Narrative:

February 2014; aircraft X; an embraer aircraft; was found to have a defective left-hand (lh) bleed hose assembly upstream from fan air control valve. Aircraft X went aog; the part was expected to arrive later that night. Another embraer aircraft; aircraft Y; was found to be leaking fuel from the fuel pressure metering unit (fpmu) and went 'out of service'. The removal of the fpmu was started. Supervision decided to cannibalize (rob) the lh hose assembly upstream from the fan air control to be installed in aircraft X. The hose assembly was canned (robbed) [from aircraft Y] and as it was being installed in aircraft X; it was found defective [and removed]. The aog hose assembly [for aircraft X finally] arrived and was installed in aircraft X; operational check good. The aog bleed hose assembly for aircraft Y was due in about three hours later that night. The fpmu for aircraft Y was removed and the plane turned over to 3RD shift to install the fpmu. The fpmu was installed and ready for leak check later that night into the following morning. Due to the canned (robbed) part being aog and on the high temperature side of the bleed system; the check could not be done safely. Supervisor X asked me to install the [defective] canned [bleed hose assembly] part so the test runs could be done for the fpmu [on aircraft Y]. I told him we could not install known defective parts. About 15-minutes later he returned and said he wanted me to install the [defective bleed hose assembly] part and run the test. I again said we cannot install defective parts on the airplane; also the hose assembly was on the high temperature side of the bleed system. Ten minutes later supervisor X came in again; saying that the part was really just a reinstall and had not caused trouble in this plane [aircraft Y]. I reminded him that the part was [originally] canned (robbed) from aircraft Y and issued to aircraft X and found defective. It was no longer issued to aircraft Y [where it originally came from] and was known to be defective. The plane was turned over to dayshift. As I was leaving aircraft Y; supervisor Y pulled up and started to enter the cargo bay. Mr. X asked supervisor Y if he was going to install the [defective bleed hose assembly] part and supervisor Y said 'yes'. On returning to work two days later; I found out aircraft Y was run for the test run with the defective part installed. When the aog part arrived it was installed in aircraft X [not aircraft Y]. The installing of defective parts; even for testing; leaves too much room for error or unintended damage. It needs to be emphasized that a defective part should never be installed on an aircraft without an approved deferral. Lead mechanic. Defective part installed was issued to another plane and defective. I refused to install defective part; supervisor Y installed part.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Lead Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) reports about the reinstallation of a known; defective Left-Hand (L/H) Bleed Hose Assembly on an Embraer aircraft by a Maintenance Supervisor without an approved deferral. Lead Technician had refused three previous attempts by another Supervisor who wanted him to reinstall the defective hose assembly.

Narrative: February 2014; Aircraft X; an Embraer aircraft; was found to have a defective Left-Hand (LH) Bleed Hose Assembly upstream from Fan Air Control valve. Aircraft X went AOG; the part was expected to arrive later that night. Another Embraer aircraft; Aircraft Y; was found to be leaking fuel from the Fuel Pressure Metering Unit (FPMU) and went 'Out of Service'. The removal of the FPMU was started. Supervision decided to cannibalize (rob) the LH Hose Assembly upstream from the Fan Air Control to be installed in Aircraft X. The hose assembly was canned (robbed) [from Aircraft Y] and as it was being installed in Aircraft X; it was found defective [and removed]. The AOG hose assembly [for Aircraft X finally] arrived and was installed in Aircraft X; Operational Check good. The AOG Bleed Hose Assembly for Aircraft Y was due in about three hours later that night. The FPMU for Aircraft Y was removed and the plane turned over to 3RD Shift to install the FPMU. The FPMU was installed and ready for Leak Check later that night into the following morning. Due to the canned (robbed) part being AOG and on the high temperature side of the bleed system; the Check could not be done safely. Supervisor X asked me to install the [defective] canned [Bleed Hose Assembly] part so the Test runs could be done for the FPMU [on Aircraft Y]. I told him we could not install known defective parts. About 15-minutes later he returned and said he wanted me to install the [defective Bleed Hose Assembly] part and run the test. I again said we cannot install defective parts on the airplane; also the hose assembly was on the high temperature side of the Bleed System. Ten minutes later Supervisor X came in again; saying that the part was really just a reinstall and had not caused trouble in this plane [Aircraft Y]. I reminded him that the part was [originally] canned (robbed) from Aircraft Y and issued to Aircraft X and found defective. It was no longer issued to Aircraft Y [where it originally came from] and was known to be defective. The plane was turned over to Dayshift. As I was leaving Aircraft Y; Supervisor Y pulled up and started to enter the cargo bay. Mr. X asked Supervisor Y if he was going to install the [defective Bleed Hose Assembly] part and Supervisor Y said 'Yes'. On returning to work two days later; I found out Aircraft Y was run for the test run with the defective part installed. When the AOG part arrived it was installed in Aircraft X [not Aircraft Y]. The installing of defective parts; even for testing; leaves too much room for error or unintended damage. It needs to be emphasized that a defective part should never be installed on an aircraft without an approved deferral. Lead Mechanic. Defective part installed was issued to another plane and defective. I refused to install defective part; Supervisor Y installed part.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.