Narrative:

At the time of the incident, I had anywhere from 9-12 aircraft on the frequency. There was so much going on that the flow controller (tmc) started coordinating and accepting handoffs for me from the overhead position. Another controller (a developmental not checked out on radar) voluntarily sat down next to me, cleared all the flight strips from in front of me and placed them in a strip bay. He then proceeded to do strip marking for me, but later admitted that he was lost and couldn't keep up with my xmissions. We were just barely managing to work the airspace when the tmc accepted a manual handoff on small aircraft X, an small aircraft overflt from the west filed 1d2./.V8 mrb bwi at 7000'. I never saw the flight strip but I did notice that as soon as we accepted the handoff it started flashing 'rdr,' signifying (I think) that there was not a strong enough beacon return and that if I wanted to work the target as a radar (primary) track I should slew and enter again and the ARTS IIIA will track the primary. I'm very wary of radar tracks and mentioned this to the tmc. Well, I then got very busy but asked small aircraft X to report mrb VORTAC anticipating a loss of radar on the aircraft. Had I seen the flight strip, I would have ensured the pilot received the inserted PAR, +mrb V3 EMI+, which is according to LOA. After mrb the pilot was proceeding direct bwi instead of V3. I did not know this because the aircraft's a/north's had dropped off the scope and radar contact was lost approximately 5 mi west of mrb. We were using cp and the aircraft went tangential. There may have been some stc circuits being used as well. I just plain forgot about the aircraft. At the time, I had aircraft going wbound at 6000, 8000 and 10000', eastbound at 7000 (small aircraft X) and 9000', and 2 other nbnds handed off to me by different sectors at dulles converging on mrb, both at 7000'! Evidently small aircraft X had gone non radar at that point, unknown to all of us. I put the 2 northbound 7000's on parallel headings. Additionally, I had 1 practice approach at mrb 4000' and below, which I cajoled into making a full stop because of heavy workload. I was holding another aircraft west of fdk at 5000' because bwi didn't have room to hold in their airspace and would not accept the handoff--and then there were iad arrs southbound from robrt descending through all this mess. The developmental did not see small aircraft X on the radar scope so he discarded the ticket as dead wood. The flight strip was filed. When small aircraft X had a chance for a communication break he reported mrb as instructed. I looked up there for his tag and didn't see it. I then realized that I had forgotten about him. I shouted out that I had a non-radar at 7000' in the vicinity of mrb and we all started looking for a target. Well, a weak beacon return was sighted about 8 mi ese of mrb just about to hit another northbound light transport at the same altitude! I believe this aircraft's call sign was atx Y. In all the confusion, I had forgotten small aircraft X's call sign and asked for the flight strip. The developmental placed the wrong strip in front of me since he had filed the correct one and didn't realize it. It was the only GA aircraft flight strip he had at 7000'. I looked at the strip and told the aircraft to turn right to 190 degrees which I thought was the best escape to take. I got a response, but unfortunately I was talking to the wrong aircraft! I was in extremis and shouted the heading again since I saw no movement to diverge. By the time we all realized that I was using the wrong call sign, the targets had merged. After the targets passed one another we found the proper ticket. I was still busy with moderate to heavy traffic and continued to work the position for about another 20-30 mins.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: 2 ACFT AT SAME ALT IN IMC WITH LESS THAN STANDARD SEPARATION. SYSTEM ERROR.

Narrative: AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT, I HAD ANYWHERE FROM 9-12 ACFT ON THE FREQ. THERE WAS SO MUCH GOING ON THAT THE FLOW CTLR (TMC) STARTED COORDINATING AND ACCEPTING HDOFS FOR ME FROM THE OVERHEAD POS. ANOTHER CTLR (A DEVELOPMENTAL NOT CHKED OUT ON RADAR) VOLUNTARILY SAT DOWN NEXT TO ME, CLRED ALL THE FLT STRIPS FROM IN FRONT OF ME AND PLACED THEM IN A STRIP BAY. HE THEN PROCEEDED TO DO STRIP MARKING FOR ME, BUT LATER ADMITTED THAT HE WAS LOST AND COULDN'T KEEP UP WITH MY XMISSIONS. WE WERE JUST BARELY MANAGING TO WORK THE AIRSPACE WHEN THE TMC ACCEPTED A MANUAL HDOF ON SMA X, AN SMA OVERFLT FROM THE W FILED 1D2./.V8 MRB BWI AT 7000'. I NEVER SAW THE FLT STRIP BUT I DID NOTICE THAT AS SOON AS WE ACCEPTED THE HDOF IT STARTED FLASHING 'RDR,' SIGNIFYING (I THINK) THAT THERE WAS NOT A STRONG ENOUGH BEACON RETURN AND THAT IF I WANTED TO WORK THE TARGET AS A RADAR (PRIMARY) TRACK I SHOULD SLEW AND ENTER AGAIN AND THE ARTS IIIA WILL TRACK THE PRIMARY. I'M VERY WARY OF RADAR TRACKS AND MENTIONED THIS TO THE TMC. WELL, I THEN GOT VERY BUSY BUT ASKED SMA X TO RPT MRB VORTAC ANTICIPATING A LOSS OF RADAR ON THE ACFT. HAD I SEEN THE FLT STRIP, I WOULD HAVE ENSURED THE PLT RECEIVED THE INSERTED PAR, +MRB V3 EMI+, WHICH IS ACCORDING TO LOA. AFTER MRB THE PLT WAS PROCEEDING DIRECT BWI INSTEAD OF V3. I DID NOT KNOW THIS BECAUSE THE ACFT'S A/N'S HAD DROPPED OFF THE SCOPE AND RADAR CONTACT WAS LOST APPROX 5 MI W OF MRB. WE WERE USING CP AND THE ACFT WENT TANGENTIAL. THERE MAY HAVE BEEN SOME STC CIRCUITS BEING USED AS WELL. I JUST PLAIN FORGOT ABOUT THE ACFT. AT THE TIME, I HAD ACFT GOING WBOUND AT 6000, 8000 AND 10000', EBND AT 7000 (SMA X) AND 9000', AND 2 OTHER NBNDS HANDED OFF TO ME BY DIFFERENT SECTORS AT DULLES CONVERGING ON MRB, BOTH AT 7000'! EVIDENTLY SMA X HAD GONE NON RADAR AT THAT POINT, UNKNOWN TO ALL OF US. I PUT THE 2 NBOUND 7000'S ON PARALLEL HDGS. ADDITIONALLY, I HAD 1 PRACTICE APCH AT MRB 4000' AND BELOW, WHICH I CAJOLED INTO MAKING A FULL STOP BECAUSE OF HVY WORKLOAD. I WAS HOLDING ANOTHER ACFT W OF FDK AT 5000' BECAUSE BWI DIDN'T HAVE ROOM TO HOLD IN THEIR AIRSPACE AND WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE HDOF--AND THEN THERE WERE IAD ARRS SBND FROM ROBRT DSNDING THROUGH ALL THIS MESS. THE DEVELOPMENTAL DID NOT SEE SMA X ON THE RADAR SCOPE SO HE DISCARDED THE TICKET AS DEAD WOOD. THE FLT STRIP WAS FILED. WHEN SMA X HAD A CHANCE FOR A COM BREAK HE RPTED MRB AS INSTRUCTED. I LOOKED UP THERE FOR HIS TAG AND DIDN'T SEE IT. I THEN REALIZED THAT I HAD FORGOTTEN ABOUT HIM. I SHOUTED OUT THAT I HAD A NON-RADAR AT 7000' IN THE VICINITY OF MRB AND WE ALL STARTED LOOKING FOR A TARGET. WELL, A WEAK BEACON RETURN WAS SIGHTED ABOUT 8 MI ESE OF MRB JUST ABOUT TO HIT ANOTHER NBOUND LTT AT THE SAME ALT! I BELIEVE THIS ACFT'S CALL SIGN WAS ATX Y. IN ALL THE CONFUSION, I HAD FORGOTTEN SMA X'S CALL SIGN AND ASKED FOR THE FLT STRIP. THE DEVELOPMENTAL PLACED THE WRONG STRIP IN FRONT OF ME SINCE HE HAD FILED THE CORRECT ONE AND DIDN'T REALIZE IT. IT WAS THE ONLY GA ACFT FLT STRIP HE HAD AT 7000'. I LOOKED AT THE STRIP AND TOLD THE ACFT TO TURN RIGHT TO 190 DEGS WHICH I THOUGHT WAS THE BEST ESCAPE TO TAKE. I GOT A RESPONSE, BUT UNFORTUNATELY I WAS TALKING TO THE WRONG ACFT! I WAS IN EXTREMIS AND SHOUTED THE HDG AGAIN SINCE I SAW NO MOVEMENT TO DIVERGE. BY THE TIME WE ALL REALIZED THAT I WAS USING THE WRONG CALL SIGN, THE TARGETS HAD MERGED. AFTER THE TARGETS PASSED ONE ANOTHER WE FOUND THE PROPER TICKET. I WAS STILL BUSY WITH MODERATE TO HVY TFC AND CONTINUED TO WORK THE POS FOR ABOUT ANOTHER 20-30 MINS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.