HAD BECOME FAIRLY COMFORTABLE WITH EACH OTHER'S IDIOSYNCRASIES. ONE OF THE CAPT'S WAS TO CALL FOR THE PRE-TKOF CHECK AND TO SET THE FLAPS PRIOR TO THE F/O COMPLETING HIS AFTER ENGINE START CHECKLISTS, SETTING THE STAGE FOR A RUSHED ENVIRONMENT. THIS PARTICULAR INCIDENT WAS NO DIFFERENT. 2) 'NONSTANDARD FLOW' - ON THIS OCCASION THE CDU WAS DUMPING THE TKOF SPEEDS, WHICH HAD TO BE MANUALLY ENTERED. I HAD ENTERED THE SPEEDS PRIOR TO PUSHBACK AND ENGINE START. AFTER ENGINE START AND TRANSFER OF THE ELECTRICAL POWER FROM THE APU TO ENGINE GENERATORS, THE TKOF SPEEDS 'DUMPED' WHICH CAUGHT ME OFF GUARD FOR THE CAPT'S EARLY CALL FOR FLAPS AND CHECKLIST. I RESET THE SPEEDS, AND ENTERED THE ZERO FUEL WEIGHT IN THE CDU. I STARTED THE PRE-TKOF CHECK AND WHEN IT CAME TIME TO CHECK THE V-SPEEDS, THEY HAD DUMPED AGAIN. I THINK THIS IS WHERE THE CHECKLIST STOPPED. THE FLAP CHECK WAS SEVERAL TIMES DOWN THE CHECKLIST FROM THE V-SPEED CHECK.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.